[ccwg-internet-governance] Coordination Group Charter, Public Comments

Carlton Samuels carlton.samuels at gmail.com
Sun Aug 17 18:26:32 UTC 2014


Tamer:
Question. We note and share your views that parallel contracts are worthy
of consideration as part of the IANA Transitional Arrangements.

For clarity's sake and in your view, is root zone maintenance a subject for
and is, of right, to be considered within the IANA transition?

-Carlton


==============================
Carlton A Samuels
Mobile: 876-818-1799
*Strategy, Planning, Governance, Assessment & Turnaround*
=============================


On Fri, Aug 15, 2014 at 5:12 PM, Tamer Rizk <trizk at inficron.com> wrote:

> [This commentary is cross-posted in transparency for the benefit of those
> who may not have otherwise had the opportunity to review]
>
> Over the past month, discussions by the IANA Stewardship Transition
> Coordination Group, or ICG, through its mailing list entitled Internal-CG,
> have culminated in the proposal of a charter to guide a favorable outcome.
> The draft has evolved from internal discourse, and public comments have
> been solicited in response to topics concerning scope, operations, and
> stakeholders.
>
> The draft charter defers opportunities to discuss accountability to the
> scope of a parallel and related process on enhancing ICANN accountability.
> In the spirit of the language within the accountability section of ICANN's
> website, such opportunities must aspire to be as easy to find and utilize
> as the ICG microsite itself, and any proactive charter should at least
> include a link to where the parallel discussions of such a separate,
> external group are going to eventually take place.
>
> In contrast to the NTIA's broad definition of directly affected parties,
> minimally comprising the IETF, IAB, ISOC, RIRs, TLD operators, root zone
> maintainer, and other interested global stakeholders, the charter
> designates three operational communities as privileged to develop proposals
> for review by the ICG. This restriction precludes meaningful participation
> by global stakeholders such as international organizations and prominent
> NGOs, especially as they relate to the salient consequences of monopoly
> power over root maintenance in shaping language for effective
> implementation.
>
> The discernible import of root zone maintenance is not in the creativity
> that it imparts to nations. Broadly speaking, root zone maintenance is the
> charge incumbent to edit the file that effects to map domain names to
> physical machines via IP addresses. Without multilateral accountability,
> the power to annex a country code top-level domain vests in the hands of
> the root zone maintainer. Given that a country's name is the global
> reference to its domain, it is no wonder that a good actor would have been
> historically compelled to hold ccTLDs to a higher standard than physical
> property, notwithstanding any motivation by entities to otherwise suggest.
>
> Threats to undermine the neutral execution of changes to the root zone are
> exacerbated by the potential for collective fusion of the IANA functions
> and root zone maintenance, foregoing the common effectiveness of the
> former, in a reaction accelerated by the introduction of competing business
> interests to the root, via new gTLDs.
>
> Short of solutions to preserve root neutrality, a transition to cardinal
> IANA functions encompassing administrative responsibilities of the root
> zone and coordination of root zone management, as delineated by ICANN's
> transition FAQ, is an indicator of disorder in an inevitable acclimation of
> root federation. If the viability of such a scenario is not enough of a
> deterrent, prior to the expiration of any contract and in the natural
> progression thereafter, perhaps choice itself will serve to neutralize
> dominant forces in order to achieve net stability. To this end, it is
> incumbent upon global stakeholders to collaboratively contribute to shaping
> the structures which together vest duty of determination within themselves
> and hence render them responsive to the doors of multilateral,
> multistakeholder sufficiency.
>
> /TR/
>
> General references:
>
> US-NSI. Contract amendment 11. Root zone maintainer may not change root
> file on ICANN’s instruction without counter signature. (Archive | Source)
>
> US-VeriSign. Contract amendment 32. Section 3.2 ICANN covenants, 3.2.C
> ICANN authorization. (Archive | Source)
>
> US-ICANN. IANA functions contract. C.2.9 four IANA functions and C.8.1
> verbatim. (Archive | Source)
>
> ICANN. IANA Transition FAQ. #2 five IANA functions, #16 paradox. (Archive
> | Source)
>
> ICG. Draft Charter. pg. 5, sec. 3, para. 1 (end), ICG/coordination group
> redundancy requires clarification. (Archive | Source)
>
> http://www.radialbasis.com/posts/coordination-group-
> charter-public-comments
>
> _______________________________________________
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> ccwg-internet-governance at icann.org
> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ccwg-internet-governance
>
>
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