[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities

Guru Acharya gurcharya at gmail.com
Wed Oct 15 21:10:47 UTC 2014


How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by
the numbers community and protocols community?

Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According
to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to
replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation
of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1

Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural
changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN
and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship.
Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00

Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear
to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace
NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be
updated to replace NTIA oversight.

Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual
agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace
NTIA oversight?

Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because
the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator.
Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and
therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and
GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.

Therefore, it is essential to either

Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight
relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to
http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/

Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate

Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is
structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into
a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.

>From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because
of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.

I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO
are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two
communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.

Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be
discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to
reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and
numbers community.

Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names
community.

Regards,
Acharya
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