[CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by CWG Proposal(s)

[Jonathan Robinson]

Thanks Chuck,
I'll drop a note explaining further as soon as I get a moment.
Jonathan
On 15 Jan 2015 19:45, "Gomes, Chuck" <cgomes at verisign.com> wrote:

>  Jonathan,
>
>
>
> I do not understand the ‘poison pill’ point.
>
>
>
> Chuck
>
>
>
> *From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org [mailto:
> cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Jonathan Robinson
> *Sent:* Thursday, January 15, 2015 8:16 AM
> *To:* jrobinson at afilias.info; 'Alan Greenberg'; 'CWG IANA'
> *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by CWG
> Proposal(s)
>
>
>
> All,
>
>
>
> Note the reference that Fadi has very recently made to the possible use of
> an over-arching conditionality (in the CWG proposal) in the form of a
> “poison pill” i.e. our (CWG) proposal being invalid unless certain key
> accountability conditions are met.
>
>
>
> Jonathan
>
>
>
> *From:* Jonathan Robinson [mailto:jrobinson at afilias.info]
> *Sent:* 15 January 2015 12:46
> *To:* 'Alan Greenberg'; 'CWG IANA'
> *Subject:* RE: [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by CWG
> Proposal(s)
>
>
>
> Alan (and the CWG),
>
>
>
> One question that strikes me which we will almost certainly be asked to
> clarify is; What is the problem/issue that you (we) are trying to solve for
> in each case?
>
>
>
> The purpose for establishing the motivation is that it may be that there
> is more than one remedy and that one remedy is more desirable than another
>  (for whatever reason including but not limited to legal advice).
>
>
>
> Perhaps a table in the form of issue / proposed resolution 1 / proposed
> resolution 2?
>
>
>
> Jonathan
>
>
>
> *From:* Alan Greenberg [mailto:alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca
> <alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca>]
> *Sent:* 15 January 2015 06:12
> *To:* CWG IANA
> *Subject:* [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by CWG
> