[CWG-Stewardship] Update on the Integrated model.

Sun Feb 22 18:17:15 UTC 2015

Hey Seun,
A quick comment on this paragraph:

>Thanks for the explanation which was quite helpful. I must say the more i try to process this, the more it seem that the proposal attempts to practically create a new operator order than ICANN (re: PTI) being the operator and turns ICANN to a "policy only" organisation. That seem like a major change in the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) mission and purpose. How will this work with ccTLDs who for instance are practically engaging with ICANN just because it is the IANA operator? how about existing gTLD contracts which were signed with the intent of ICANN being the operator?

I think it’s important to remember that the IANA functions are not something that should be considered integral to ICANN, they are currently operated by ICANN under contract from NTIA, and it has been repeated on a number of occasions that the concept of separability is very important to a large number of people involved in this process. I think it may be a dangerous road to go down to suggest that IANA may never be moved out of ICANN as that would imply that any IANA accountability measures would have no recourse to move the IANA contract way from ICANN. If there are barriers to that separability then we need to example these as part of any model that has a separability clause.

As has been developed within the RIR and IETF submissions, I think that it’s important that no matter what solution we end up deciding on that the ability for the IANA functions to sustain operations regardless of its home should be at the core of discussions. This needs to be captured as part of the stress tests and should be one of the core concepts in my opinion, the survivability of the IANA functions is paramount over any considerations of home/operator/jurisdiction.

From: cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Seun Ojedeji
Sent: Sunday, February 22, 2015 5:38 PM
To: Avri Doria
Cc: cwg-stewardship at icann.org
Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Update on the Integrated model.

Hello Avri,
Thanks for the explanation which was quite helpful. I must say the more i try to process this, the more it seem that the proposal attempts to practically create a new operator order than ICANN (re: PTI) being the operator and turns ICANN to a "policy only" organisation. That seem like a major change in the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) mission and purpose. How will this work with ccTLDs who for instance are practically engaging with ICANN just because it is the IANA operator? how about existing gTLD contracts which were signed with the intent of ICANN being the operator?

Looking at the proposal, how do we achieve accountability of the "community board"? i mean why should one be comfortable that the "community board" will be more accountable than the current ICANN board? even if they are, why can't some of the proposed characteristics of the "community board" be suggested within the CCWG in other to make ICANN board more accountable? I am overly concerned that we may be creating multiple structures and too many accountability points that could overall cripple the already efficient IANA department.

As you have also noted in the proposal; the outcome of the CCWG activities may indeed handle the accountability issues that the proposal attempts to address, just that it seem you don't think the implementation of the outcome will be timely? and i believe you are speaking from experience (re: ATRT). However, i think things may be different this time and one could have faith in the CCWG process considering that NTIA categorically emphasised that outcome of ccwg with that of ICG is a prerequisite to transition. That said, i appreciate the intent of separating IANA operation from the policy side of ICANN. Although one may argue that such septation already exist (with IANA being a department in ICANN) and can be maintained "through relevant addition to the bylaw" in the absence of NTIA contract.
Finally, its good to note that we now have 7 CWG proposals (yes Avri's is practically 3 in 1).  From all the proposals, the IAP and CSC seem to cut across (in terms of their role). Maybe we should pick the CSC and review its role and composition to ensure that it transparently provides it outcome to the entirely community. Utilising the outcome of the CSC to keep the board/IANA staff accountable is what CCWG could then worry about. This would avoid duplication of accountability mechanism to ensure maintenance of a stable, secure and resilient IANA
Regards
PS: These are personal views only!

On Sat, Feb 21, 2015 at 6:09 PM, Avri Doria <avri at acm.org<mailto:avri at acm.org>> wrote:

On 21-Feb-15 01:08, Seun Ojedeji wrote:

Hi,

How does this proposal address the few points below:

- ICANN is running IANA properly and should continue to be the operator

This proposal rest upon the same team being able to continue handling the operator functions.  The 12 person IANA team is what is doing the job properly and what needs protecting in a stewardship transition.

In the fully owned subsidiary configuration, ICANN remains the operator, or rather the owner or the operator.
In the Shared Service Arrangement ICANN remains one of the owners.  In this operational control is shared with the other operational communities while ICANN remains a co-owner, has SLA/MOUs and a board seats.

