**Cross-Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability** Draft 5.1, 28-Dec-2014

**Work Area 2: Review Input from Public Comment and Categorize into Work Streams 1 & 2**

Proposed rationale for designating Work Streams:

Work Stream 1 is designated for accountability enhancement mechanisms that must be in place [or firmly committed] *before* IANA transition occurs.

All other consensus items could be in Work Stream 2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from ICANN management and board.

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| *1. Mechanisms giving the ICANN community ultimate authority over the ICANN corporation. Most of these are initially designated as WS1, since community Members need the leverage of IANA transition to obtain these Bylaws changes.*  |
| **Accountability Suggestions from public comments and posts** | **Supported by** | **WS** |
| **Community Members as ultimate authority[[1]](#footnote-1)**. Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize permanent cross-community Members (ALAC, ccNSO, GAC, SSAC, NRO, RSSAC, IETF, ASO, and each Constituency) with authority in these specific areas: | GNSO Joint Statement, BC, ITIC, B.Carpenter, CNNIC, Siva, TPI, Verizon, NCSG, Just Net, E.Morris, Izumi | WS1 |
| Appoint members of *Affirmation* review teams | BC, Spain, Avri Doria | WS1 |
| Review any board decision. Non-approval would send decision back to bottom-up policy development process.  | BC, ITIC, Heritage, SIIA, EC, C. Gutiérrez | WS1 |
| [Alt:] Refer any board decision to an independent review panel. The CWG believes this should be binding for IANA functions. | BC, ITIC, Heritage, SIIA, EC, Mueller, **CWG** | WS1 |
| Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 majority | BC, ITIC, SIIA, Hutty | WS1 |
| Approve annual proposed ICANN budget [vote threshold?] | BC, ITIC, USCIB | WS1 |
| Recall one or all ICANN Board members [vote threshold?] | BC, Avri Doria, NCSG | WS1 |
| Bring the *Affirmation of Commitments* (incl the Reviews) into the ICANN bylaws, with these amendments: | BC, USCIB, SIIA, Verizon, Morris | WS1 |
| *Affirmation* Review Teams get access to all internal documents | Doria, MPAA, CIS, Morris | WS2 |
| *Affirmation* Accountability & Transparency Review Team could recommend sunset of original reviews and create new reviews | BC, USCIB | WS2 |
| Change *Affirmation* reviews from “in the public interest” to “for protection and advance of human rights and internet freedoms” | NCSG, Robin Gross[Opposition noted] | WS2 |
| Change bylaws for Reconsideration Process: trigger when board acts arbitrarily or capriciously; make decisions subject to Independent Review | Google | WS1 |
| Create a contract between ICANN and Registries & Registrars, with Registrants as 3rd party beneficiaries. Contract lets ICANN impose rules on others only when supported by consensus of affected parties.  Disputes go to independent arbitration panel that could issue binding decisions. | David Johnson | WS1 |
| Replace *Affirmation* with accountability contract between ICANN and ‘Contract Co.’ | Guru Acharya | WS1 |
| Independent certification for delegation & re-delegation requests | **CWG** | WS1 |
| Independent Appeals Panel for contested root zone changes & WHOIS | **CWG** | WS1 |

