	Design Team N/X Punch List Items	
IANA Functions Review		
	Task	Recommendation
6	Proposal contemplates that a Special Review may also be initiated by TLDs on concerns raised by TLDs directly with the ccNSO or the GNSO. (Section III.A.i.d.)	DT-N Recommendation: This trigger for the Special Review should be struck and the Special Review should only be triggered after the CSC first undertakes remedial action procedures and then refers the matter to the ccNSO/GNSO for approval. Individual TLD operators are empowered to raise these issues with the CSC and that is the correct pipeline through which these problems should come up.
7	Annex F contemplates any amendments proposed by IFR would be subject to ratification by ccNSO and GNSO. Determine voting threshold for ccNSO and GNSO (e.g., majority or supermajority? require both organizations?). (Annex F, page 50)	Recommendations would require a supermajority of both the ccNSO and the GNSO.
8	Special review is triggered by supermajority vote of ccNSO and GNSO councils. Determine voting threshold (i.e., 66-2/3%; 75%, etc.). (Section III.A.i.d. and Annex F, page 55)	"Supermajority" threshold and definition will be defined by internal voting procedures in the ICANN bylaws and special rules and procedures. For the GNSO, a supermajority is defined as: two-thirds (2/3) of the Council members of each House, or a three-fourths (3/4) of one House and a majority of the other House. For the ccNSO, [To Come]
9	If persistent problem triggers a special review, will timeline of review be accelerated to address issue? If not, how are issues addressed in the interim? (Annex F, page 55)	A special review will follow the same phases identified for the IANA Functions review including: -Consultations with IFO; -Consultations with CSC; -Consultation with ccTLD and gTLD Operators; -Public Comment Period; Draft amendments to come out of the Special Review would, likewise, be subject to :

		-Public Comment Period -Ratification by the ccNSO and GNSO -Approval by the ICANN Board We contemplate, however, that the inputs to the Special Review process would be narrower. Instead of reviewing all of the inputs identified for the Periodic Review process, the Special Review would focus primarily on the identified deficiency and its implications for overall IANA Performance, as well as on how that issue is best resolved. Given the narrowed set of inputs, we imagine that the timeline would be accelerated.
10	Special Review can be initiated after "defined escalation procedures are exhausted" and "defined accountability mechanisms are exhausted." Define with specificity what these procedures and mechanisms will be. (Annex F, page 55)	

Separation Process

	Task	Recommendation
24	Under what circumstances can the separation process be triggered? Will it only be upon a recommendation of the IFR? (Section III.A.ii.d. and Annex L)	The Separation process would be triggered by the following steps: ● IFR Recommendation ● Supermajority of GNSO & supermajority of ccNSO ● Board approval
25	What remedies must be exhausted prior to triggering separation process? (Section III.A.ii.d. and Annex L)	
26	Who can initiate a separation process? (Section III.A.ii.d. and Annex L)	[Isn't this the same as the answer to 24?]
27	Is the cross community working group for a separation contemplated by Annex L different from the IFR team? If so, more detail is needed. (Annex L)	The Separation Process Team (SPT) would be be a different set of multistakeholder representatives, with the same composition as the IFR team.
28	Is there an interim approval of an IRF recommendation to separate (i.e., by SOs/ACs) or does recommendation go directly to ICANN/Board? (Section III.A.ii.d. and Annex L)	Goes to GNSO and ccNSO, and is subject to public comment, then to ICANN Board
29	Implementation of a separation. (Section III.A.ii.d. and Annex L)	