[CWG-Stewardship] Update on the Integrated model.

[Seun Ojedeji]

On Mon, Feb 23, 2015 at 1:13 AM, Milton L Mueller <mueller at syr.edu> wrote:

>
>
> seem that the proposal attempts to practically create a new operator order
> than ICANN (re: PTI)
>
> MM: But the PTI is just ICANN’s current IANA department, is it not?
>
Well not for the free standing version. Nevertheless i guess the major
point is that PTI is not just looking to become a department as we have
presently, but rather an entity with its own board. Do we really need such
level of management over 12 staff members that are merely operating on
existing set of instructions.


>  being the operator and turns ICANN to a "policy only" organisation. That
> seem like a major change in the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
> Numbers (ICANN) mission and purpose.
>
> MM: Not really, because the current IANA contract requires a significant
> level of separation.
>
I am not sure i get the distinction you are making here. The way i
understand it, the contract is what makes ICANN operate IANA, and if by
transition there will be a new board (irrespective of where it sits) that
oversight on IANA, what would you say has happened to ICANN mission in that
context? Maybe i should paste here the role of the "community board" for
reference as i think its beyond a mere procedural oversight currently
performed by NTIA:

   - Oversight of the IANA team, operations
   - Addressing escalation issues from IANA customers, i.e those with MOUs
   with Post Transition IANA.
   - Responsible for ensuring funding for operations
   - Budget approval for Post Transition IANA

Implementing the above in practice would mean ICANN is now a policy making
organisation and a new IANA operator has emerged. That was not its main
purpose from day 0, its purpose is to operate IANA.

 How will this work with ccTLDs who for instance are practically engaging
> with ICANN just because it is the IANA operator?
>
> MM: It should make them very happy, because they can deal with IANA
> directly and independently and not through the medium of ICANN’s gTLD
> policy making morass
>
Well i doubt what is being proposed will lack some form of medium as well,
will leave that for the CCs to determine. Perhaps its good to note that it
seem you are implying that implementation of PTI will remove need for some
existing internal procedures. I just hope i am wrong on that assumption; if
there is something wrong with the current medium, then the process should
be reviewed and corrected which is largely within the scope of the CCWG not
that of the CWG.

>  how about existing gTLD contracts which were signed with the intent of
> ICANN being the operator?
>
> MM: If IANA is a subsidiary of ICANN this is not an issue; if it is not
> the modifications required are minor as long as IANA is contractually bound
> to implement legitimately passed ICANN policies. IANA is an ancillary
> aspect of the registry agreement; it is referenced only once regarding
> emergency transition and in the final convenants where ICANN agrees to
> implement RZF changes within 7 days of request. I don’t see how that would
> be difficult to transfer that obligation to an SLA negotiated with the new
> IANA.
>
Well that does not remove the fact that those registries signed an
agreement with ICANN as the IANA operator. Maybe i am the one seeing this
differently so i will try to illustrate; a typical registry A enters into
agreement with ICANN to oversee operation of its TLD, the registry does
that based on the fact that it recognises that ICANN as the operator would
execute what it has agreed upon.  ICANN in this context is the board and if
that is changing then it may require a change in contract writeup. Unless
ICANN board, recognises that it is responsible for the "community board"
which could mean exercising some form of oversight on it.


>  Looking at the proposal, how do we achieve accountability of the
> "community board"? i mean why should one be comfortable that the "community
> board" will be more accountable than the current ICANN board?
>
> MM: That’s easy. In part, because it is directly accountable to IANA
> customers. And also because (I think) the functions contract could be
> transferred to someone else.
>
Do you mean there is going to be a contract somewhere; between who and who?
ICANN and PTI? PTI and registries?

Overall, the intent of maintaining the current separation (i.e IANA being a
department) will be good. However it does not have to be achieved through
creation of new structures. Creating multiple structures may not
necessarily guarantee accountability, it may actually worsen it OR at least
slow down processes which may not be good in ensuring stable, efficient and
secure domain system. It may be good to task the CCWG to ensure current
ICANN board's accountability once and for all.

Regards
-- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------





*Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb:      http://www.fuoye.edu.ng
<http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email:
<http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng
<seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng>*

The key to understanding is humility - my view !
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/cwg-stewardship/attachments/20150223/6f41ea22/attachment-0001.html>