Mandatory Statutory Member Rights¹ Relevant to CMSM² and Methods of Limiting the Exercise of Those Rights

| Statutory Member Right | | Limit on CMSM's exercise ³ | |
|------------------------|--|---|---|
| | | Proposed Vote in CMSM ⁴ | ICANN Board Action Required ⁵ |
| 1 | Elect directors | Per CCWG proposal | |
| 2 | Unilaterally set/change board size stated in the bylaws through a CMSM-initiated and approved bylaw amendment | Supermajority/consensus | |
| 3 | Remove directors without cause | Per CCWG proposal | |
| 4.a | Fill board vacancies as a result of director removal | Per CCWG proposal | |
| 4.b | Fill board vacancies caused by reasons other than removal | Per CCWG proposal | |
| 5 | Approve bylaw amendments which would materially and adversely affect the sole member's voting rights | Per CCWG proposal | |
| 6/7 | Unilaterally initiate and adopt amendments to bylaws that extend or increase the length of directors' terms; and Unilaterally adopt, amend, or repeal other bylaw provisions | Supermajority/consensus | |
| 8 | Approve amendments to articles of incorporation | ³ ⁄4 vote (same as for fundamental bylaws) | \checkmark |
| 9 | Amend governing documents to terminate member structure | Supermajority/consensus | |
| 10 | Approve indemnification of a corporate agent | majority | |

| | | Limit on CMSM's exercise ³ | |
|------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|---|
| Statutory Member Right | | Proposed Vote in CMSM ⁴ | ICANN Board Action Required ⁵ |
| 11.a | Bring suit to remove a director for fraud, dishonesty, abuse of authority, or breach of fiduciary duty | Supermajority/consensus | |
| 11.d | Bring suit against a third party in the corporation's name (a "derivative suit"), including an action to remedy a breach of charitable trust or against a director for self-dealing ⁶ | Supermajority/consensus | |
| 12 | Approve sale or disposition of all or substantially all assets | Supermajority/consensus | \checkmark |
| 13 | Approve merger | Supermajority/consensus | \checkmark |
| 14 | Petition for court-ordered involuntary dissolution of the corporation | Supermajority/consensus | |
| 15 | Elect to voluntarily dissolve the corporation | Supermajority/consensus | |
| 17 | Inspection rights | majority | |
| 18 | Member resignation | Supermajority/consensus | |

¹ For a full listing of all rights which must be granted to members of a California nonprofit public benefit corporation, see <u>Responses to Questions from</u> <u>Samantha Eisner from June 8, 2015</u>, As the sole statutory member of ICANN, the CMSM will have *all* the rights of a member under California corporate law that were listed in the table from the June 8 memorandum.

² Certain of the rights listed in the table to the June 8 memorandum, such as meeting or voting rights, are relevant only in multiple-member contexts, and are not applicable where a corporation has a sole member. Accordingly, these rights will not apply to the CMSM for practical purposes. Similarly, in the CMSM model, there will be no classes of members, so rights given to member classes will be inapplicable as well. We have not listed these rights herein, but they include rights relating to (11b/c) suits to resolve director/member deadlock, (19) due process for member expulsion, (21-28, 31) member meetings and voting, and (32) equality of member rights. We have also omitted for simplicity certain other member rights, such as the rights to (16) receive reports and (20,29) be protected from liabilities, and (30) the right to approve certain corporate obligations (which may, but need not, be provided to members in the Bylaws).

³ By limit on CMSM's exercise, we mean what sort of structural restraints exist to make sure that the exercise of powers by the CMSM will reflect the consensus of the community and have received full consideration. For certain actions—such as bylaw amendments or articles of incorporation amendments (including those which would eliminate the member structure), or approval of mergers or sales of substantially all the assets of the corporation--California law

allows third persons to be given approval rights, in addition to whatever member or Board approvals are otherwise required. These third persons could be participants in the CMSM or from outside the CMSM entirely.

⁴ The CMSM governing provisions that will be incorporated into the ICANN Bylaws can be as flexible as desired. These provisions can provide that the CMSM will exercise its statutory rights as the sole member of ICANN in the same manner as the other decisions under consideration. Thus, the decision to exercise any statutory right in the table could be made through the same community voting mechanism that will exist for making decisions to exercise the essential community powers, with the same SOs and ACs having the same number of votes. At the same time, however, if the CCWG-Accountability decides it would be preferable, each such right could have different requirements for its exercise by the CMSM, including the percentage of votes (available or cast) required to approve the CMSM's exercise of the right. We have indicated the rights where a higher threshold has been discussed, or would logically follow from the thresholds for similar rights, by "supermajority/consensus." Rights which might reasonably be exercised with a lower threshold, but which we are not aware have been discussed, are noted as "majority."

⁵ For certain actions, California corporate law *requires* the approval of *both* the member and the Board of Directors; neither can act without the other. These are marked in the table. This limitation on the power of CMSM as the sole member is not optional.

The power to require ICANN to enter into an IRP—as opposed to filing a derivative suit--would be accomplished by a simple majority vote.