<p dir="ltr">I agree Yes this also makes sense to me...</p>
<p dir="ltr">I support yhe "may" to SHALL and the addition od explanatory material ...</p>
<div class="gmail_quote">On 28 Feb 2016 8:56 am, "avri doria" <<a href="mailto:avri@apc.org">avri@apc.org</a>> wrote:<br type="attribution"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
Makes sense to me to change the may to a shall and add explanatory material.<br>
<br>
avri<br>
<br>
On 27-Feb-16 15:03, Drazek, Keith wrote:<br>
><br>
> Hi Thomas, Mathieu and Leon. I’m submitting the following on behalf of<br>
> the undersigned members/participants from the GNSO:<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> ---------------------------------------------<br>
><br>
> Dear CCWG-Accountability Chairs,<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> We are very concerned with the response of the Board to the request<br>
> for clarification regarding the need to adjust the thresholds for the<br>
> Empowered Community to exercise its powers if the number of decisional<br>
> participants is less than 5 SOACs. Currently the text in Annex 1 and 2<br>
> regarding this possibility is ambiguous:<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on<br>
> this assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be<br>
> decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support may be<br>
> adjusted. Thresholds may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to<br>
> have more SOs or ACs.”<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> In our view, there is no question that the thresholds /must/ be<br>
> adjusted if there are fewer than five decisional participants. We have<br>
> acknowledged repeatedly and operated under the assumption that there<br>
> should not be a requirement of unanimous support for the Empowered<br>
> Community to exercise its powers. Yet, if there are less than five<br>
> decisional participants, unless the thresholds are adjusted it would<br>
> require unanimous support for the Empowered Community to:<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> · Reject a proposed Operating Plan/Strategic Plan/Budget;<br>
><br>
> · Recall the entire Board of Directors; and<br>
><br>
> · Reject an ICANN Board decision relating to reviews of IANA<br>
> functions, including the triggering of any PTI separation process.<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> These powers are central to ensuring that ICANN remains accountable to<br>
> the Empowered Community. This matter is too critical to the primary<br>
> purpose of the CCWG-Accountability proposal to remain unclear. As the<br>
> Board has noted in its own formal comments, “Leaving this issue for<br>
> future consideration raises the potential for renegotiation of the<br>
> community thresholds. This potential for renegotiation adds a level<br>
> of instability and a lack of predictability.”<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> Although it has a superficial resemblance to the recent debate over<br>
> thresholds in the GAC carve-out, we believe it is fundamentally<br>
> different. There is a great distinction between an SO or AC<br>
> */choosing/* to not participate, and an SO or AC being */blocked/*<br>
> from participation in a specific instance, as was the case in the case<br>
> of the GAC carve-out. We were willing to accept a unanimous threshold<br>
> for Board recall in the unique circumstances of the GAC carve-out,<br>
> where the GAC was blocked from participation, but we believe firmly<br>
> that if any SO or AC */elects/*, whether through a conscious decision<br>
> or an inability to decide, to not participate, then the non-unanimity<br>
> principle must be upheld.<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> However, as we saw with the debate over the thresholds in the GAC<br>
> carve-out, this could be a contentious issue. It is far better to<br>
> resolve this matter now (and during the drafting of bylaws), prior to<br>
> the official transfer of the proposal to NTIA, than to delay it when<br>
> it could have significant negative ramifications on the transition<br>
> through a failure to resolve it during the implementation phase.<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> Therefore, we respectfully request that the current text in Annex 1<br>
> and Annex 2 be edited to replace “may” with “shall” and add an<br>
> additional explanatory clause:<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on<br>
> this assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be<br>
> decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support<br>
> */shall/*be adjusted */to prevent the need for unanimous support among<br>
> the decisional Participants to exercise any of the seven Community<br>
> powers/*. Thresholds may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to<br>
> have more SOs or ACs.”<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> Signed,<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> Phil Corwin<br>
><br>
> Steve DelBianco<br>
><br>
> Keith Drazek<br>
><br>
> James Gannon<br>
><br>
> Robin Gross<br>
><br>
> Ed Morris<br>
><br>
> Brett Schaefer<br>
><br>
> Greg Shatan<br>
><br>
> Matthew Shears<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> _______________________________________________<br>
> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list<br>
> <a href="mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org">Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org</a><br>
> <a href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community</a><br>
<br>
<br>
---<br>
This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software.<br>
<a href="https://www.avast.com/antivirus" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://www.avast.com/antivirus</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list<br>
<a href="mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org">Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org</a><br>
<a href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community</a><br>
</blockquote></div>