[CWG-Stewardship] {SPAM/L} Re: [Cctldworld] [ccTLDcommunity] Questions regarding InternetNZ's views on the IANA transition

[Paul M Kane]

Due to the way in which the mailing lists are managed - I am a little out of the
loop, but here's a quick update.

Within the CWG group there is significant support for both the "internal" and
"external" models.

Within the ccTLD community I think the same is true for both internal and
external.  

So there is no reason why both models cannot co-exist and operate efficiently,
serving their respective constituencies.

I am now going to Singapore, so see some of you next week.  If are not in
Singapore and want a particular view expressed, I am happy to make sure your
perspective is aired.

Regards to all

Paul 

Quoting Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el at lisse.na>:

> Just for the record,
> 
> the position of the .NZ ccTLD manager is not uncontroversial, and if at all
> only applies to .NZ.
> 
> el
> 
> Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
> 
> > On Feb 6, 2015, at 01:11, Jordan Carter <jordan at internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
> > 
> > Hi Paul, all:
> > 
> > Thanks for your email. This is an important discussion for our ccTLD
> community as well as for all those affected by the transition of stewardship
> away from ICANN.
> > 
> > In summary, for those who want the short version:
> > 
> > - the principles of distributed stewardship and separability are status quo
> principles that are in place today. Some seem to want to upend them in favour
> of One Big ICANN to be the steward of the DNS, and yet such people are
> claiming black is white, and that those defending the status quo are somehow
> proposing a revolution. It is the other way around.
> > 
> > - these principles are important to the stewardship of the DNS, not to the
> operation of ICANN per se - but they do have consequences for ICANN
> operations and structures, as set out below.
> > 
> > - we need to conduct this discussion in a way that is accurate, not
> misleading, and that helps the community towards a consensus rather than
> driving people apart.
> > 
> > 
> > Here below the longer version.
> > 
> > 
> > Paul, there are several surprising and concerning points made in your
> email, which Greg Shatan’s earlier reply dealt with in part.
> > 
> > The most significant strangeness is your assertion that distributed
> stewardship or separability are new principles. 
> > 
> > They are not new. They are the status quo. 
> > 
> > Today, stewardship of the DNS is distributed today: between ccTLD managers,
> gTLD managers, registrars, ICANN as a policy body, ICANN as the IANA
> Functions Operator, Verisign as the root zone maintainer, the NTIA as the
> steward of the system, Internet users as participants and more. Critical to
> these distributed roles and responsibilities is the independence of many of
> the players, and the complex web of relationships between them.
> > 
> > Separability exists today because the NTIA assigns the right to operate the
> IANA functions to ICANN via a contract. NTIA could assign those functions to
> another party: most easily for names, but still with teeth for the other IANA
> customers.
> > 
> > The question is, with NTIA stepping out of its crucial role as 
> > a) a component of the distributed stewardship system and
> > b) as the core of separability, the granter of the rights to operate IANA,
> > 
> > What should replace it?
> > 
> > Our argument is the conservative one: that we should not create a Big
> Brother of Internet technical coordination by putting it all in ICANN; that
> we should retain the status quo of distributed stewardship and separability
> that we have today.
> > 
> > In contrast, what those critiquing the status quo seem to be proposing is a
> very significant revolution. The implicit claim in your note and in the
> arguments Chris has been advancing is that One Big ICANN is an appropriate
> outcome: that what is today distributed among many parties should be more
> concentrated in the one institution.
> > 
> > The CWG doesn’t agree, as Greg pointed out. I don’t agree with you.
> Many others don’t agree. The notion of creating a point of failure with
> significant power and authority in the Internet’s DNS is not one that
> anyone caring about the security and stability of the system should endorse.
> It’s a significant change to the status quo and no argument justifying this
> change has yet been advanced - other than non-arguments about convenience, or
> partially . 
> > 
> > So in terms of the stewardship of the DNS system, that’s where the
> difference is. You want a narrowing of that responsibility to fewer players.
> I want to see it remain broad based and external to ICANN.
> > 
> > On operations, things are simpler I think. There’s a pretty narrow
> difference here. We seem to agree on the following points:
> > 
> > - ICANN is operating the IANA functions well at the moment
> > - There is no desire to remove IANA from ICANN at the moment
> > - customers should have a key role in oversight of the IANA functions
> > - There should be a way to remove IANA from ICANN should ICANN fail at
> operating the functions
> > - A decision about separating IANA from ICANN would need to meet high
> thresholds
> > 
> > The point of departure seems to be what vehicle allows for separation
> should it be required: an internal bylaw, an internal trust, an external
> trust, an external contract company. That’s an implementation detail in
> respect of the direct operational question, but it loops back to the broader
> question of the overall stewardship. An external-to-ICANN option is the
> status quo and is consistent with the principles we are arguing for. An
> internal-to-ICANN option is the revolution you propose, and is not consistent
> with those principles. The principles we set out relate to the transition of
> stewardship, not to ICANN’s operations. 
> > 
> > What is represented in ICANN’s bylaws is of less interest to me because I
> don’t want it to be the One And Only steward. I want ICANN to retain its
> very limited, focused mission on coordinating global policy for a set of
> Internet identifiers and protocols. I don’t want it to massively grow its
> mission as you suggest when you say it should be concerned with “the stable
> and secure operation of the Internet.”
> > 
> > 
> > On the matter of a so-called “rigid separation” - it’s my view that
> if there was ever to be a need to separate the IANA functions from ICANN, it
> would be because the organisation had truly become dysfunctional. If that was
> the case, there would be a lot going on - lots of pressure on all