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| *2. Mechanisms to restrict actions of the board and management of the ICANN corporation. Most of these are initially designated as WS2, since the Members could reverse board or management decisions if Members are empowered in WS1 (above).* |
| **Accountability Suggestions from public comments and posts** | **Supported by** | **WS** |
| Require supermajority for Board to approve action despite advice to the contrary from ACs or significant subsets of SOs. Izumi believes this will take time, so should be in WS2 | ISPCP, ITIC, Izumi | WS1 |
| Ensure that the ICANN Board can be held to its Bylaws, with effective remedy if breach found by independent adjudicator [Alt: found by the community]. | Malcolm Hutty, Seun Ojedeji | WS1 |
| Prevent ICANN Board redefining mission/scope in Bylaws without community consensus | Malcolm Hutty | WS2 |
| Ensure ICANN Board does not act "ultra vires", and stays within assigned mission and scope. e.g., prevent scope creep in policies imposed via RAA. | Malcolm Hutty, BC, TPI  | WS2 |
| Prohibit ICANN from entering agreements that impose obligations unrelated to DNS management | Heritage | WS2 |
| Require supermajority board vote and 2/3 community vote to change ICANN not-for-profit status or change ICANN’s state of incorporation | USCIB, Verizon, SIIA [opposition noted] | WS2 |
| Before leaving California, ICANN must show benefits exceed costs | SIIA, USCIB | WS2 |
| Broadly expand grounds on which ICANN decisions and operations can be challenged; lower threshold to succeed in a challenge | Spain, Heritage | WS2 |
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| *3. Mechanisms to prescribe actions of the ICANN corporation. Most of these are initially designated as WS2, since the Members could reverse board or management decisions if Members are empowered in WS1 (above). For example, a bottom-up consensus process to change ICANN bylaws might be rejected by ICANN board, but the Members could then reverse that decision and force the change.* |
| **Accountability Suggestions from public comments and posts** | **Supported by** | **WS** |
| Require a defined notion of consensus for any GAC advice that would need to be given deference by the ICANN board. Izumi believes this will take time, so should be in WS2 | Heritage, Izumi, BC Stress Test #6 | WS1 |
| Let local courts hear complaints on free expression, security, and privacy | NCSG [opposition noted] | WS2 |
| Establish an independent inspector general for ICANN | SIIA | WS2 |
| Commit the ICANN organization to maintain freedom of expression | Heritage, NCSG | WS2 |
| Require registry and registrar agreements be equitable and non-discriminatory | ITIC, Heritage | WS1 |
| Require supermajority of board to [increase] change registry or registrar fees [Members could reverse] | Heritage | WS1  |
| Create channels for inquiry/complaint/suggestions  | Internet Society of China | WS2 |
| Recall mechanism for any board member selected by an AC/SO  | Avri Doria | WS2 |
| Recall mechanism for SO Council and ALAC member selected by NomCom | Avri Doria | WS2 |
| ICANN to engage with all governments as equal community stakeholders | Fiona Asonga | WS2 |
| Allow GAC to select 2-4 voting ICANN board members | Spain [opposition noted] | WS2 |
| Give Ombudsman ability to refer a matter to external body | NCSG [opposition noted] | WS2 |
| Change bylaws to establish term limits for ICANN senior officers | Heritage | WS2 |
| Change bylaws to require that ICANN remain subject to US Law. Izumi notes this should be WS2 | Heritage [opposition noted] | WS1 |
| Explore incorporation as international org under international law | NRO [opposition noted] | WS2 |
| Limit ICANN executive function to implementation of policies | ITIC, Siva | WS1 |

| **Accountability Suggestions from public comments and posts** | **Supported by** | **WS** |
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| Require ICANN to operate under rule of law in jurisdictions that support effective redress | MPAA [opposition noted] | WS1 |
| Require one-third of board members to devote full time to ICANN | Spain | WS2 |
| Separate policy functions from root zone management functions | Heritage, Google, USCIB, Mueller, Verizon | WS1 |
| Allow NomCom to select and retain Ombudsman | Morris | WS2 |
| Have Transparency International conduct audit of all SOs and ACs | Morris [opposition noted] | WS2 |
| Severely limit ICANN ability to deny disclosure/transparency requests | SIIA, Siva | WS2 |
| ICANN to undergo annual audit for transparency and achievement of goals | ITIC, Heritage, Google, Spain | WS2 |
| Make all board deliberations transparent (with minimal redaction) | Siva, Robin Gross, Internet Society of China, BC | WS2 |
| Require all Supporting Organizations, including Numbers and Protocol entities, to have accountability and transparency mechanisms aligned to those of ICANN | Morris, Fiona Asonga, Carlos Gutiérrez | WS2 |
| Improve mechanism to obtain transparency of ICANN documents (e.g. FOIA) | USCIB, CIS, Verizon | WS2 |
| Establish an Open Data Policy and develop an Open Data action plan, where ICANN documents are open by default. | ITIF, W. Donkor  | WS2 |
| Equal footing of stakeholders: rethink the separation of SOs and ACs. At least Users (if represented in ALAC) and Governments (GAC) deserve equal footing with commercial interests in policy making.  | Carlos Gutiérrez | WS2 |
| Equal footing in policymaking: differences between contracted and non-contracted parties are blurred with new gTLDs. The representativeness of non-commercial Stakeholders, vis a vis ALAC and GAC remains a question. Academic accreditation does not seem related to the issues discussed in the IANA Stewardship transition and some of the newer PDPs. If there is equal footing, the GNSO houses have to be rebalanced as per above  | Carlos Gutiérrez | WS2 |
| Structural and/or Organizational separation between a) Policy Making, b) Operations and c) Compliance functions.  | Carlos Gutiérrez | WS2 |
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Links to sources cited in the table:

