Comments on the Evolving Governance of the Root Server System (RSS)

After having gone through *RSSAC037* and the concept paper *"On a community-driven process to develop a Final Model Based on RSSAC037",* it is essential that the autonomy and independence of the Root Server Operators (RSOs) as outlined in *RSSAC042* be strictly maintained even in the face of meeting new governance, transparency and accountability requirements. There does lie a risk that binding Service Level Agreements (SLAs) and parental supervision from the proposed trio of the Root Server System Governance Board (RGB), Root Server Standing Committee (RSC) and the Root Server Operator Review Panel (RRP) over the RSOs may impede the latter's independence.

Concerning the governance model, it is not clear if all current RSOs should abide to the proposed governance model once it is in place. What if an RSO opts out and decides to not be under any supervision, will such a RSO be barred from serving the root zone?

On to other matters, both the *RSSAC037* and the concept paper do not mention how the proposed governance structures will be transparent and accountable to Internet end users who aren't necessarily members of ALAC. As Internet users are the biggest beneficiaries of the RSS, how will the proposed structures assure Internet users of the trust and integrity of the RSS?

Lastly, what will be the purpose and relevance of the RSSAC and its caucus when the RGB, RSC and RRP are in place? From the documents these three organs serve both operational and advisory roles and thus, will RSSAC continue to exist or will RSSAC be subsumed into the new governance structures?

Respectfully,

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