

**“Punch List” on Post-Transition IANA Model  
Items for CWG Discussion and Input**

	<b>Task</b>	<b>Responsible Group</b>	<b>Status</b>
<b>New Post-Transition IANA (PTI) entity type</b>			
1.	Determine legal entity: non-profit corporation or limited liability company. (Section III.A.i.a.)		
<b>Transfer of naming functions to PTI</b>			
2.	Determine assets that will need to be transferred to PTI. (Section III.A.i.a.)		
3.	Determine whether consents will be required to transfer/assign assets to PTI. (Note: IETF consent is required for the assignment of the IETF MOU.) (Section III.A.i.a.)		
<b>PTI Board</b>			
4.	Determine size and composition. Determine who appoints. (Section III.A.i.b.)		
5.	Determine scope of PTI Board role. (Section III.A.i.b.) (See Sidley Austin memo of April 28 for statutory duties)		
<b>IANA Function Review (IFR)</b>			
6.	Confirm that IFR will be provided for under the ICANN governance documents (i.e., in bylaws), rather than a right under the ICANN/PTI Contract (Section III.A.i.d.)		
7.	Proposal contemplates that IFR team can recommend amendments to SOW. Annex F contemplates any amendments proposed by IFR would be subject to ratification by ccNSO and GNSO. Determine voting threshold for ccNSO and		

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	GNSO (e.g., majority or supermajority? require both organizations?). (Annex F, page 50)		
8.	Special review is triggered by supermajority vote of ccNSO and GNSO councils. Determine voting threshold (i.e., 66-2/3%; 75%, etc.). (Section III.A.i.d. and Annex F, page 55)		
9.	If persistent problem triggers a special review, will timeline of review be accelerated to address issue? If not, how are issues addressed in the interim? (Annex F, page 55)		
10.	Special review can be initiated after “defined escalation procedures are exhausted” and “defined accountability mechanisms are exhausted.” Define with specificity what these procedures and mechanisms will be. (Annex F, page 55)		
11.	Is there a need to integrate AoC review with new IFR process? (Annex F, page 54)		
<b>Customer Standing Committee (CSC)</b>			
12.	Determine whether CSC will be formed under ICANN structure (i.e., in bylaws) or in ICANN/PTI contract. (Section III.A.ii.a.)		
13.	Composition: who will select the TLD representative that is not a ccTLD or gTLD registry? (Annex G, page 59)		
14.	Full membership of CSC is approved by ccNSO and GNSO. By what percentage? (Annex G, page 60)		
15.	If ccTLD or gTLD representative is recalled, can meetings continue before a replacement is named? (Annex G, page 60)		
16.	Determine how CSC will decide on who will be liaison to IFR. (Annex F, page 52)		

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17.	Proposed Remedial Action Procedures is noted as item to be agreed upon by CSC and PTI. Will this happen prior to transition? (Annex F, page 62)		
18.	IANA Problem Resolution Process: contemplates that CSC can escalate to ccNSO and GNSO which may then decide to take further action “using agreed consultation and escalation processes”. What will these processes be and is anything contemplated beyond a Special Review? (Annex J, page 68)		
<b>ICANN/PTI Contract; Statement of Work and SLEs</b>			
19.	Determine to what extent the ICANN/PTI contract will be the source of rights (vs. CSC, IFR or other ICANN accountability mechanisms). (Section III.A.i. and Section III.A.i.c. See also Annex F)		
20.	Determine which rights under the existing NTIA contract will be implemented in the ICANN governance documents and which will be in the new ICANN/PTI contract. (Section III.A.i.c.)		
21.	Determine who will have the right to trigger remedies for breaches of, and otherwise enforce, ICANN/PTI Contract (i.e., will PTI Board exercise this right or will this require CSC or IFR). (Sections III.A.i.b, c, and d)		
22.	DT-A SLE documentation following receipt of additional IANA documentation. (Section III.A.ii.b. and Annex H)		
<b>Escalation mechanisms</b>			
23.	Who does ccNSO/GNSO escalate unresolved issues to? Will there be an IRP process (Section III.A.ii.a. and Annex J, footnote 22)		
24.	Additional detail on how a persistent performance issue/systemic problem will be defined (e.g., discretion given to CSC or some principles-based standard)? (Section III.A.ii.c.)		
25.	Customer complaints, Phase 2: additional detail on customer mediation process		

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	and ability to initiate an IRP. (Annex I, page 66)		
<b>Separation Review</b>			
26.	Under what circumstances can a separation review be triggered? Will it only be upon a recommendation of the IFR? (Section III.A.ii.d. and Annex L)		
27.	What remedies that must be exhausted prior to triggering separation review? (Section III.A.ii.d. and Annex L)		
28.	Who can initiate a separation review? (Section III.A.ii.d. and Annex L)		
29.	Is the cross community working group for a separation contemplated by Annex L different from the IFR? If so, more detail is needed. (Annex L)		
30.	Is there an interim approval of an IRF recommendation to separate (i.e., by SOs/ACs) or does recommendation go directly to ICANN/Board? (Section III.A.ii.d. and Annex L)		
31.	Implementation of a separation. (Section III.A.ii.d. and Annex L)		
<b>Root Zone Maintainer (RMZ)</b>			
32.	Proposal contemplates that if RMZ transition is completed prior to IANA stewardship transition, need mechanism to ensure that change requests for Root Zone are implemented in a timely manner by RMZ (proposal references possible agreement between RMZ and PTI). (Section III.A.iii.b.)		
33.	Discuss potential required for an agreement between PTI and RMZ or changes to the Cooperative Agreement. (Annex N, page 77)		
<b>Timeline</b>			
34.	Develop timeline for implementation. CCWG dependency (consider with		

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	CCWG timeline). (Section IV.D.)		
<b>CCWG Dependencies</b>			
35.	ICANN Budget – Ability for the community to approve/veto the ICANN budget. Requirements relating to budget to include transparency of IANA function’s comprehensive costs and itemization of costs at project level. (Section III.A.iv.b.)		
36.	Community Empowerment Mechanisms – The multistakeholder community would be empowered to have certain rights with respect to ICANN Board and the IANA functions including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. ability to appoint/remove board members;</li> <li>ii. ability to exercise oversight with respect to key ICANN board decisions (approve/veto rights);</li> <li>iii. ability to approve amendments to fundamental bylaws</li> </ul>		
37.	IANA Function Review – the IFR should be created and empowered to conduct periodic and special reviews of the IANA functions. (Section III.A.i.d.; Annex F)		
38.	Customer Standing Committee (CSC) – A CSC should be created and empowered to monitor the performance of the IANA functions and escalate non-remediated issues to the ccNSO and GNSO. The CSC should be contemplated by the ICANN bylaws. If not currently within the mandate, the ccNSO and/or GNSO should be empowered to address matters escalated by the CSC. Section III.A.ii.a.; Annex G and Annex J)		
39.	Appeal Mechanism – An appeal mechanism, for example in the form of an Independent Review Panel, will be required for issues relating to the IANA functions. (Annex I and Annex J)		
40.	Separation Review – Mechanism for a separation review to be included once certain remedies are exhausted which would trigger a separation of PTI. (Annex L)		

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41.	Fundamental Bylaws – All of the foregoing mechanisms are to be provided for in the ICANN bylaws as “fundamental bylaws”.		