> participants from the ICANN community, on ICANN staff and governors, and so
> on.
> > 
> > That would be the very last time you would want to have to rally the
> community around to try and develop new institutions to take the burden away
> from ICANN. You don’t build plans for bad situations by saying “let’s
> sort it out if it happens!”.
> > 
> > It’s that preventive preparation concept which underpins the validity of
> the CWG’s proposal with Contract Co, or an external trust. It means that
> now, under the stability and peace of the current settlement, we put a robust
> mechanism in place should it be needed. It increases the resilience of the
> system by not leaving all the eggs in one basket. (It retains the status quo,
> in other words.)
> > 
> > It might be possible to blend approaches wrt an internal trust or golden
> bylaw so there is an adequate resilience here - Google made a suggestion to
> that effect with a backup operator concept in their comments to the CWG plan.
> I don’t know - I assume that’s what the CWG is working on. But it’s
> sensible to take the status quo position, which I do, without a solid case
> and proposal being made for why an alternative is better.
> > 
> > The argument for getting rid of the external backstop, and forcing the
> community to rely on a single institution which would be in crisis should
> this situation ever need resolving, seems to be to be inexplicable and
> dangerous. 
> > 
> > It cannot do anything other than pose a threat to the security and
> stability of the DNS in the long run. 
> > 
> > It assumes that ICANN can be made perfect. I don’t believe that about any
> institution. There is a reason that balances of powers and distributed
> responsibilities are common features of every constitution that governs a
> state, and of every other governance system that is able to be resilient.
> > 
> > [None of this deals with an earlier discussion from the last Singapore
> ICANN meeting about the desirability of the IANA department becoming, for
> instance, a wholly owned subsidiary company of ICANN, to give a clearer
> boundary between the iANA functions operator and ICANN as policy body. That
> operationally related separation seems to still be in play but I just want to
> be clear that this discussion isn’t part of it.]
> > 
> > 
> > On one other point: this is not a transition to the private sector. 
> > 
> > NTIA is seeking to transition stewardship of the Internet’s DNS to the
> “global multistakeholder community” as per their comments in their
> release of 14 March 2014 and all material since. I don’t know why you think
> that translates to the “private sector” but as a ccTLD manager that
> blends technical community and civil society perspectives, I know that we in
> .nz don’t think the private sector is the destination for stewardship. I
> would be shocked if that was AUDA’s position. 
> > 
> > Can you please clarify? Is it AUDA’s view that the stewardship of the
> Internet’s DNS should be transferred to the private sector? On the face of
> it, that would directly contradict NTIA’s requirements.
> > 
> > 
> > Finally: your email has the regrettable effect of portraying the orthodox,
> status quo position I am arguing for as something out of the box, novel and
> dangerous. 
> > 
> > I ask that you avoid such characterisations in future, for two reasons. 
> > 
> > - As set out above, they are not accurate. This discussion is hard enough
> without participants misleading each other as to the current situation. 
> > 
> > - Such an approach makes the discussion harder to have, and reduces the
> likelihood of consensus being achievable once the discussion is over. 
> Without consensus the transition will run aground.
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > See you soon in Singapore.
> > 
> > Thanks,
> > Jordan
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >> On 5/02/2015, at 7:47 pm, Paul Szyndler <paul.szyndler at auda.org.au>
> wrote:
> >> 
> >> Hi Jordan (and all),
> >> 
> >> I wanted to follow up on a few exchanges that Jordan and Chris had over
> the last couple of weeks regarding the work of the CWG on the IANA
> transition.
> >> In particular, I wanted to ask a few questions in order to get a better
> understanding of the reasons behind InternetNZ’s position and the
> principles outlined in your submission to the CWG’s consultation.
> >> 
> >> Among your key principles, there are some that I obviously wouldn’t
> question – for example, the ongoing independence and policy development
> responsibilities of ccTLD managers.
> >> But there are a few principles upon which you base your position that
> don’t immediately appear aligned with ICANN’s core mission nor the goals
> of the NTIA’s intent to transfer the management of the DNS “to the
> private sector”.
> >> 
> >> As you know, the fundamental mission of ICANN is to coordinate the stable
> and secure operation of the Internet.
> >> Supporting principles include the introduction of consumer choice and
> competition, stakeholder participation and the meaningful engagement of other
> relevant stakeholder bodies and affected parties.
> >> 
> >> But neither the ICANN Bylaws nor mission statement refer explicitly to
> Internet NZ’s proposed principles of separability and a distributed model
> for stewardship.
> >> How then, do your proposed principles contribute to ICANN’s ongoing
> mission, and the resolution of the current transition process? Why are the
> principles of separability and distributed stewardship afforded such weight?
> >> In particular, as a ccTLD manager, what has led you to assume and justify
> the principles of separability and distributed stewardship, when no such
> principles existed previously?
> >> 
> >> My next few questions relate to the fundamental differences of opinion we
> have exchanged regarding the future of IANA.  
> >> 
> >> Even if the principle of structural separation is to be accepted, why does
> InternetNZ believe that such a significant and rigid act of separation
> (establishment of a Contract Co) is required at this stage of ICANN’s
> evolution?
> >> Is it not equally valid to consider that the codified “ability” to
> separate in the future is an acceptable outcome?
> >> Are models, such as a Trust, at least equally capable of delivering a
> desired result, without issues such as jurisdiction and structure, that are
> associated with establishing a Contract Co.? 
> >> 
> >> I’d welcome your views – both via email and (inevitably) further
> discussion when we catch up in Singapore.
> >> 
> >> Regards,
> >> 
> >> Paul
> >> 
> > 
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