<HTML><BODY><p style='margin-top: 0px;' dir="ltr">Exactly right Andrew. . The best complete rebuttal I have seen. . Well said. </p>
<p dir="ltr">--<br>
Paul Rosenzweig<br>
Sent from myMail app for Android</p>
Saturday, 20 February 2016, 11:37AM -05:00 from Andrew Sullivan <<a href="mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com">ajs@anvilwalrusden.com</a>>:<br><br><blockquote style='border-left:1px solid #FC2C38; margin:0px 0px 0px 10px; padding:0px 0px 0px 10px;' cite="14559863210000093916">
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<div id="style_14559863210000093916_BODY">Hi Steve,<br>
<br>
On Sat, Feb 20, 2016 at 10:23:27AM -0500, Steve Crocker wrote:<br>
> <br>
> With respect, this is not the right way to frame the issue.<br>
<br>
I don't understand why, and you haven't actually made an argument as<br>
to why. If some potential participant -- GNSO, ccNSO, ALAC, GAC, or<br>
Council of Martians and Other Planet-dwellers -- decides not to be<br>
part of the Empowered Community, that changes the number of<br>
participants and changes the way that majorities need to be<br>
calculated. For instance, suppose that both the GAC and the ALAC<br>
tomorrow announce that they don't want to be part of the Empowered<br>
Community after all. In that case, surely you wouldn't still require<br>
four SOs and ACs for action against the Board, because the threshold<br>
could never be met.<br>
<br>
> All of this quite convoluted discussion and negotiation seems to be<br>
>based on a fear of the extraordinary power of the GAC to apply<br>
>pressure on the Board.<br>
<br>
I don't know what the state of mind of others is, but the argument I<br>
offered is not based on fear. It is based on the request of the GAC<br>
that their unusual function in ICANN discussions be maintained. The<br>
GAC wants to be able to inject its observations at a point in the<br>
process different to any other SO or AC. If it wants to use that<br>
power, it implicitly decides that it isn't like everyone else, and so<br>
it doesn't get treated like everyone else. If the GAC wants to be<br>
treated like everyone else, it gets to choose to do that, too. <br>
<br>
> As the recent IRP ruling made clear, the Board cannot justify an<br>
>action by pointing to the GAC and saying, in effect, the GAC made me<br>
>do it.<br>
<br>
Of course, but that has nothing to do with how the GAC's participation<br>
in the Empowered Community mechanism. The choice about whether to do<br>
that lies entirely with the GAC.<br>
<br>
> To say it more compactly, if there is a reason to spill the Board, it has to be because of what the Board has or has not done, not because of anything the GAC did or did not do.<br>
> <br>
<br>
Correct; but that's not what's at issue here. What is at issue is who<br>
participates in determining that reason. The GAC is offered a choice<br>
as to whether it wants to participate, or whether it wants its views<br>
to be treated in an extraordinary way.<br>
<br>
> But what about the GAC’s special role, you might ask? Well, to<br>
> start with there is really less to its special role than it might<br>
> seem. As I said, the obligation on the Board is to engage in<br>
> meaningful discussion. That’s perfectly reasonable<br>
<br>
It is indeed perfectly reasonable, but as you acknowledge it is in<br>
fact different than the way the other ACs are treated. Much of the<br>
community is arguing that, if the GAC wants to be treated differently,<br>
then its participation needs to change too.<br>
<br>
> , and, if we want<br>
> to explore how to level the playing field, perhaps the right thing<br>
> is for the Board to treat the other advisory organizations with the<br>
> same deference. I’m not suggesting we attempt to make that change<br>
> at this particular moment, but I am suggesting we separate the<br>
> issues.<br>
<br>
But we're not building a process about how some _other_ arrangement<br>
would work. We're talking about how to handle things given the<br>
current roles of SOs and ACs. If ICANN wants to reorganize itself in<br>
the future (there's a whole work stream coming up, I understand) and<br>
change the arrangements then, it would then be worth talking about how<br>
to adjust these rules too. For instance, if other ACs get to give<br>
special-consideration advice to the Board, I'd expect them also to be<br>
excluded from the decision-making process later.<br>
<br>
Right now, the goal is to come up with a stable, practical, and<br>
legitimate process given the _current_ roles of the SOs and ACs.<br>
That's what the unamended proposal does.<br>
<br>
> the ills we deal with is the accumulation of special cases and<br>
> inconsistencies. This serves no one and is simply poor governance.<br>
<br>
I agree; and yet the current proposal from the Board would create a<br>
special case, because it would treat different kinds of actors the<br>
same except in some circumstances. It seems to me that the simplest<br>
arrangement is one under which, if an SO or AC wants to participate,<br>
it participates on an equal footing as all the others. That makes it<br>
easy to know who might be in and who might be out. Why isn't that the<br>
right way to frame this issue?<br>
<br>
Best regards,<br>
<br>
A<br>
<br>
-- <br>
Andrew Sullivan<br>
<a href="/compose?To=ajs@anvilwalrusden.com">ajs@anvilwalrusden.com</a><br>
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