It is only in the Free Standing configuration that ICANN would cease being an owner of a subsidiary though would probably remain owners, perhaps even members, of the Free Standing company.   And would retain Community Board seats.

- ICANN is purpose built with it's main purpose of centrally operating IANA for the 3 communities

While this may have been the intention at day 0, the evolution of ICANN over the years has been anything but purpose built.  ICANN has evolved into a much needed policy group that deals with the political, financial and other issues that grow out of its narrow technical mandate.   The remaining issue that has not been solved in the Internal models is the one where the policy organization for gTLDS, the bulk of ICANN's 100+ MUSD operations is not separated from IANA.

- The task at hand is to transition IANA stewardship, is the proposal not doing more than that?

Not really.  Especially the model is very much about stewardship and finding ways to distribute that stewardship in the light of losing NTIA.  In one configuration, ICANN retains complete control, just of a structurally separated internal component that provides greater transparency.  In the Shared Service Arrangement, IANA shares this ownership with the other 2 communities, if they are interested in sharing.  If they aren't, I figure they will be fine with leaving it as a full Owned subsidiary of ICANN.

- Based on the response given by Milton, the practical implication of this proposal seem to imply absolute separation between IANA functions so names operation is no longer under ICANN oversight. If that is correct are we still within scope of our task by proposing that?

I do not speak for Milton, that is beyond my pay grade.

While there is structural separation it is not absolute - currently some try to argue that there is functional separation at ICANN as required by NTIA in the RFP, though some of us have our doubts on this actually being the case, especially since IANA isn't even as separated as is GDD.  Not all separation is the same or absolute.

In two of the configurations, that structural separation is contained within the existing organizations and remains under ICANN protection. Even in the Free Standing configuration, ICANN remains on of the controling voices on the Community Board.  ICANN retains its share of the stewardship role in all of the configurations in the model.  In no part of the model, and in none of it configurations is the separation complete or absolute.  And remember we allegedly have functional separation today.  This model is just an evolution of current realities with as little disruption as possible.

In fact for absolute or complete separation in this model, ICANN would have to utilize the same so-called nuclear option the other two operational communities are posting, the ability to take their business elsewhere.  None of the configurations offered provides absolute separation.

I see nothing that excludes this from our scope to find the best stewardship solution we can given the constraint of multistakeholder general agreement.  We face an impasse with strong smart people insisting they are correct on two very opposed sides of the discussion.  We can continue the tug of war about who is right; constantly worrying over who has the better argument of the day or the best allies.  Perhaps we can even engage in some brinkmanship - just like US political leaders.  We decided to try to find a solution that satisfies many of the concerns of both camps without scaring those who are watching.

- What does the proposal intend to address; separability OR separation?

It is attempting to balance the most critical requirements for a multistakeholder solution, an Internal solution and also for an External solution, and one that is solid, stable and safe from International capture enough to satisfy Republicans in Congress as well.  It is meant to be a reasonable and based on a relatively standard business relationship that provides the multistakeholder control through ownership, sla/mous, and membership in the Post Transition Board.  Separability is a principle that all solutions must satisfy, but it is not a goal.  The goal is stewardship for a multistakeholder, stable, secure and resilient IANA. The secondary goal was making the solution as simple as possible with as little reliance on CCWG-Accountabilty fundamental change as possible.

thanks

avri

Thanks

Regards
sent from Google nexus 4
kindly excuse brevity and typos.
On 21 Feb 2015 00:19, "Avri Doria" <avri at acm.org<mailto:avri at acm.org>> wrote:

On 20-Feb-15 16:50, Milton L Mueller wrote:
My question:

Does this model provide for separability?

First it provides structural separation in all configurations.  That is a first level of severability and hopefully as much as really is ever needed.  Additionally, in this model, ICANN would have the same ability to pick another provider, or perhaps a redundant provider, just as the names or protocols can now.  This is made possible by virtue of structural  separation and the defintion of SLA/MOUs across a corporate boundary.

Further levels of separability can, however, be obtained in the Shared Service Arrangement configuration or the finally in the Free Standing configuration.

Finally

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Seun Ojedeji,
Federal University Oye-Ekiti
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The key to understanding is humility - my view !

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