[CWG-RFP3] Contract re-bidding at regular intervals or permanent mandate?

Fri Nov 14 02:13:41 UTC 2014

Seun
There is a simple answer to your question. If the service provided by the incumbent is satisfactory then they are likely to retain the contract. Other applicants might look very good in the ‘beauty contest,’ but unless there is some kind of profound dissatisfaction with the incumbent there is a lot of pressure not to change. So one could re-bid the contract every three years but still end up with the same organization doing it for 12 years or 30 years.

From: Seun Ojedeji [mailto:seun.ojedeji at gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, November 13, 2014 12:29 PM
To: Guru Acharya
Cc: RFP3; Milton L Mueller
Subject: Re: [CWG-RFP3] Contract re-bidding at regular intervals or permanent mandate?

While we consider all these options, I will ask that we also consider whether it's better to concentrate on an organisation with the aim of improving it's operation OR we keep on moving from one incomplete organisation to the other in the name of keeping the previous/current operator accountable.

We should in this process determine whether there is significant improvement in the current operator of IANA and also whether there is room for further  improvement. Stability cannot be maintained if the operator itself is not stable.

My 2 cents.

Cheers!

sent from Google nexus 4
kindly excuse brevity and typos.
On 13 Nov 2014 18:03, "Guru Acharya" <gurcharya at gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya at gmail.com>> wrote:
I agree with Milton that the IANA contract should be for a limited time period (say 3 or 5 years). The oversight body should be responsible for deciding the new IANA operator at the end of the contract term. This is the most effective way of ensuring accountability.

However, I disagree with the mechanism of "Open Bidding" that Milton seems to be suggesting for determining the new IANA operator. The term Open Bidding seems to suggest financial reverse auctions. The mechanism should instead be in the form of a transparent beauty contest wherein open applications are invited from all interested parties. The judging parameters for the beauty contest should be mostly technical. In this beauty contest, the incumbent IANA operator should get extra marks in case of a good record in the previous contract term, the measure of which should be in the form of objective service level criteria.

If the IANA contract is perpetual or with termination clauses based solely on service levels then, in case of serious dissatisfaction with the incumbent IANA operator, the process of changing the IANA operator may be subjected to a lot of litigation and arm-twisting. The current transition arrangements need to have the foresight to avoid such problems.

On Thu, Nov 13, 2014 at 7:03 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller at syr.edu<mailto:mueller at syr.edu>> wrote:

From: Bertrand de La Chapelle [mailto:bdelachapelle at gmail.com<mailto:bdelachapelle at gmail.com>]
view, accountability was also exercised on a regular basis, through the monitoring of performance, the possibility of audits and, actually, also the role of NTIA as RZM process administrator (on each modification). In this regard, moving the contract somewhere else, as "nuclear option", was the ultimate accountability stop but not the alpha and omega of the accountability system.

MM: True. Those forms of accountability are complementary. But most of the proposals on the table for a new contracting authority also include these other forms of monitoring.

Furthermore, ultimate accountability does not need to come from a single point of authority. It can be more distributed. For instance, if the different user communities of the IANA functions were to establish separate agreements with ICANN (or recognize that it plays this role for them) with the capacity to cancel this agreement on the basis of specific criteria (including performance), the capacity to "pull the trigger on a contract" would be fulfilled.

MM: This is a very interesting idea and I hope you pursue it and make it more concrete. As a future scenario it is highly likely that IANA’s performance might satisfy one or two of the operational communities but not the other one. Furthermore, as you suggest, it is safer to distribute this contracting authority rather than having it concentrated.

The question of accountability should not be limited to the single model of replacing the NTIA by another single structure (to be created), continuing without question the practice of re-bidding that was the result of circumstances as much as a voluntary choice, and focusing on the "nuclear option" as the most important aspect, neglecting on the way more continuous accountability dimensions.

MM: Well, I do not want to neglect more continuous accountability dimensions, but after 16 years of experience with the ICANN environment I have a pretty strong conviction that nothing short of periodic renewal can provide the foundation for all the other forms of monitoring and accountability.

All I argue for is that we should include in our thinking the following option: what would be the accountability mechanisms appropriate IANA were permanently managed by ICANN?

MM: No, there is definitely a contradiction between “being accountable” and a grant of “permanent management” rights. While there can be some additional supervisory or oversight mechanisms, insofar as the grant is permanent it massively increases the slack that the operator has against its principals. If the assumption is, “I will always be the contractor” you can issue all the stern warnings and bad reports you like, the incentive to change is drastically weakened. This seems obvious to me.

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