<html><head><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></head><body dir="auto"><div>Dear All</div><div>Christopher raised an important issue deserved to be taken into account</div><div>Regards</div><div>Kavousd</div><div> <br><br>Sent from my iPhone</div><div><br>On 21 Feb 2016, at 12:39, Christopher Wilkinson <<a href="mailto:lists@christopherwilkinson.eu">lists@christopherwilkinson.eu</a>> wrote:<br><br></div><blockquote type="cite"><div><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=us-ascii"><div style="margin: 0px; font-size: 12px; ">Jordan, All:</div><div style="margin: 0px; font-size: 12px; min-height: 14px; "><br></div><div style="margin: 0px; font-size: 12px; ">May I make a few key points in this connection:</div><div style="margin: 0px; font-size: 12px; min-height: 14px; "><br></div><div style="margin: 0px; font-size: 12px; ">1.<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"> </span>I have no record or recollection of any *decision* having been taken by CCWG. At the last conference call in which I was able to participate, the 'carve-out' was still being discussed as an open option.</div><div style="margin: 0px; font-size: 12px; min-height: 14px; "><br></div><div style="margin: 0px; font-size: 12px; ">2.<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"> </span>The scenario whereby the GAC is excluded in certain circumstances from exercising accountability powers is not plausible. Absent the GAC, the remaining participants include three SOs, with an in-built majority. </div><div style="margin: 0px; font-size: 12px; "><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"> </span>The resulting opportunities for collusion are too great to be contemplated.</div><div style="margin: 0px; font-size: 12px; min-height: 14px; "><br></div><div style="margin: 0px; font-size: 12px; "><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"> </span>Indeed, one may regret the abstention of certain ACs, who were essential to maintain the multi-stakeholder balance, but we are where we are.</div><div style="margin: 0px; font-size: 12px; min-height: 14px; "><br></div><div style="margin: 0px; font-size: 12px; ">3.<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"> </span>One possible solution would be that in the event that the GAC abstains (e.g. having exercised their advisory role), the other ACs (in practice ALAC, absent the others), </div><div style="margin: 0px; font-size: 12px; "> <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"> </span>would have additional voting participation to restore the multistakeholder balance. Leaving such decisions (however exceptional) to a super-majority of SOs should clearly be out of the question.</div><div style="margin: 0px; font-size: 12px; min-height: 14px; "><br></div><div style="margin: 0px; font-size: 12px; ">Regards to you all</div><div style="margin: 0px; font-size: 12px; min-height: 14px; "><br></div><div style="margin: 0px; font-size: 12px; ">Christopher Wilkinson (CW)</div><div style="margin: 0px; font-size: 12px; "><br></div><div style="margin: 0px; font-size: 12px; min-height: 14px; "><br></div><div style="margin: 0px; font-size: 12px; min-height: 14px; "><br></div><div><div>On 21 Feb 2016, at 04:25, Jordan Carter <<a href="mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz">jordan@internetnz.net.nz</a>> wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr">Hi all<div><br></div><div>I'm trying for a recap / reset in this message, not sure I succeed but trying to help the discussion along.</div><div><br></div><div>Here's the background that has caused the current extension of debate, as I understand it:</div><div><br></div><div>- CCWG incorporated the idea that a decisional participant with a special role (GAC's advisory role that requires due deference by the Board, unique among ACs) should not be a decision-maker in applying accountability powers in relation to the consequences of that role. (In other words, GAC can choose - either consensus advice, or the ability to decide on accountability powers re its views - but not both).</div><div><br></div><div>- if GAC is excluded from decisions, there would likely be four other SOs and ACs participating.</div><div><br></div><div>- CCWG developed a principle that the use of community powers should not require unanimity for their use, so a proposal was made that the threshold for the Board Removal power should lower to 3 in such a situation.</div><div><br></div><div>- the debate since has been about when that lower threshold of 3 SOs/ACs should apply.</div><div><br></div><div> - some participants think it's only if an IRP holds that the Board has breached the mission / bylaws</div><div><br></div><div> - other participants think it's broader than that and applies whenever the cause is related to Board responses to GAC advice</div><div><br></div><div>- the Board has repeatedly said that it does not want the "no unanimity" principle to apply, but is willing to accept the lower threshold where an IRP finds against it.</div><div><br></div><div>- there seems to be disagreement about what the CCWG actually decided in this, which is driving the discussion.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>So here is what I think are some basics that we have to do:</div><div><br></div><div>- we have to reach clarity about what precisely we have decided, and if there were any gaps in that, they need to be specified.</div><div><br></div><div>- we have to decide what to do if that clarity exposes alternatives that haven't been decided between - that may include a position that the Board isn't happy with.</div><div><br></div><div>- we have to choose alternative that can drive the widest possible consensus within the group (unlike Steve Crocker's email, I don't think that a decision on this can be pushed to implementation)</div><div><br></div><div>- we have to publish the report</div><div><br></div><div>I'm not a spokesperson for the leadership team but I can say that I'll be doing what I can with the co-chairs and other rapporteurs to help make sure that the options are as clear as they can be for our meeting on Tuesday -- so that the chances of confusion are as low as possible.</div><div><br></div><div>I've said before that I don't mind where the group finalises on this issue. Here's why</div><div><br></div><div>I do not think it's likely that the community is going to use the new accountability powers to disagree with Board implementation of matters that include GAC advice in the future. There are a number of reasons why I hold that view, two key ones being:</div><div><br></div><div>- the improving transparency of GAC advice and particularly the GNSO/GAC engagement and the Board/GAC engagement</div><div>- the existence of the new accountability framework, which makes it less likely the Board will go against strong community sentiment</div><div><br></div><div>If I thought this was an important issue which would have a significant impact on our package, and that it was a life or death matter to resolve one way or the other, I would be very offended by the way this has played out in the past few days. But because the stakes are so low on the substance, I am *very* happy to fall into consensus with whatever direction the group wants to go, and I *do not* see this as an issue where *anyone* should be adopting non-negotiable positions.</div><div><br></div><div>I don't expect that everyone will agree with me that this simply isn't that important an issue, but I really hope that as a CCWG, we can put this matter into perspective. The CCWG has to come to a conclusion on that, and get the report out. </div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>SO -- hopefully on Tuesday we can work through the options in front of us and come to a decision about what to do. </div><div><br></div><div>If any party gets to the point on this issue that they feel like dying in the ditch is worth it, well may I humbly suggest that you find yourself a ditch? :-)</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>best</div><div>Jordan<br clear="all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class="gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr" style="font-size:small">Jordan Carter<br><br>Chief Executive <br><b>InternetNZ - your voice for the Open Internet</b><br></div><div dir="ltr" style="font-size:small"><br>+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob)<br>Email: <a href="mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz" style="color:rgb(17,85,204)" target="_blank">jordan@internetnz.net.nz</a> <br>Skype: jordancarter<br></div><div style="font-size:small">Web: <a href="http://www.internetnz.nz/" target="_blank">www.internetnz.nz</a> </div><div dir="ltr" style="font-size:small"><br></div><br></div></div></div></div></div></div></div>
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