[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community Organising Outside ICANN

Fouad Bajwa fouadbajwa at gmail.com
Thu Oct 23 15:25:24 UTC 2014


There is a lot of sense in here.

Its very close to what I personally feel that IANA at this stage
should not evolve into a separate entity without a good deal of
working that is not achievable in an open community process by
September 2015 however if a clause for separability was developed and
kept in the proposal and then later and somehow a consensus process or
approach was to approve such, it can be considered.

Lets strip it out of ICANN isn't workable and I would not support it.
The proposal should show a way forward for the longterm and that
should include a mechanism (however hard it may be). One fact remains,
ICANN is a non-profit under US law. Putting IANA completely under it
is again prone to law affects on ICANN and vice versa. That discussion
has somehow disappeared to the ATRT process.

For the IANA function transition in an open and inclusive manner, it
does have to move out of under ICANN's complete remit, but how,
remains the big question.

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 10:31 AM, Guru Acharya <gurcharya at gmail.com> wrote:
> I forward below a vital discussion that is happening outside CWG but relates
> to the names proposal.
>
> I've added Avri's suggestion as Option 5 here:
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Avri Doria <avri at acm.org>
> Date: Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:07 AM
> Subject: Re: [ianatransition] [] A thought re accountability...
> To: ianatransition at icann.org
>
>
> Hi,
>
> Well if the GNSO and ccNSO can't leave ICANN, maybe the IANA could leave if
> necessary.  Wasn't that always the point of the NTIA being able to transfer
> the contract?  So if we want to keep things similar, we need to maintain the
> ability for the contract to move from ICANN to another organization, or
> perhaps to a standalone organization.  We need 'separability' of the IANA
> function to remain one of its attributes.
>
> Stability and security demand that it stay where it is for the moment.  But
> I believe that one outcome of the transition should be that it remains as
> separable as it is now.  It  must be separable from ICANN if things go
> badly.  Just as IETF can move its data to somewhere else it the relationship
> with ICANN turns sour, the GNSO and ccNSO should be able to move their data
> to somewhere else.  Personally I do not believe multiple little IANAs is the
> best solution so perhaps we need something similar to the ICG on a periodic
> basis (e.g. 5 years) to be created from the various parts of the community
> to review the performance, the audit reports, consultation based evidence
> &c. and to decide whether changes are required.  These changes could be
> minor fixes or could be major and involve transfering the responsibility.
>
> Such a mechanism based solution would be easier to craft than one that
> invovles creating yet another permanent superstructure that serves the same
> set of stakeholders involved in the current operational communities.  The
> idea that we would create an oversight for ICANN somewhat like ICANN itself
> reminds me of tortoises stacked on the backs of tortoises all the way up as
> we reach for true accountabity.  It would also not create a new organization
> with the risk that brings of recapitulating ICANNs all the way up.
>
> A separability mechanism gives the GNSO and ccNSO the same ability that the
> IETF and the RIRs have of finding another provider if necessary.  And
> working together with the advice and participation of global stakeholders, a
> decision can be made periodically on whether it has become necessary to do
> so.  One thing we have to remember, it is not ICANN the corporation that is
> the operational policy community for names.  It is the GNSO and the ccNSO
> and the advising AC's that are.  Just as the ICG does not require the ICANN
> Board's approval before sending its decision to the NTIA, so to this
> periodic review committee of IETF, RIRs, GNSO ccNSO and related policy
> advice mechanisms from the I* ecosystem, like ISOC, ALAC, GAC, SSAC, RSSAC,
> & others, would not require ICANN Board approval to move the IANA function.
>
> There may be some legal issues to be resolved in the creation of such a
> mechanism, again the problem of how does one make ICANN corporate do what
> ICANN corporate doesn't want to do.  Perhaps the construction of an IANA
> trust to hold the contract, could solve that problem.
>
> Just a thought.
>
> avri
>
>
>
> On 18-Oct-14 12:39, Milton L Mueller wrote:
>
> I'm not Jordan but will answer this anyway ;-)
>
> I would say it is _possible_.
>
> The problem is that moving GNSO and CCNSO out of ICANN at this point would
> involve such a complex set of organizational arrangements and such
> destabilizing potential for power shifts among the stakeholder groups
> involved that it could not be contemplated within anything like the time
> frame we have.
> Would it involve the creation of a new board? What would happen to GAC and
> ALAC? Just 2 examples of the kind of knotty questions that would have to be
> answered.
>
> --MM
>
> -----Original Message-----
> On Oct 15, 2014, at 3:18 PM, Jordan Carter <jordan at internetnz.net.nz>
> wrote:
>
> If we are going to have a successful transition, it's really important for
> the
>
> numbers and protocols folks to understand that:
>
> ...
> b) the names people cannot copy number/protocol accountability
> mechanisms because they aren't organised outside ICANN
> c) it isn't possible for names to organise outside ICANN in the way
> numbers/protocol people do
>
> Jordan -
>
>    Could you elaborate on why "c" isn't possible?
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> On Oct 15, 2014, at 3:18 PM, Jordan Carter <jordan at internetnz.net.nz>
> wrote:
>
>
> A thought that has been bubbling away here at ICANN LA this week for me:
>
> If we are going to have a successful transition, it's really important for
> the numbers and protocols folks to understand that:
>
> a) they have superior accountability situations to the names people today
> b) the names people cannot copy number/protocol accountability mechanisms
> because they aren't organised outside ICANN
> c) it isn't possible for names to organise outside ICANN in the way
> numbers/protocol people do
> d) there may need to be structural changes or new bodies to provide a
> workable settlement for names
> e) without a workable settlement for names, there isn't going to be a
> transition.
>
> I raise this now because both for numbers and protocols there's a clear
> direction to try and rule out any institutional changes.
>
> I strongly caution against any part of the community being dogmatic about
> any of these, because it will a) attract some attention that'll risk the
> whole transition process failing (esp. from governments), and b) means that
> a negotiated outcome is harder to achieve, also risking failure.
>
> Wonder how others feel about this.
>
> cheers
> Jordan
>
>
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-- 
Regards.
--------------------------
Fouad Bajwa
ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor
My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/
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