<p dir="ltr">That's fine Jordan, but just to be clear, such change(reduction/increase in threshold as applicable) will only occur when the community come together to agree again right? i.e the current CCWG proposal does not say if the "empowered community" becomes 4, then the thresholds automatically reduces. I hope that is not what you are communicating.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Regards</p>
<div class="gmail_quote">On 24 Feb 2016 06:22, "Jordan Carter" <<a href="mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz">jordan@internetnz.net.nz</a>> wrote:<br type="attribution"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Seun, all,<div><br></div><div>If there are 4 decisional SOs/ACs instead of 5, then the thresholds all need to change. </div><div><br></div><div>The ones that currently have a threshold of 4 would then require unanimity. </div><div><br></div><div><span></span>That would be totally unacceptable. It is not consistent with our work to date or with our report. The report specifically notes that a change from 5 eligible decisional participants leads to threshold changes for this very reason.<div><br></div><div>Best</div><div>Jordan <br><div><div><div><br>On Wednesday, 24 February 2016, Seun Ojedeji <<a href="mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com" target="_blank">seun.ojedeji@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><p dir="ltr">I believe this makes sense and can be noted during implementation. However, IMO a reduction of participating SO/AC in the "empowered community" from 5 to 4 should not cause any need for change since none of the exercise of community powers requires more than a threshold 4 and considering that 4 still represents over 50%(4/7) of the ICANN community we should be fine. So the current threshold proposed from paragraph 25 to 47 on Annex 2 could still be maintained (ofcourse without any reduction)</p>
<p dir="ltr">However anything that goes below 4, I expect would make the model impractical and require a complete overhaul.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Regards</p>
<div class="gmail_quote">On 24 Feb 2016 04:39, "Bruce Tonkin" <<a>Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au</a>> wrote:<br type="attribution"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hello All,<br>
<br>
In response to the question from Brett Schaefer:<br>
<br>
>> I would hope that we could get explicit clarification and commitment from the Board that, if the GAC cannot decide or chooses not to become a decisional participant, that the Board would support lowering the thresholds for exercising all EC powers to avoid the requirement for SOAC unanimous support to exercise those powers.<br>
<br>
The Board supports the language in the report, at Page 72 of Annex 2:<br>
<br>
“The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on this assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be Decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support may be adjusted. Thresholds would also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to have more SOs or ACs.”<br>
<br>
<br>
The Board’s earlier comment on this issue from Page 5 of our 14 December 2015 Comments to the Third Draft Proposal from the CCWG is as follows:<br>
<br>
"B. Board Comments and Supporting Rationale on Further Defining Thresholds<br>
<br>
The thresholds as set out in the Proposal (Pages 22-23) seem well defined for the design of ICANN today. The Board would not support lowering of any of these thresholds because these community powers represent the voice of the ICANN community. A reduction of the threshold could risk that a decision does not reflect the community’s will.<br>
<br>
While the thresholds seem well defined for the design of ICANN today, the Board recommends further defining the thresholds for exercising community powers in the event that the number of SOs or ACs change. Leaving this issue for future consideration raises the potential for renegotiation of the community thresholds. This potential for renegotiation adds a level of instability and a lack of predictability. As a result, the Board recommends (1) clarifying that the thresholds identified in the Proposal are based on the current structure; and (2) identifying the percentages that will be applied in the event that there is a change in the number of SOs or ACs in the future."<br>
<br>
When we previously discussed this with the CCWG, we understood from Page 72 of Annex 2 that the CCWG does not want to set percentages and has agreed to revisit the thresholds if the number of participants change.<br>
<br>
We will further discuss this issue when it becomes clear who the future participants will be, and whether fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be Decisional Participants in the Empowered Community.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
Bruce Tonkin<br>
<br>
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</blockquote></div>
</blockquote></div></div></div></div></div><br><br>-- <br>Jordan Carter<br>Chief Executive, InternetNZ<p><a href="tel:%2B64-21-442-649" value="+6421442649" target="_blank">+64-21-442-649</a> | <a href="mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz" target="_blank">jordan@internetnz.net.nz</a><p>Sent on the run, apologies for brevity<br></p></p>
</blockquote></div>