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<h1><font size="2"><span style="font-weight:normal">Dear all</span></font></h1><div><font size="2"><span style="font-weight:normal">As promised on our call, I have prepared a paper on the decision-making thresholds matter for CCWG consideration.</span></font></div><div><font size="2"><span style="font-weight:normal"><br></span></font></div><div><font size="2"><span style="font-weight:normal">The paper itself is pasted below, and the attached versions in .docx and .pdf also include the decision table with thresholds etc. It is unchanged.</span></font></div><div><font size="2"><span style="font-weight:normal"><br></span></font></div><div><font size="2"><span style="font-weight:normal">Look forward to comments and discussion...</span></font></div><div><font size="2"><span style="font-weight:normal"><br></span></font></div><div><font size="2"><span style="font-weight:normal">best</span></font></div><div><font size="2"><span style="font-weight:normal">Jordan</span></font></div><div><font size="2"><span style="font-weight:normal"><br></span></font></div><div><font size="2"><span style="font-weight:normal"><br></span></font></div><h1>Community Decision-Making: Thresholds
Consideration</h1>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Calibri">18 November 2015</span></p>
<h3>Introduction</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Calibri">During its call #68
on 17 November, the CCWG discussed a scenario related to decision thresholds in
the Community Mechanism that has been raised by participants on the email list.
This discussion has happened a couple of times since it became clear at / after
Dublin that the RSSAC and SSAC would not be decisional participants in the
Community Mechanism. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Calibri"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Calibri">With these two groups
excluded, it is likely the Third Draft Proposal will specify the three SOs,
ALAC and GAC as the five “decisional participants” – groups that can express
support for or objection to the use of a community power & the engagement
process, or choose to express no view at all.</span></p>
<h3>The scenario</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Calibri">A version of this
scenario is as follows (this is entirely hypothetical):</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Calibri"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:36pt"><i><span style="font-family:Calibri">A proposed Annual
Operating Plan and Budget is approved by the Board even though substantial
community concerns about a particular project (Project X) related to generic
top level domains have not been taken into account.</span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:36pt"><i><span style="font-family:Calibri"> </span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:36pt"><i><span style="font-family:Calibri">The ALAC and the GNSO
follow the escalation path and convene a Conference call to discuss exercising
the Budget veto. Opposition continues to register.</span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:36pt"><i><span style="font-family:Calibri"> </span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:36pt"><i><span style="font-family:Calibri">The GAC joins the
group in favour of vetoing the Budget to call a Community Forum. Opposition
continues to register.</span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:36pt"><i><span style="font-family:Calibri"> </span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:36pt"><i><span style="font-family:Calibri">The ASO makes it
clear it has no interest in the level of funding for Project X, which is the
core of the dispute between Board and Community, and will not participate in
the decision. This means only four SOs and ACs are left to make decisions.</span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:36pt"><i><span style="font-family:Calibri"> </span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:36pt"><i><span style="font-family:Calibri">The ccNSO is split on
whether it is appropriate to make a decision on a gTLD names matter, and proves
unable to reach a decision by the end of the time allowed. This is even though
many ccTLD managers are opposed to Project X, and only a few support it.</span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:36pt"><i><span style="font-family:Calibri"> </span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:36pt"><i><span style="font-family:Calibri">The use of the
community power lapses with only three SOs supporting its use, none objecting,
and one not offering a decision (effectively, abstaining), so the Annual
Operating Plan and Budget go into effect. The community remains upset and
considers other options.</span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Calibri"> </span></p>
<h3>The problem</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Calibri">The concern raised by
this scenario is as follows:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Calibri"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:36pt"><b><span style="font-family:Calibri">By reducing the
number of decisional participants from seven groups to five groups, a <u>threshold
