[CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by CWG Proposal(s)

[Alan Greenberg]

I believe that this is the minimalist list of accountability measures 
or accountability-related processes that would be required based on 
the two proposals currently under consideration.

I have explicitly not included the wider list of measures that the 
CCWG is considering for possible inclusion in its WS1, specifically 
those which the community would like to see and for which the IANA 
transition might provide additional impetus for the Board to approve, 
but are not absolutely required to ensure that the IANA transition 
can occur. I recognize that this is a judgement call that not all 
might agree with.

During the last of the four weekend meetings, Chuck mentioned one 
additional issue, and referred to a chat exchange between him and 
Donna during the third meeting that listed several other potential 
accountability issues. Unfortunately, that chat transcript was not 
preserved due to an error in saving it.

The list of measures for the Contract Co. model is based on the list 
that the Co-Chairs created in December, augmented by Chucks 
suggestion. I do not believe that the December list has been negated 
by any work done in the interim, but perhaps I have missed something. 
I could not find a rationale for the inclusion of the first of the 
three items, but include it here so that the CWG could decide if it 
is based on a real need associated with the proposal or not. If 
included, I would suggest the CWG be more specific as to under what 
conditions it would apply. Chuck's suggestion seems to conflict with 
the 2nd measure in that the 2nd measure is specified as being 
binding. I am also not sure if it could possibly be replaced by the 
more generalized IAP (once the request goes to IANA).

The requirements for the internal-to-ICANN model are based on my 
discussions with a number of people over the last weeks.

Contract Co. Model Requirements

1. Independent Review of Board Actions

Change the ICANN Bylaws to specify that under certain circumstances 
(to be defined) the determinations of an Independent Review of Board 
Actions Panel would be binding and not implemented at the Board's discretions.

2. Independent certification for delegation and re-delegation requests

This would be a replacement for the authorization function for all 
changes to the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database currently performed by 
the NTIA. The replacement mechanism would have gTLD requests for 
delegations and re-delegations authorized by an independent third 
party and its decision on these matters would be binding on ICANN/IANA.

3. Independent Appeals Panel

An independent review panel must be set up to deal with contested 
changes to the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database. Although discussions 
are still ongoing as to the specifics of such a proposal, it is 
generally agreed that the decisions of such a panel would be binding. 
There may also be a need for an injunction-like mechanism to defer 
the change in question during the appeal process.

4. gTLD Delegation or Redelegation Appeal within ICANN prior to the 
change request going to IANA

A Registry could appeal an ICANN decision to delegate or redelegate 
and gTLD, based on policy not being followed (or presumably 
contractual terms not being followed).

Internal-To-ICANN Model Requirements

This model will require all of the above measures plus the following:

5. Control over ICANN Board decisions.

The ability for ICANN Stakeholders, potentially augmented by other 
non-ICANN entities, to mandate or overrule, a particular Board 
decision, or to require that the implementation of such a decision be 
subject to consideration of an independent, binding review. These 
measures might need to be augmented by advance notice of such 
decisions and allow the MS community to react. In the most restricted 
form, this ability might be restricted to decisions related to IANA, 
but in reality, it may not be practical to define this scope 
limitation (ie how to recognize an IANA-related decision).

6. Ability to Remove Directors

The ability of the overall multi-stakeholder community to remove some 
or all of the Board Directors. In the case of a full Board removal, a 
mechanism would be required for appointing an Interim Board and then 
a replacement regular Board. In addition, ACs and SOs could be given 
the right to recall their appointed Director(s).








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