<p dir="ltr">Of note, Jan's comments are very valuable; the one which sticks out in my mind would be;</p>
<p dir="ltr">"How does one ensure that the community empowerment mechanism does not become a vehicle for capture of ICANN by insider activists?"</p>
<p dir="ltr">RD</p>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Apr 20, 2015 6:02 AM, "Mathieu Weill" <<a href="mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr">mathieu.weill@afnic.fr</a>> wrote:<br type="attribution"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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Dear Colleagues, <br>
<br>
Please find below a contribution on our draft public comment report
by Jan Aart Scholte, in his capacity as one of our Advisors. <br>
<br>
Best regards,<br>
Mathieu<br>
<div><br>
<br>
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<td>[CCWG-Advisors] jan comments on 17 april ccwg materials</td>
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<td>Mon, 20 Apr 2015 07:19:58 +0000</td>
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<td>Jan Aart Scholte <a href="mailto:jan.scholte@globalstudies.gu.se" target="_blank"><jan.scholte@globalstudies.gu.se></a></td>
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<th align="RIGHT" nowrap valign="BASELINE">Pour : </th>
<td>CCWG-Advisors <a href="mailto:ccwg-advisors@icann.org" target="_blank"><ccwg-advisors@icann.org></a>,
<a href="mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz" target="_blank">jordan@internetnz.net.nz</a> <a href="mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz" target="_blank"><jordan@internetnz.net.nz></a></td>
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<p>Hello All</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Great to see that CCWG continues to make impressive headway
after the productive Istanbul meeting. Many thanks, Adam,
for your thorough briefing accompanying the documents
circulated on Friday. My read of the materials prompts the
following thoughts, mainly concerning the community
empowerment mechanism:</p>
<p> </p>
<p>(1) The community empowerment mechanism increasingly looks
to be based on SOs and ACs. A key question of course remains
with what distribution of seats, and also whether any other
body such as GAC or SSAC would have a voting representation.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>(2) Would any adjustments in the AC and SO constructions be
advisable at this juncture, concurrent with the IANA
transition, in order that 'the Community' as
institutionalised in the empowerment mechanism aligns
sufficiently closely with the present actual constellation
of ICANN stakeholders in the world at large?</p>
<p> </p>
<p>(3) How (and how readily) could the the formula which
constitutes 'the Community' in the empowerment mechanism be
adjusted in future, as and when the prevailing arrangement
is found inadequately to reflect the constellation of ICANN
stakeholders at that future time? Consider how difficult it
has been to adjust membership of the UN Security Council and
the Boards of the Bretton Woods institutions, which remain
largely frozen in the world of 1945. The world of 2045 is
likely to be quite different from that of 2015 - will
ICANN's constitution allow it readily to change with the
times?</p>
<p> </p>
<p>(4) Related to (3), could overly high supermajorities have
unwanted consequences of excessive constitutional
conservatism? To be sure, too low a threshold could invite
constitutional instability, but too high a threshold could
invite institutional ossification. For example,
constitutional reform of the International Monetary Fund has
been so difficult in good part because an 85% vote is needed
to alter the Articles of Agreement, which has effectively
entrenched a US Government veto.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>(5) Then there is that ever-present thorn of the
accountability of those who hold ICANN to account. How will
participants in the empowerment mechanism be held
accountable to wider stakeholder circles, both within ICANN
(i.e. the ACs and SOs)
<em>and beyond</em>? Legislators in democratic nation-states
are subject to election by the general population, but
delegates in the ICANN 'parliament' would only be elected by
ACs and SOs, whose connections to wider constituencies - and
that so-called 'global public interest' - can be quite thin?
How does one ensure that the community empowerment mechanism
does not become a vehicle for capture of ICANN by insider
activists?</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Happy for this note to be made available to all CCWG if
thought suitable. Not sure about the protocols of advisors'
communications.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Greetings</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Jan</p>
<p> </p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
</div>
<br>
</div>
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