[GNSO Joint Statement](http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/internal-cg/2014-July/000202.html), London, 26-Jun-2014

[Staff summary of accountability proposals taken from public comments](https://community.icann.org/display/acctgeneral/Proposed%2BSolutions%2Bfrom%2BPublic%2BComment), 15-Oct-2014

[ITIF post of Key Principles](http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/), 26-Jul-2014

[Public comments on enhancing ICANN Accountability](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-enhancing-accountability-06may14/), 7-May thru 30-Jul, 2014

[BC (Business Constituency) comments](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-enhancing-accountability-06may14/pdfUqkydSWPcN.pdf) and Stress Tests, 27-May-2014

[Google comments](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-enhancing-accountability-06may14/pdfwmPf9Fr4gw.pdf), 28-May-2014

[SIIA comments](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-enhancing-accountability-06may14/pdfUayC2ZzenT.pdf), 30-May-2014

[Heritage Foundation comments](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-enhancing-accountability-06may14/pdftmfaKEvnSR.pdf), 20-Jun-2014

[Public comments on enhancing ICANN Accountability](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-enhancing-accountability-06sep14/index.html#00014), 6-Sep thru 13-Oct, 2014

[ITIC Principles](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-enhancing-accountability-06sep14/pdfrffl9RL6Ci.pdf), 27-Sep-2014

[CDT Endorsement of ITIC principles](https://cdt.org/blog/clear-and-concrete-principles-for-icann-accountability/), 4-Aug-2014

[ISPCP comments on proposed Bylaws change](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-bylaws-amend-gac-advice-15aug14/pdfhGb2aiKDu8.pdf) 14-Sep-2014

[Malcolm Hutty, comments at ICANN51, Enhancing ICANN Accountability session](http://la51.icann.org/en/schedule/mon-accountability-governance/transcript-accountability-governance-13oct14-en.pdf) 13-Sep-2014
[Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority](http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-plan-needs-new-ideas-to-ensure-accountability), 17-Dec-2014

[Blog](http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/12/19/icann-accountability-a-coup-or-a-contract/) by David Johnson, 19-Dec-2014

1. California Nonprofit Corporation Law expressly authorizes non-profit organizations to have Members with ultimate authority to control the organization. Under Cal. Corp. Code § 5310 “A corporation may admit persons to Membership, as provided in its Articles or Bylaws”. California law recognizes that Members may reserve the right to approve nonprofit actions and oversee the Board of Directors. (§ 5210) A Board of Directors’ authority to conduct the affairs of a nonprofit may be limited by the rights of the Members specified in the law or in the nonprofit corporation’s Articles or Bylaws.

  Although ICANN does not currently have Members under Article XVII of its Bylaws, ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation expressly anticipate that ICANN may have Members: “These Articles may be amended by the affirmative of at least two-thirds of the directors of the Corporation. When the Corporation has Members, amendments must be ratified by a two-thirds (2/3) majority of the Members voting on any proposed amendment.” (Section 9) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)