[CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by CWG Proposal(s)
alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca
Thu Jan 15 06:12:09 UTC 2015
I believe that this is the minimalist list of accountability measures
or accountability-related processes that would be required based on
the two proposals currently under consideration.
I have explicitly not included the wider list of measures that the
CCWG is considering for possible inclusion in its WS1, specifically
those which the community would like to see and for which the IANA
transition might provide additional impetus for the Board to approve,
but are not absolutely required to ensure that the IANA transition
can occur. I recognize that this is a judgement call that not all
might agree with.
During the last of the four weekend meetings, Chuck mentioned one
additional issue, and referred to a chat exchange between him and
Donna during the third meeting that listed several other potential
accountability issues. Unfortunately, that chat transcript was not
preserved due to an error in saving it.
The list of measures for the Contract Co. model is based on the list
that the Co-Chairs created in December, augmented by Chucks
suggestion. I do not believe that the December list has been negated
by any work done in the interim, but perhaps I have missed something.
I could not find a rationale for the inclusion of the first of the
three items, but include it here so that the CWG could decide if it
is based on a real need associated with the proposal or not. If
included, I would suggest the CWG be more specific as to under what
conditions it would apply. Chuck's suggestion seems to conflict with
the 2nd measure in that the 2nd measure is specified as being
binding. I am also not sure if it could possibly be replaced by the
more generalized IAP (once the request goes to IANA).
The requirements for the internal-to-ICANN model are based on my
discussions with a number of people over the last weeks.
Contract Co. Model Requirements
1. Independent Review of Board Actions
Change the ICANN Bylaws to specify that under certain circumstances
(to be defined) the determinations of an Independent Review of Board
Actions Panel would be binding and not implemented at the Board's discretions.
2. Independent certification for delegation and re-delegation requests
This would be a replacement for the authorization function for all
changes to the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database currently performed by
the NTIA. The replacement mechanism would have gTLD requests for
delegations and re-delegations authorized by an independent third
party and its decision on these matters would be binding on ICANN/IANA.
3. Independent Appeals Panel
An independent review panel must be set up to deal with contested
changes to the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database. Although discussions
are still ongoing as to the specifics of such a proposal, it is
generally agreed that the decisions of such a panel would be binding.
There may also be a need for an injunction-like mechanism to defer
the change in question during the appeal process.
4. gTLD Delegation or Redelegation Appeal within ICANN prior to the
change request going to IANA
A Registry could appeal an ICANN decision to delegate or redelegate
and gTLD, based on policy not being followed (or presumably
contractual terms not being followed).
Internal-To-ICANN Model Requirements
This model will require all of the above measures plus the following:
5. Control over ICANN Board decisions.
The ability for ICANN Stakeholders, potentially augmented by other
non-ICANN entities, to mandate or overrule, a particular Board
decision, or to require that the implementation of such a decision be
subject to consideration of an independent, binding review. These
measures might need to be augmented by advance notice of such
decisions and allow the MS community to react. In the most restricted
form, this ability might be restricted to decisions related to IANA,
but in reality, it may not be practical to define this scope
limitation (ie how to recognize an IANA-related decision).
6. Ability to Remove Directors
The ability of the overall multi-stakeholder community to remove some
or all of the Board Directors. In the case of a full Board removal, a
mechanism would be required for appointing an Interim Board and then
a replacement regular Board. In addition, ACs and SOs could be given
the right to recall their appointed Director(s).
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