[CWG-Stewardship] The reverse hybrid model starts from a faulty premise (was: The Reverse Hybrid Model)

[Gomes, Chuck]

Good points and questions Andrew.  I just don't like to throw ideas out too quickly.   At the same time I also don't want to waste time.

Chuck

-----Original Message-----
From: cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2015 9:23 AM
To: cwg-stewardship at icann.org
Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The reverse hybrid model starts from a faulty premise (was: The Reverse Hybrid Model)

Hi Chuck,

Thanks, this is nice and concrete.  I do wonder, however, whether this list offers some of the evidence for my claim that the reverse hybrid model provides for mechanisms that ought properly to live in some other organization (probably ICANN).  See below.

On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 12:37:08PM +0000, Gomes, Chuck wrote:
> 
> At first glance, here are some ideas that I think might have value Andrew: 
> 	- irrevocable agreement

This irrevocable agreement is a necessary device in order to make it possible for ICANN to delegate the responsibility for a function that it operates to someone else, and not be able to change that.  That is, ICANN is the policy body for the names IANA function; but under this model instead of ICANN just doing its oversight job the model, it sets up an affiliate and gives it the power to do that oversight and then takes away its own power to undo that transfer of power.  This seems rather an indirect way to achieve the oversight goal.  What is the reason to prefer this to the more straightforward approach?

> 	- the Affiliate would be given the right to contract for an entity to 
> act as IANA Functions Operator

The only reason that is necessary in this model is because the function operation itself remains inside ICANN.  If the goal is to solve that internality, the legal separation model is considerably simpler.  Moreover, what isn't clear to me in this model is the extent to which the affiliate is given the right to contract for an entity to act as IANA functions operator for all IANA functions.  If it is able to do that, then what happens to arranement if the other operational communities change operators?  The need to handle such an issue appears to be a by-product of creating this complication.

> 	- The multi-stakeholder community would (s)elect the independent 
> Board of the Affiliate

Well, which multi-stakeholder community would be one of the things to work out; but of course, this ability to select an independent board of the affiliate isn't unique to the reverse hybrid approach.

> 	- The CSC and the PRT would be activities of the Affiliate, created by bylaws of the Affiliate, with a multistakeholder board providing oversight over the CSC and the PRT and ultimately over the IANA Functions Operator.
> 

I think that approach quite nicely illustrates the way I think this approach forces duplication of other functions.  It appears that the CSC and PRT need to be somewhere, but there's a whole new multistakeholder board here that is apparently responsible for oversight of appeals functions, and that will be able to bid the contract out.  I'd be astonished if that didn't result in venue-shopping for appeals whenever there is some sort of dispute.  I expect it will attract people who are dissatisfied with some policy decision to try to argue that some IANA procedure was violated.  This function is rather similar to the Contract Co proposal from before, in that it has all the disadvantages of that approach.

So, from my point of view, there are considerable disadvantages to the approach, and many of the advantages appear to be such only if one concludes that the names community can't offer proper oversight of this IANA function.  Have we really conceded that?

Best regards,

A

--
Andrew Sullivan
ajs at anvilwalrusden.com
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