[CWG-Stewardship] CWG-Stewardship Chairs' Statement - Summary of ICANN 52 Meeting

[Milton L Mueller]

John
I think your concerns are warranted. I would note, however, that Larry Strickling came before the Noncommercial Users Constituency Feb 11 and was confronted with exactly the same question you are raising. He assured us (and this text is from my notes of the meeting):

“we (the MS community) are the deciders. He doesn't want to tip scales on substance of the proposals. Just make sure they are well thought through.”




From: cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of John Poole
Sent: Wednesday, February 18, 2015 6:58 PM
To: cwg-stewardship at icann.org; jrobinson at afilias.info; Greg Shatan
Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] CWG-Stewardship Chairs' Statement - Summary of ICANN 52 Meeting

I may be the only one thinking this, but it seems to me the following needs to addressed, before proceeding further--

In late January, 2015, Larry Strickling said: "The community should proceed as if it has only one chance to get this right. Everyone has the responsibility to participate as they deem appropriate."

Who is the community Strickling is referring to? It is not just ICANN nor just ICANN stakeholders--

".... the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) today announces its intent to transition key Internet domain name functions to the global multistakeholder community.  As the first step, NTIA is asking the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to convene global stakeholders to develop a proposal to transition the current role played by NTIA in the coordination of the Internet’s domain name system (DNS)...." (NTIA, March, 2014)

The global multistakeholder community is broader than just ICANN or the so-called ICANN community. Both ICANN and the US Department of Commerce acknowledge this in the Affirmation of Commitments<https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/affirmation-of-commitments-2009-09-30-en>:

"... ICANN and DOC recognize that there is a group of participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than Internet users generally. To ensure that its decisions are in the public interest, and not just the interests of a particular set of stakeholders, ICANN commits to... "

Subsequent to the March, 2014, announcement, at the request of the NTIA, ICANN convened a process led by, and comprised mostly of, ICANN stakeholders, but nominally open to participation by other members of the global multistakeholder community. Prior to ICANN 52, this CWG had 2 external models and 2 internal models under consideration, and was awaiting procurement of independent legal counsel advice in order to proceed with its work. Then ICANN 52 happened. I was not there personally, but I attended remotely online via Adobe Connect and also followed the #ICANN52 Twitter feed. What I read and heard was disconcerting--to name but a few examples:

a) At a Registry Stakeholders Group meeting (co-Chair Jonathan Robinson was present), it was said by a CWG-stewardship member that external models were "off the table" and referred to statements of Larry Strickling/NTIA at ICANN 52.
b) Jordan Carter<https://twitter.com/jordantcarter/status/564718002214432768> @jordantcarter: "Pretty surprised at the intensity of #USG and #ICANN pressure at #ICANN52 regarding an "Internal to ICANN" solution to #NTIA stewardship."
c) Milton Mueller<https://twitter.com/miltonmueller/status/564718886562459649> @miltonmueller: "The US Commerce Dept is overplaying its hand in Singapore #ICANN52. If its up to the ms community, leave us alone, stop tipping the scales"

Therefore I can only conclude that notwithstanding the public announcements and statements of NTIA and Larry Strickling, the US Government/Dept of Commerce/NTIA (perhaps joined in by others within ICANN) are now trying to control or manipulate, inappropriately, the outcomes of the CWG-Stewardship work. Larry Strickling and his ilk do not intimidate me--I have already addressed reports of his and other NTIA personnel inappropriate conduct in Singapore, with my US Congressman and US Senators--House and Senate Hearings are being planned after the current recess.
At the same time, positive and supportive feedback was given at ICANN 52 for the CWG-Stewardship work and process thus far:
Jordan Carter @jordantcarter · Feb 9 -"Impressed by the dedication, experience and skill of the #CWG team developing the names transition for #IANA stewardship. #ICANN52"
Mathieu Weill @mathieuweill · Feb 9 - "I called #icann Board members to act as leaders #ianatransition : support volunteers, be clear on assessment criteria, dont get to details."

Therefore, I request the Co-Chairs to assure this CWG that notwithstanding inappropriate "pressure" at ICANN 52, our work can continue as before, that neither external nor internal models are "off the table." If however, it is the judgment of the Co-Chairs, or this CWG as a whole, that this is now a top-down process being directed or manipulated from within NTIA or ICANN, then I request the Co-Chairs to so inform all CWG-Stewardship members/participants so we can end the charade--I am sure most of us have better things to do.
External Trust Model proposed change:
All of the above said, I attended remotely more ICANN 52 sessions than probably anyone could have who was in Singapore. I listened closely to all of the comments made in public sessions dealing with the CWG-Stewardship work. I heard Jonathan Robinson give so many presentations of the CWG-Stewardship work at ICANN 52 that I thought maybe he had changed his name to Johnny Icann :-) .  Based on all of the comments made, I propose amending (and simplifying) the External Trust Model by providing (1) MRT/CSC and IAP functions (if deemed still necessary), be moved "internal to ICANN" by simply making them requirements/terms of the IANA functions operator contract; (2) that the Trust property include the IP referenced by the IETF proposal<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-09> ("iana.org<http://iana.org>" and other associated marks), as well as the Internet "authoritative root server" referenced in: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/og00033r.pdf, in addition to all of the U.S. Government’s rights and duties included within its “stewardship” role over the Internet and DNS, including the right to issue the IANA Functions Contract, and its related IP--e.g., InterNIC, a registered service mark of the U.S. Department of Commerce, licensed to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. To reiterate, the purpose of the Trust/Trustees is to be the "lightweight" high-level, external contractual counter-party, ensuring a free, open, stable and secure internet in accordance with NETmundial Statement principles and the Affirmation of Commitments, all of which would be referenced and incorporated within the Trust instrument, enforceable by the Court where the Trust is registered; Trustees also accountable to/selected by/representative of the global multi-stakeholder community. The Trust/Trustees would have no operational role in the operation of the IANA functions or Internet Root Zone.

In reality, the IANA contract is not going anywhere--ICANN is and will continue to be the IANA functions operator under a long-term contract but for insolvency, bankruptcy, or material breach such as failing to perform the IANA functions as provided by the contract, in which event the Trustees would be empowered to select a successor to ICANN in accordance with the terms of the Trust instrument. The NTIA's procedural role of approving changes to the authoritative root zone file is either not needed or could be performed by ICANN itself, the Root Zone Maintainer, or a 3rd party audit firm. The External Trust Model provides a minimal, but necessary, safeguard of external accountability in place of US government oversight.
I would also note that it appears CCWG-Accountability has a lot of work to do--I am glad that is not our job--I wish them well.

A final note: I am personally perplexed by proposals which discuss separating IANA from ICANN. All of ICANN's authority is derivative of its role as the IANA functions operator--including ICANN's authority to authorize new gTLDs. While the day-to-day operation of the IANA department should be separate internally from the policy-making functions of ICANN, if you strip IANA from ICANN, ICANN is powerless. If I am wrong, I would like to see some authority in support thereof.

Best regards,
John Poole
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