[CWG-Stewardship] Update on the Integrated model.

[Gomes, Chuck]

Andrew,

One concern I have about your proposed variation is the use of a NomCom like approach.  The NomCom as it is configured today is made up of people who are selected by the multi-stakeholder community but once they are selected they are really not accountability to the groups that select them.  They are presumably accountable to the public interest but that is an ill-defined concept that means different things to different people and I am not sure that will ever change and maybe it shouldn't except with regard to the issues of security and stability, which I think there is broad agreement.

Chuck

-----Original Message-----
From: cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan
Sent: Sunday, February 22, 2015 1:11 AM
To: cwg-stewardship at icann.org
Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Update on the Integrated model.

Greetings,

On Wed, Feb 18, 2015 at 02:09:28PM -0500, Avri Doria wrote:
> 
> The working draft, which is still a work in progress and remains open 
> for comment can be found at:
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1SvKDEIaeHdre3BQXHNe1K3hCA95dsFWqWA
> z2Kg5YZCU/edit?usp=sharing
> 

I've read this.  I want to thank the contributors for a serious and earnest effort.  It's good to be talking about specific text.

> In the draft we present three possible configurations for the model. 
> The authors believe that Shared Service Arrangement (page 6) is the 
> preferred configuration, as it offers the most accountability for the 
> least amount of change or complexity.

I can see why that might be the authors' preference, but I have pretty grave doubts that it is an achievable configuration.  In particular,

> It should be noted that this model would require a minimal amount of 
> accommodation by the Protocols and Number communities

at least for the protocol parameters community, I disagree pretty strongly that the accommodation is "minimal".

Right now, the IETF has a simple system: it runs the policy, and it outsources the entire operation of the registry to ICANN.  The IETF has to process the service statistics from IANA, and once a year there's some effort on SLAs, but this is a pretty low-overhead, outsourced-operator approach.  The model in the document, particularly in the "shared service arrangement" configuration, requires significantly more effort on the part of the IETF.  It's a little hard for me to see why the IETF would go for this: more work for no more benefit is always harder to sell, and the IETF has been quite clear that it is happy with the arrangements as they are.  Moreover, the proposal seems to work from the assumption that the IETF's ability to leave and go elsewhere is a thing to be "mitigated", but the IETF appears to like that arrangement.

I wonder, however, whether the model might not be modified slightly to deliver most of the same benefits, while still not upsetting the existing arrangements between ICANN and the RIRs or ICANN and the IETF.  (This really is wondering: in the interests of getting a reaction out quickly, I haven't allowed this to bake.)

In order to do this, one would start with the ICANN subsidiary configuration.  But instead of changing the MOU & SLAs from the RIRs and from the IETF, those just remain with ICANN.  In other words, the non-names communities see no difference.

ICANN, however, would (sub)contract all IANA functions to the PTI subsidiary.  Since ICANN would be the only customer, the governance of PTI could be undertaken by a board appointed by a nomcom rather than appointed by the three communities.  This might well mitigate some of the worries about ICANN accountability that are listed as issues with the "subsidiary" configuration.  It automatically provides a structural separation because ICANN's policy function remains firmly inside ICANN, and would put ICANN in the position of having to negotiate its agreement, SLAs, and so on with PTI.  (Presumably, these negotiations would be driven by the GNSO and ccNSO, but I think that's a detail to be worked out if this approach seems promising.)  The IAP, if needed, would I think be relevant to policy disputes in ICANN but not necessarily relevant to the PTI (since the latter has a nomcom-appointed board, and that could function as the appeal mechanism).

A significant benefit to this approach is that it drastically minimizes changes.  Indeed, for two of the three affected communities, the effect is practically nothing.  The names community of course has more work to do, but it is the community has the most confused current arrangements, so this only clarifies the arrangements in the case where they need it.  Because it puts IANA into a different organization that ICANN, it requires an agreement between the policy authority (or authorities) for names (within ICANN) and the IANA operator strictly construed.  Presumably ICANN would also need to contract with PTI for the SLAs to satisfy ICANN's obligations to the IETF and RIRs, but I am assuming for these purposes that would be easy to do.

What do people think of this somewhat more modest approach?

Best regards,

A

--
Andrew Sullivan
ajs at anvilwalrusden.com
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