Not sure that Board comments are being fast tracked, but considered

You are correct Ed, that the requirement to bring an IRP first could only apply where there are grounds to invoke an IRP

J. Beckwith Burr
Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006

Office: +1.202.533.2932  Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 /

From: Edward Morris <>
Reply-To: "" <>
Date: Monday, February 15, 2016 at 2:08 PM
To: Paul Rosenzweig <>, "" <>, Accountability Community <>, Becky Burr <>
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] CCWG ACCT Proposed Agenda - Call #84 - Tuesday, 16 February @ 06:00 UTC

Hi Becky,
I have two concerns here that I hope those with expertise in these specific areas can help me put to rest:
?1. Why are these latest Board objections/proposals being fast tracked within the CCWG at the last minute? Did the Board not have ample opportunity to raise these issues during the normal and proper review of the third draft proposal? Is there something I'm missing here? My belief was that we're at the point of vetting the Supplemental for technical, not substantive, omissions and additions. Should not these Board objections now be included in a Minority Statement, rather than receiving preferential consideration by the entire CCWG? If the answer to that query is in the negative. that substantive revisions may still be adopted,  do not our rules mandate consideration at two meetings before any alteration to our proposal should occur? 
2. I personally don't have a problem with requiring the community to invoke an IRP before spilling the Board when the reason for the recall was Board implementation of GAC advice when said advice is related to subject matter appropriate for an IRP panel to hear (generally, ICANN acting in a way outside its scope and/or not consistent with its Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation). 
?What, though, of GAC consensus advice that is itself outside the scope of an IRP? I'm thinking of consensus GAC advice that is within ICANN's mission and scope, where there is no allegation of a Bylaws or Articles violations, yet whose approval by the Board triggers a community desire to spill the Board. An example could be something related to the delegation of a gTLD that, for some reason, has prompted GAC opposition. The IRP would not act affirmatively in this instance to any request to nullify the Board action because the reasons for the community opposition presumably lay outside the remit of an IRP. Do we then want the fact that the IRP refused to act, because it can't, to then raise the threshold by which Board spillage will occur?  I'm not sure that's wise.
Of course, as Becky noted I don't anticipate this aspect of our proposal  will truly ever come into play. At least I hope its doesn't. That said, we need to design our structures as if it might and raising spill thresholds as a result of an IRP not making a substantive decision on an issue because said issue itself  is outside it's we really want to do this?
Ed Morris   

From: "Burr, Becky" <>
Sent: Monday, February 15, 2016 6:26 PM
To: "Paul Rosenzweig" <>, "Brenda Brewer" <>, "CCWG-Accountability" <>
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] CCWG ACCT Proposed Agenda - Call #84 - Tuesday, 16 February @ 06:00 UTC
Paul - 
Are you asking whether we will discuss the proposal that Bruce put on the table regarding the GAC carve out?  As I understand it, the proposal would apply only where Board recall was sought in response to Board implementation of GAC consensus advice and the GAC was thus precluded from participating in the EC as a decision maker.  In that situation, we reduced the requisite support level from 4 to 3 (to prevent requiring unanimity).  I understand that reduction is a matter of concern to the Board.
I personally don’t have a lot of trouble with the notion that the community would be required to invoke the IRP process before moving to recall the entire Board in that circumstance.  To be candid, my comfort reflects my belief that the Board recall power is nearly illusory, given how disruptive such a step would be.  I can’t imagine why one would choose recall over resort to the independent judiciary wherever possible.  
That said, I agree we should discuss the proposal on our call tomorrow.

J. Beckwith Burr
Neustar, Inc./Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006

Office:+1.202.533.2932  Mobile:+1.202.352.6367 /

From: Paul Rosenzweig <>
Date: Monday, February 15, 2016 at 10:43 AM
To: "" <>, Accountability Community <>
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] CCWG ACCT Proposed Agenda - Call #84 - Tuesday, 16 February @ 06:00 UTC

Dear Co-Chairs


Will the Board’s proposal re: further revisions to the EC process be discussed under Item #2?   I would hope that we would have full discussion of this proposed change, which I would be opposed to …




Paul Rosenzweig

O: +1 (202) 547-0660

M: +1 (202) 329-9650

VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739

Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066

Link to my PGP Key


From: Brenda Brewer []
Sent: Monday, February 15, 2016 8:03 AM
To: CCWG-Accountability <>
Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] CCWG ACCT Proposed Agenda - Call #84 - Tuesday, 16 February @ 06:00 UTC


Dear all,

In preparation for your call #84 – Tuesday, 16 February 2016 at 06:00 – 08:00 UTC (time converter), see below a proposed agenda:

1.      Opening Remarks

2.      Comments on Supplementary Report

3.      Budget

4.      AOC

Adobe Connect:


Thank you!

Kind regards,