[CWG-Stewardship] Fwd: Stress Tests for IANA transition proposals
Greg Shatan
gregshatanipc at gmail.com
Fri Nov 28 06:44:40 UTC 2014
All,
Further to our recent discussions of stress tests, scenarios and the like,
I am forwarding to the group an email from Steve DelBianco of the Business
Constituency with a number of examples of stress tests and links to further
discussion.
This is particularly relevant to RFP4 (which requests a "Description of
how you have tested or evaluated the workability of any new
technical or operational methods proposed in this document and how
they compare to established arrangements") and RFP3 (to inform our
discussion of various alternatives and their strengths and weaknesses).
Greg
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco at netchoice.org>
Date: Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 3:24 PM
Subject: Stress Tests for IANA transition proposals
To: "gregshatanipc at gmail.com" <gregshatanipc at gmail.com>
Cc: Steve Metalitz <met at msk.com>, Tony Holmes <tonyarholmes at btinternet.com>,
Phil Corwin <psc at vlaw-dc.com>, Aparna Sridhar <aparnasridhar at google.com>, "
skawaguchi at fb.com" <skawaguchi at fb.com>, Jonathan Zuck <JZuck at actonline.org>,
Kristina Rosette <krosette at cov.com>, Rick Lane <RLane at 21cf.com>, Elisa
Cooper <Elisa.Cooper at markmonitor.com>
Greg — as you requested on our call today, here are ’stress tests’ from
the BC's June comments (link
<http://www.bizconst.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/BC-reply-comment-on-Enhancing-ICANN-Accountability-FINAL.pdf>
to
comments). The stress tests in a standalone doc are also available at
http://bizconst.org/StressTests
Some of these stress tests relate to general ICANN accountability
concerns. But several are relevant to the IANA role you are looking at for
Naming Functions (Numbers 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10, in red below):
The BC recommends use of scenarios, or ‘stress tests’ to help design and
evaluate ICANN accountability structures and mechanisms. Today, ICANN is an
effective organization that generally performs its core functions. Although
it can be uncomfortable to imagine a scenario where a future ICANN fails
dramatically or is confronted with a serious threat, we should consider
challenging scenarios that could arise, such as those described below:
1.
Scenario: ICANN unilaterally cancels the Affirmation of Commitments,
which it may do with just 120 days notice. And if not outright
cancellation, ICANN could refuse to implement recommendations of an
Affirmation
review. Presently, the discipline imposed by needing to win the IANA
contract forces ICANN to adhere to the only external accountability it has
today: the Affirmation of Commitments. If the Affirmation is to remain
part of the new ICANN accountability framework, it is essential that the
leverage formerly conveyed by the IANA contract be replaced with a new
mechanism, which may or may not include parties external to ICANN.
2.
Scenario: ICANN takes steps to eliminate its legal presence in a nation
where Internet users and domain registrants are planning to seek legal
remedies for ICANN’s failure to enforce contracts. This scenario is not
about ICANN opening new offices around the world as part of its global
outreach. Rather, it is about ICANN creating a new legal entity distinct
from its present status as a California non-profit corporation, and
eventually relocating its legal presence. ICANN’s current corporate
presence in California creates legal certainty for businesses; presence in
a new jurisdiction might not.
3.
Scenario: ICANN becomes financially insolvent, due to lawsuits or gross
mismanagement. However unlikely, this scenario should explore the orderly
continuation of IANA functions and ICANN contract enforcement in the event
ICANN could not maintain the necessary qualified technical resources.
4.
Scenario: ICANN expands scope beyond its limited technical mission by
using domain registration fees to fund grants for developing nations or
other worthy causes. ICANN has the power to determine fees charged to TLD
applicants, registry operators, registrars, and registrants, so it presents
a big target for any Internet-related cause seeking funding sources. This
scenario should examine how a fully independent ICANN could be held to its
limited technical mission, and whether its fees and spending are subject to
external accountability.
5.
Scenario: ICANN attempts to add a new top-level domain in spite of
security and stability concerns expressed by technical community leaders.
This scenario actually came close to occurring when ICANN management did
not respond to recommendations of its own Security and Stability Advisory
Committee (SSAC) regarding risks of new TLDs interacting with security
certificates and internal domains already in use. SSAC recommendations from
prior years were not acted upon until late 2013, after significant pressure
from a root server operator, Internet service providers, and system
integrators. In the actual event, ICANN responded with a collision
mitigation plan. This scenario should assess how proposed new
accountability mechanisms could respond to similar technical risks
expressed before a TLD delegation, as well as reactive responses to
problems reported after a delegation.
6.
Scenario: Governments in ICANN’s Government Advisory Committee (GAC)
amend their operating procedures to change from consensus decisions to
majority voting. Today GAC adopts formal advice according to its Operating
Principle 47: “consensus is understood to mean the practice of adopting
decisions by general agreement in the absence of any formal objection.”13
But the GAC may at any time change its procedures to use majority
voting, where each government has equal voting power, such as in the UN and
ITU. (Notably, only 61 governments were present at the GAC meeting
in Singapore
during March 2014, where several GAC members expressed dissatisfaction with
the multistakeholder process and consensus threshold for new gTLD program
advice.) While ICANN’s board is not strictly obligated to follow GAC
advice, this scenario should assess how ICANN could respond to GAC advice
with strong majority support but less than consensus. This scenario might
also indicate need to amend ICANN bylaws regarding deference to GAC advice
that is not supported by consensus.
1.
Scenario: As described in scenario 6, the GAC might issue
majority-supported advice instructing ICANN to suspend a TLD that refuses
to remove domains with content critical of governments (e.g., .corrupt
). Today, this kind of censorship routinely occurs at the edge of the
Internet when governments block domestic access to websites, such as Turkey
blocking Twitter. This scenario envisions censorship moving from the edge to
the core of the internet – the root table of TLDs used by the entire
world. The stress test would ask how a proposed accountability mechanism
could respond if a future ICANN board bowed to GAC advice for censorship at
the root of the DNS.
2.
Scenario: ICANN attempts to re-delegate a gTLD because the registry
operator is determined to be in breach of its contract. The registry
operator challenges the breach determination and obtains an injunction from
a national court. What procedures or appeal mechanisms would be used by the
entity charged with maintenance and publication of the root zone?
3.
Scenario: A court grants an injunction against delegation of a new gTLD
that’s a plural version of another TLD that has already been delegated.
(for example, .hotels following after .hotel, or .coms following after
.com) The court may have ruled on infringement of rights or on arbitrary
and capricious behavior by ICANN, but that’s beside the point. The point of
this scenario is to ask how a post-transition ICANN and IANA would be
empowered to respond to a court injunction granted by a jurisdiction where
ICANN has a legal presence. Would ICANN/IANA be able to defer a delegation
until court proceedings were concluded? How would ICANN/IANA be accountable
for its decision if it ignored the court injunction?
4.
Scenario: A government telecom minister instructs ICANN to re-delegate a
country-code top-level domain (ccTLD), despite objections from many current
registrants and user communities in the country concerned. Faced with this
re-delegation request, what response options and measures could be
available to ICANN and the entity charged with maintenance of the root
zone?
--
*Gregory S. Shatan **ï* *Abelman Frayne & Schwab*
*666 Third Avenue **ï** New York, NY 10017-5621*
*Direct* 212-885-9253 *| **Main* 212-949-9022
*Fax* 212-949-9190 *|* *Cell *917-816-6428
*gsshatan at lawabel.com <gsshatan at lawabel.com>*
*ICANN-related: gregshatanipc at gmail.com <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> *
*www.lawabel.com <http://www.lawabel.com/>*
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