of four SOs and ACs expressing support to exercise a power is too high</u> (if
one of them is unable to participate). It is too high because it requires
complete unanimity among the rest, a threshold that is inconsistent with the
CCWG’s desire to avoid unanimity being required for the use of any of the
powers.</span></b></p>
<h3>Solving the problem</h3>
<p class=""><span style="font-family:Calibri">The approach I raised
for dealing with this issue proposed on the CCWG call on 17 November was as
follows:</span></p>
<p class="" style="margin-left:36pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri">For community powers that require consensus support from four SOs or ACs
to exercise the power (powers on Budget, Fundamental bylaws change, Board
recall and IANA Names functions separation), an exception should be added as
follows:</span></p>
<p class="" style="margin-left:36pt"><b><span style="font-family:Calibri">Where only four SOs
and ACs are participating in the decision to exercise the power (through
supporting it or objecting to it), the threshold required is only three (3)
SOs/ACs in favour, and no more than one objection.</span></b><span style="font-family:Calibri"></span></p>
<p class=""><span style="font-family:Calibri"> </span></p>
<p class=""><span style="font-family:Calibri">In essence, adding
this exception is a possible way to deal with the reduced number of
decision-makers (from seven to five), and reduce the likely number of cases
where unanimity might be required to use the relevant community powers. This
would in turn make sure the powers could be used, and so the incentive effects
they are designed to have on Board / Community cooperation would remain strong.</span></p>
<p class=""><span style="font-family:Calibri">This approach develops
what was in our Second Draft Proposal, where we suggested only counting
affirmative votes to hit support thresholds. Non-participation in that system
could also have led to unanimity among participants being a practical
requirement.</span></p>
<p class=""><span style="font-family:Calibri"><br>
Adopting this solution would be a <b>change</b>
to our decision-making approach and would be noted as such (compared with
Dublin, as this whole Dublin-based approach is new compared with the Second
Draft Proposal).</span></p>
<h3>The counter-argument & approach</h3>
<p class=""><span style="font-family:Calibri">A counter-argument to
this can be expressed as follows:</span><span style="font-family:Calibri"> </span></p>
<p class="" style="margin-left:36pt"><b><span style="font-family:Calibri">Regardless of the
reduced number of participants, the threshold should stay the same, because
only the strongest and broadest possible community support should allow the
exercise of the Community Powers for which a threshold of four SOs/ACs in
favour has been proposed.</span></b></p>
<p class=""><span style="font-family:Calibri">To give effect to
this approach, no changes need to be made to what we decided a week or two ago.</span></p>
<h3>Discussion</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Calibri">My view as rapporteur
is that this question is finely balanced. There are two competing principles:</span></p>
<p class="" style="text-indent: -18pt;"><span style="font-family:Symbol">·<span style="font-size:7pt;line-height:normal;font-family:'Times New Roman'"> </span></span><span style="font-family:Calibri">Making sure community powers can be used
without setting a threshold that practically requires unanimity </span></p>
<p class="" style="text-indent: -18pt;"><span style="font-family:Symbol">·<span style="font-size:7pt;line-height:normal;font-family:'Times New Roman'"> </span></span><span style="font-family:Calibri">Making sure community powers are only used
with widespread community consensus</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Calibri"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Calibri">As a CCWG participant,
I haven’t come to a firm conclusion. It seems like the proposed approach steps
back a little bit from high degrees of consensus (though they remain quite
high); on the other hand, not modifying in line with the proposed approach
risks leaving some of the powers practically un-useable, and that is not
desirable.</span></p>
<p class=""><span style="font-family:Calibri"> </span></p>
<p class=""><span style="font-family:Calibri">Jordan Carter, WP1
Rapporteur, CCWG</span></p>
<div><br></div>-- <br><div class="gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr" style="font-size:small">Jordan Carter<br><br>Chief Executive <br><b>InternetNZ</b><br></div><div dir="ltr" style="font-size:small"><br>+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob)<br>Email: <a href="mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz" style="color:rgb(17,85,204)" target="_blank">jordan@internetnz.net.nz</a> <br>Skype: jordancarter<br></div><div style="font-size:small">Web: <a href="http://www.internetnz.nz" target="_blank">www.internetnz.nz</a> </div><div dir="ltr" style="font-size:small"><br><i>A better world through a better Internet </i></div><br></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div>
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