<div dir="ltr"><div>Mathieu,</div><div>Thanks for your views.</div><div>It make the task more complex .</div><div>The issue was not as complex as you the one zou referred to are talking about.</div><div>If we follow this path ,we generate a new discussion and may end it up February 2017.</div><div>Regards Kavouss </div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">2016-01-20 20:29 GMT+01:00 Eric (Maule) Brunner-Williams <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net" target="_blank">ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net</a>></span>:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Mathieu,<br>
<br>
Thank you for the suggestion, however ... The authors and the various<br>
eventual applicants to ICANN in 2000 and 2004 and 2010 for delegations<br>
for linguistic and/or cultural and/or municipal and/or regional service<br>
registries, as I recall them did not, in general, frame the agreements<br>
they proposed within their eventual applications as being made for the<br>
purpose of competitive advantage in a contention process.<br>
<br>
The authors of the applications in 2010 for delegations other than those<br>
for linguistic and/or cultural and/or municipal and/or regional service<br>
registries, again, as I recall them, rationally evaluated whether their<br>
business models could be achieved under the (presumed enforced) restrictions<br>
of the "community-type" (which bobbled through each of the revisions of the<br>
draft AGB, in form, and in dispositive function).<br>
<br>
My point being that there are "voluntary commitments" such as services to<br>
users who prefer a Catalan namespace, or a cooperative-operated registry,<br>
absent any application impediment such as string similarity. Dissimilarly,<br>
there are "voluntary commitments" which appear to have no meaning outside<br>
of the application type restriction of 2004, and more recently, the similar<br>
string contention resolution mechanism of 2010.<br>
<br>
We can distinguish between these, and should, as the exercise of "voluntary<br>
commitments" for the purposes of gaming type restrictions (2004) and/or<br>
gaming contention (2010), substitutes (gamed) implementation for the policy<br>
of record.<br>
<span><br>
> And most importantly, regarding the discussion about "voluntary<br>
> commitments", as Avri points out, we might have a way forward if we were<br>
> to agree that *the scope of acceptable commitments in any agreement should<br>
> be defined by policy* (with all the related process safeguards, including<br>
> bottom up nature as well as advisory inputs), instead of implementation.<br>
> Then it would be up to the policy makers to define whether eligibility<br>
> conditions are appropriate or not and should be enforced, whether a<br>
> specific form of stakeholder consultation or governance is acceptable,<br>
> etc.<br>
<br>
</span>As a process coda, prior to the June 2010 meeting in Bruxelles, there was<br>
no "single user" application type in any draft of the AGB. Our current<br>
problem contains the implementation-trumps-policy warts of the 2010 round,<br>
and we cannot pretend that policy has been made transparently, accountably,<br>
and from the bottom-up, though we can hope that it is in the present, and<br>
will be in the future.<br>
<br>
Eric Brunner-Williams<br>
Eugene, Oregon<br>
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