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Becky, do you foresee the power to be exercised including removal of the
entire Board (as a remedy to action/inaction related to GAC advice). If
so, that reduced the Board removal threshold to three which is at odd
with several comments including those of the Board.<br><br>
Alan<br><br>
At 02/02/2016 05:10 PM, Burr, Becky wrote:<br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">UPDATED:<br><br>
I have attempted to set out the proposals discussed last night. <br>
<u> <br>
Aresteh Proposal</u>:<br>
<br>
Modify Rec. #11/ Annex 11 to provide that GAC Advice supported by
consensus, defined as general agreement in the absence of a formal
objection, may be rejected only by a vote of at least <b>60%</b> of the
Board. All other requirements (e.g., rationale to be provided,
etc.) unchanged. This proposal is strictly limited to
Recommendation 11 Annex 11 without any change to Recommendation 1 as it
stands on 02 February 2016.<br>
<br>
<u>Hutty Gloss on 60% Threshold</u>: Add language to ensure that
supermajority requirement creates no new expectation of approval or
otherwise modify the Board’s standard of review of GAC Advice.
<br>
<br>
<u>Burr Proposal</u>:<br>
<br>
· Modify Rec #1/Annex 1: Add the
following to the end of Paragraph 23. <br>
<br>
<i>The GAC may not, however, participate as a decision maker in the
Empowered Community’s consideration of the exercise a community power for
the purpose of challenging or blocking the Board’s implementation of GAC
Advice. In such cases, the GAC remains free to participate in community
deliberations in an advisory capacity, but its views will not count
towards or against otherwise agreed thresholds needed to initiate a
conference call, convene a Community Forum, or exercise a specific
Community Power. This carve out preserves the ICANN Board’s unique
obligation to work with the GAC try to find a mutually acceptable
solution to implementation of GAC Advice supported by consensus (as
defined in Rec. #11) while protecting the community’s power to challenge
such Board decisions.<br>
<br>
</i>· Modify the Table in Rec. #2/Annex 2
to reflect this carve out and add the following language to cover
situations that would otherwise require the support of four SOs or
ACs:<br>
<br>
<i>The CCWG-Accountability also recommends that in a situation where the
GAC may not participate as a Decisional AC because the community power is
proposed to be used to challenge the Board’s implementation of GAC Advice
and the threshold is set at four in support, the power will still be
validly exercised if three are in support and no more than one
objects. <br>
</i><br>
Kavouss has asked whether my proposal is paired to a 66% threshold, 60%
threshold or simple majority for rejecting GAC Advice. It is not
inconsistent with any of those outcomes.<br><br>
<b>J. Beckwith Burr <br>
Neustar, Inc. </b>/<b> </b>Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy
Officer<br>
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006<br>
<b>Office: </b>+1.202.533.2932 <b>Mobile: </b>+1.202.352.6367
<b>/</b> <a href="http://www.neustar.biz"><b>neustar.biz</a><br>
</b><br><br>
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