[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities

[Seun Ojedeji]

Modified Option ii combined with modified option i which gives:

An existing body agree with ICANN to self regulate only with community
created policies/processes

Cheers!
sent from Google nexus 4
kindly excuse brevity and typos.
On 15 Oct 2014 14:11, "Guru Acharya" <gurcharya at gmail.com> wrote:

> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by
> the numbers community and protocols community?
>
> Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According
> to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to
> replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation
> of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
> www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1
>
> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural
> changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN
> and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship.
> Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00
>
> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community
> appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to
> replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities
> will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
>
> Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual
> agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace
> NTIA oversight?
>
> Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community
> because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA
> operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN,
> and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and
> GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
>
> Therefore, it is essential to either
>
> Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight
> relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to
> http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/
>
> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
>
> Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is
> structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into
> a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
>
> From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable
> because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
>
> I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO
> are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two
> communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
>
> Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be
> discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to
> reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and
> numbers community.
>
> Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names
> community.
>
> Regards,
> Acharya
>
>
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