[CWG-RFP3] Is separability possible under an internal solution
Chris Disspain
ceo at auda.org.au
Fri Jan 9 06:07:28 UTC 2015
Hi Suen,
There is also the other not insignificant fact that the current IANA function contract is a zero cost one.
And, I'm interested in your point that moving the operations of IANA also means moving the policy body. Could you expand on that please?
Cheers,
Chris
> On 9 Jan 2015, at 16:51, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> sent from Google nexus 4
> kindly excuse brevity and typos.
> On 8 Jan 2015 10:22, "Milton L Mueller" <mueller at syr.edu> wrote:
> >
> > Chris:
> >
> > Brief answer due to time constraints:
> >
> >
> >
> > I will take another, closer look at the AuDA proposal and try to do a comparison of it to the CWG proposal with respect to complexity and risk.
> >
> >
> >
> > We disagree on periodic re-tendering (remember that is what we have been doing for the past 15 years), and it’s unlikely you will convince me otherwise.
> >
> >
> Well they have the independent resources to do so even though deep inside they know the bidding process is only going to yield 1 result. I also saw the contracting then as a way of protecting the young ICANN. We should also bear in mind that NTIA has never exercised transferring to another operator because no sane organisation will want to abandon a construction at 20th floor to start building another one; moving to another IANA operator is not only about the function but also the policy body (as it fixes noting if ICANN still runs the policy). multistakeholder should not set itself on such a path but should make possible a way to get the current builder to improve and if no improvement, a way to change the builder (board removal) so building can continue from 20th floor
>
> Hope that convinces Milton ;-)
>
> Regards
> >
> >
> >
> > From: Chris Disspain [mailto:ceo at auda.org.au]
> > Sent: Wednesday, January 7, 2015 5:04 PM
> >
> > To: Milton L Mueller
> > Cc: RFP3
> > Subject: Re: [CWG-RFP3] Is separability possible under an internal solution
> >
> >
> >
> > Hello Milton,
> >
> >
> >
> > Speaking entirely in my capacity as CEO of auDA, some responses to your paragraph below.
> >
> >
> >>
> >> Second, the internal advocates seem to want to have their cake and eat it, too. They say, “let’s not go to all the trouble of creating complex institutional mechanisms such as Contract Co. to achieve separability, let’s just improve ICANN’s accountability. That is a coherent position, but it is not what you, or Chris Disspain, or Martin of SIDN seem to be advocating.
> >
> >
> >
> > On the contrary, that is what I am advocating. I am saying that I believe ICANN is the right organisation to perform the IANA function and that a series of IANA specific accountability mechanisms can be built to ensure that the ccTLD and gTLD customers of the IANA function can get good service at agreed levels and have disputes resolved in a fair and binding manner.
> >
> >
> >
> > I am opposed to the concept of creating some entity in some, to be identified, jurisdiction that would have the "right" to grant the contract to perform the IANA function. I am especially opposed to the concept of this critical function being re-tendered every X years.
> >
> >
> >
> > However, I recognise that a number of my ccTLD and gTLD colleagues believe that there should be a mechanism for the IANA function to be moved elsewhere. The auDA alternative proposal sets out a way in which that could happen that would be acceptable to us.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >> You seem to be saying, “we hate the idea of Contract Co., but we also support separability, so let’s create a Contracting entity through an internal process of ICANN that we can magically pull out of a hat when we need it.”
> >
> >
> >
> > Well, kind of, yes. But, just so we are crystal clear:
> >
> >
> >
> > a) I do not believe that separability can only be achieved by utilising the concept of a contracting entity. It is entirely possible to be opposed to the current proposal but to believe in separability,
> >
> >
> >
> > b) our alternative proposal does not involve the use of magic nor of hats of any description. It contemplates a "nuclear" option of the IANA function leaving ICANN and provides a mechanism that can indeed be used "when we need it" and,
> >
> >
> >
> > c) the alternative proposal it is not an internal ICANN process but rather a process controlled by the IANA function customers together with representatives from other parts of the multistakeholder firmament.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >> And far from avoiding complex institutional mechanisms, the internalists end up creating even more complex, difficult to understand and less well-defined mechanisms than the CWG proposal.
> >
> >
> >
> > Whilst I may be cast as an "internalist" out proposal is not an "internalist" proposal. And it is certainly no more complex and no less well-defined than the current CWG proposal.
