[bc-gnso] GAC scorecard and quick summary

[Ron Andruff]

This information clearly sets the goal posts for the match, but it also
points out where fresh staff work will be focused - should the Board agree
to these terms, and it is pretty clear to me that the right action of the
Board will be to capitulate to most of what the GAC wants.  Regarding staff
work, for example, VI, as per the GAC, will need a lot of thought to sort
the methodology on this out: 5: Restrict cross-ownership between registrars
and registries where ICANN determines that the TLD is likely to obtain
market power.  What is the threshold of 'likelihood'?  

 

In any case, I agree with Steve's analysis that we have a GAC that wants to
play nice with the ICANN Community so I do hope that this golden opportunity
does not get trashed due to competing egos or ideology.

 

Kind regards,

 

RA

 

Ronald N. Andruff

RNA Partners, Inc.

 

 

  _____  

From: owner-bc-gnso at icann.org [mailto:owner-bc-gnso at icann.org] On Behalf Of
Steve DelBianco
Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2011 11:24 PM
To: bc-GNSO at icann.org
Subject: [bc-gnso] GAC scorecard and quick summary

 

In preparation for their meeting with the ICANN Board on Monday, the GAC
just published their 'scorecard' on ICANN's new gTLD plans.

http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/gac-scorecard-23feb11-en.pdf

 

Below I provide some summary points about this GAC 'Advice'.  But first,
read the GAC's intro for their scorecard:

 

The scorecard below represents the considered efforts of the GAC to distil
the key elements of consensus advice regarding the introduction of new gTLDs
it has been providing the ICANN Board since March, 2007. As the GAC noted in
its Cartagena Communique, the GAC's initial advice, presented in the form of
Principles, pre-dated both the completion of the GNSO's Recommendations on
new gTLDs and the ICANN Board's subsequent adoption of those Recommendations
in June, 2008. 

 

The GAC has sought from the outset of its deliberations regarding the public
policy aspects related to the introduction of new gTLDs to contribute to the
bottom-up, consensus-based policy development process within ICANN. As per
the ICANN Bylaws, the GAC provides advice directly to the ICANN Board. Once
the GAC forwards its advice to the ICANN Board, the GAC understands that it
is within the ICANN Board's remit to instruct ICANN staff to take the GAC's
advice into account in the development of the implementation plan for the
introduction of new gTLDs. 

 

The GAC therefore welcomes the opportunity presented by the ICANN Board's
agreement to hold a meeting with the GAC to review its longstanding and
outstanding concerns regarding ICANN's proposed implementation plan for the
introduction of new gTLDs. From the GAC's perspective, the Brussels meetings
are not only an appropriate but a critical next step in ensuring the
perspectives of governments are fully taken into account in the ICANN
private sector-led, multi-stakeholder model that ICANN represents.

 

I believe the government reps in the GAC really do appreciate private sector
role in building internet infrastructure and creating nearly all compelling
content and commerce.   And I think they are gradually warming to the
mulit-stakeholeder model.   But it takes two to Tango, so ICANN needs to get
up and dance, too.

 

And if you dislike the idea of showing respect for the GAC, you will
positively hate the idea of letting the UN-ITU run things.  That is a very
real threat - especially if the new gTLD round lets governments say, "I told
you this was going to happen".    Just ask Marilyn and others  who are
'observing' the UN debating the future of internet governance. 

 

GAC Advice:

 

1.1:  GAC may object to a string during initial evaluation.   ICANN board
can disregard GAC advice, but they must provide an explanation.

 

1.2: Individual governments (not the entire GAC) may object to
Community-based applications and they don't want to pay a fee to file an
objection.  Makes it that much harder to get a community-based TLD.

 

3: GAC is concerned about ICANN capacity and root zone stability with
200-300 simultaneous applications.  Makes case for a limited first batch of
300.

 

4: gTLD applicants must describe benefits of their TLD and explain how they
will mitigate costs to registrants and consumers. 

 

5: Restrict cross-ownership between registrars and registries where ICANN
determines that the TLD is likely to obtain market power. 

 

6.1:  TM Clearinghouse should accept any TM recognized in country where
registry is based. Both Sunrise and TM Claims should be mandatory, and
include variations on the TM term.  And.  the TM clearinghouse [and
services?] should continue after launch.

 

6.2 URS should be faster, simpler, and be based on lower standard of proof. 

 

6.3: post-delegation dispute resolution should require a lower standard of
proof, and be simpler to pursue.

 

6.4: national consumer protection authorities want ICANN to provide
adequate compliance resources. 

 

7: TLD contracts must require registry operator to comply with any legally
binding decisions of governments.

 

8: For community-based applications, Allow governments to protect their
legal interest in geographical names. 

 

9: ICANN should seek legal advice where national competition authorities
might object to a TLD.

 

10: Make it cheaper and easier for new gTLD applicants from developing
countries.  (and for Applications in languages whose presence on the web is
limited )

 

11: Law enforcement wants publicly available and accurate WHOIS, deeper
vetting of applicants, and higher weight to applicants offering highest
level of security.

 

12: ICANN should give 'early warning' to applicants if governments object to
the string. 

 

 

 

 

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