[CWG-Stewardship] The Reverse Hybrid Model

[Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond]

Thanks for this Greg and thanks to Paul for the suggestion.
I know that time is of the essence and a resource that nobody appears to
have enough of, but a diagram (even very simple, perhaps drawn by hand &
scanned) would help in our understanding.
Kindest regards,

Olivier

On 14/04/2015 07:41, Greg Shatan wrote:
> All,
>
> Paul Kane among others has suggested a variation on the current
> "internal" models.  Rather than quashing it, I thought it was proper
> to give it appropriate consideration.  As Paul is traveling, I thought
> I would put this together so that it could be given such consideration. 
>
> For the sake of convenience, I'm calling it the "Reverse Hybrid Model."
>
> In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform
> the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model.  However, ICANN 
> would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the
> IANA Functions.  Rather than having the right to perform the IANA
> Functions itself, the Affiliate would be given the right to contract
> for an entity to act as IANA Functions Operator.  (Thus, the Affiliate
> would be set up as a supervisor, not as an operator.)  Initially (but
> not perpetually), that subcontracted entity would be ICANN, the
> current IANA Functions Operator.  However, the Affiliate would have
> the option, under the circumstances designated by the CWG, to separate
> the performance of the IANA Functions from ICANN (e.g., by issuing an
> RFP and enter into an agreement with a third party).
>
> As with the current internal models, ICANN Corporate would be the only
> member of the Affiliate. The multi-stakeholder community would
> (s)elect the independent Board of the Affiliate, which would have a
> limited (and defined) scope.
>
> It may appear that ICANN is granting a right to itself, through the
> Affiliate.  However, the key is that the Affiliate would have the
> oversight and stewardship responsibility over the IANA Functions, by
> exercising the rights and powers it has under the agreement with the
> IANA Functions Operator.  In other words, the Affiliate would be the
> contractor with oversight of ICANN-as-IANA Functions Operator, and
> would also have the right to exercise escalation rights, up to and
> including issuing an RFP and potentially a contract to a third party
> if the designated triggers warranted it.  The CSC and the PRT would be
> activities of the Affiliate, created by bylaws of the Affiliate, with
> a multistakeholder board providing oversight over the CSC and the PRT
> and ultimately over the IANA Functions Operator (initially,
> ICANN-as-IANA). 
>
> Under the irrevocable agreement, ICANN would retain "ownership" of the
> IANA Function Operator rights but the Affiliate would (irrevocably)
> hold the right to subcontract for the performance of those services. 
> Although ICANN would be the only member, we would need to insure that
> its rights as the member to override the Board were as limited as
> possible.
>
> While this does not structurally separate the IANA Function operations
> from the rest of ICANN, it does separate the stewardship and the
> decision-making rights regarding the performance of the operations
> from ICANN.  As with the second option under the current hybrid
> proposal, there would be functional separation of the IANA Function
> operations from the rest of ICANN.
>
> While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make
> a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the
> current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less
> likely form of total separation.  The more likely form of total
> separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator,
> and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN. 
>
> More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and
> stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be
> structurally separated from ICANN.  It would be firmly in the CSC, the
> PRT and the multistakeholder board.  This would be the primary job of
> the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center.  Yet,
> it does not slight separability.
>
> I believe this proposal has sufficient merit to warrant due
> consideration.   One of the reasons we have engaged Sidley is so that
> we can understand the viability and desirability of various models and
> mechanisms (and so I and other don't have to "play lawyer").  In that
> spirit, I am forwarding this model to both the CCWG and the Client
> Committee so that this "Reverse Hybrid" model can be appropriately
> considered.
>
> Speak to you all in a few hours, as dawn rises over New York City.
>
> Greg
>
>
>
>
>
> Kind regards to both
>
> Best
>
> Paul
>
>
>
>
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-- 
Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD
http://www.gih.com/ocl.html

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