> >
> >
> >
> > Cheers,
> >
> >
> >
> > Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
> >
> > .au Domain Administration Ltd
> >
> > T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
> >
> > E: ceo at auda.org.au | W: www.auda.org.au
> >
> >
> >
> > auDA - Australia's Domain Name Administrator
> >
> >
> > On 7 Jan 2015, at 08:01, Milton L Mueller <mueller at syr.edu> wrote:
> >>
> >> Martin,
> >>
> >> I am having trouble understanding your comment. Let’s break it down one by one.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> First, ICANN has been promoting the internal solution, both in Steve Crocker’s comments here and in the written comments ICANN submitted. Crocker has stated quite explicitly that “NTIA did not ask whether ICANN should continue to provide the function. That’s not really in question.” Obviously, there is no concept of separability there. So it is not only the opponents of the internal solution who believe that an internal solution implies no separability – the primary advocates of an internal solution are saying that, too. When I see ALAC and you actively criticizing these kinds of statements then and only then will I take seriously the idea that interal solutions and separability are compatible.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Second, the internal advocates seem to want to have their cake and eat it, too. They say, “let’s not go to all the trouble of creating complex institutional mechanisms such as Contract Co. to achieve separability, let’s just improve ICANN’s accountability. That is a coherent position, but it is not what you, or Chris Disspain, or Martin of SIDN seem to be advocating. You seem to be saying, “we hate the idea of Contract Co., but we also support separability, so let’s create a Contracting entity through an internal process of ICANN that we can magically pull out of a hat when we need it.” And far from avoiding complex institutional mechanisms, the internalists end up creating even more complex, difficult to understand and less well-defined mechanisms than the CWG proposal.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> I frankly think that an internal solution that provides for separability is legally incoherent and cannot exist under California law. For many years now ICANN legal has been contending that it cannot have a binding independent review process because under Cal law no subunit of ICANN’s process can overrule the board. Yet you are saying that a subcommittee formed within ICANN, or even called into existence by ICANN, can issue a recommendation that strips ICANN of something that it really, really wants to hold on to, against the wishes of the board. When you start looking at the internal reforms required to make that possible, believe me, the CWG proposal will look simple and straightforward by comparison.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> From: Martin Boyle [mailto:Martin.Boyle at nominet.org.uk]
> >> Sent: Tuesday, January 6, 2015 4:20 AM
> >> To: Seun Ojedeji; Milton L Mueller
> >> Cc: RFP3
> >> Subject: RE: [CWG-RFP3] Revised Survey
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> I am even more concerned that there is the idea being pushed that an internal solution implies no separability.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> I see no reason why there could not (should not) be an internal solution with a nuclear clause that failure by the IANA functions operator and inability to correct leads to a bid process. This would essentially be the equivalent to the nuclear button process with instructions to the Contract Co. That you set up Contract Co. at this stage in response to a failure, rather than at the transition, will obviously have some downsides, but then so does the immediate creation of Contract Co.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> So I’m sorry, I do not see Contract Co. as the only solution to separability any more than I see an internal solution as the antithesis.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> What it does mean is that the separation process might be slightly longer with an internal solution model as a contract company would need to be created at the stage of last resort. But then for stability interests, I would not feel uncomfortable with anything that did not have a cooling off period or a significant process barrier before making such a momentous and potentially disruptive step.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Cheers
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Martin
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> From: cwg-rfp3-bounces at icann.org [mailto:cwg-rfp3-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Seun Ojedeji
> >> Sent: 06 January 2015 08:32
> >> To: Milton L Mueller
> >> Cc: RFP3
> >> Subject: Re: [CWG-RFP3] Revised Survey
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Well, as far as i am concerned summing up public comments by indicating Yes or No on separability is just not an appropriate way to review inputs otherwise you would have just asked people to provide comment on separability as that could have different meaning in this context.
> >>
> >> However, as you have said, maybe i have not looked at the comments and "your compilation" with professorial eyes like yours ;-), but i can assure you that the layman eyes of mine tells me that people's comments about the CWG proposal is beyond just a concern that can be quantified and qualified with a Yes or No as you have presented it.
> >>
> >> Regards
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 4:57 AM, Milton L Mueller <mueller at syr.edu> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> From: Seun Ojedeji [mailto:seun.ojedeji at gmail.com]
> >>
> >> Thanks for the share...i missed that particular meeting. However, I just randomly picked one of the submissions(that of USCIB) that has Yes on both column and i come to conclude that whatever metrics used in determining what is Yes and what is No is absolutely flawed.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Seun
> >>
> >> The Yes in the first column means they support separability; the Yes in the second column means they have serious concerns about the MRT.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Here is a direct quote from the USCIB:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> “we support the concept that a new structure may need to oversee various administrative functions set forth in the IANA Functions Contract, which is currently performed by NTIA. And we concur that it is appropriate that direct consumers of the IANA naming functions should be vested with such oversight functions.”
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> To me, that qualifies as a clear Yes for separability.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Regarding the MRT, the USCIB comments are, admittedly, more vague and do not directly address the composition of the MRT, but they do very strongly emphasize the need to avoid duplicating accountability functions. So we marked them a yes there, too. In effet, the USCIB was critical of the structure, but supported the principle of separability.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Thanks for your input, I hope you go through the comments and our compilation more carefully next time.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Milton L Mueller
> >>
> >> Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor
> >>
> >> Syracuse University School of Information Studies
> >>
> >> http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/
> >>
> >> Internet Governance Project
> >>
> >> http://internetgovernance.org
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >>
> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>
> >> Seun Ojedeji,
> >> Federal University Oye-Ekiti
> >> web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng
> >> Mobile: +2348035233535
> >> alt email: seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng
> >>
> >> The key to understanding is humility - my view !
> >>
> >>
> >>
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> >
> >
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