[CWG-Stewardship] A few additional comments for … Two additional webinars on 6-7 May

[Milton L Mueller]

1.               It is important that Post Transition IANA, as a whole, remains anchored with Protocols and Numbering, that is with IETF and the RIRs. There are several reasons for this.
MM: Then be advised that both RIRs and IETF consider the IANA functions operator to be a simple clerical service that is provided to them on a contractual basis, and wish to maintain a clear and non-negotiable right to terminate the contract and switch providers.

2.               ( a ) Open Internet Standards are critical for fair competition and low entry barriers. Governments and Users have an existential interest in the work of IETF. ( b ) Numbering, and particularly communications numbering are of critical interest to public policy. Most governments have accepted with more-or-less good grace that that shall continue to be done for the Internet by the RIRs. However, I believe that in the last resort their ability to comment and advise on numbering policy through ICANN/IANA/GAC is a significant element in their acceptance.

MM: Once again you are showing a very fundamental misunderstanding about what IANA functions are and what the IANA functions operator (IFO) does. Policy is made outside of the IANA functions operator (IFO); IFO merely implements and keeps track of registry entries in a way that maintains global uniqueness. Advising on number policy will be done through the RIRs (not through ICANN, unless it is a global policy); advising and development of naming policy will be done through ICANN’s GNSO, ccNSO, ALAC and GAC; development of standards and protocols is done by IETF. In all three cases, the IFO merely changes the registries in ways directed by the three ‘customers’ (ICANN, RIRs, IETF). IFO is irrelevant to the making of policy.

As a long-time student and practitioner of industrial economics applied to the information society, let me say that IANA, as a fully privatised commercial service, would become financially  invaluable to its owners.
MM: Another misunderstanding. IANA is a clerical service. If it is properly confined to making the changes in registry entries as directed by IETF, RIRs and ICANN, it performs a vital but not lucrative service. The numbers top level registry could probably be run for less than $100,000/ year. The labor-intensive protocols registry could probably be done for $1-2 million a year. As long as IFO is not the root zone maintainer, the names part is not that expensive, either. And if any IFO tries to exploit its role to make it more “financially invaluable,” then the solution is to make it EASY, not hard, to switch service providers.
The second line of defence is to make it as difficult as possible to separate IANA from ICANN (as to be reformed under the CCWG Accountability proposals). In the last resort, a 'separate' IANA must be protected as a public service against any form of capture. However, that last resort is not yet credible. There are no

MM: The _best_ protection against capture is to make sure that IANA is not a fixed monopoly in the control of a single player. If it is a monopoly and the operator cannot be changed, then there will be all kinds of incentives to ‘capture’ it and exploit it as for economic or political purposes.

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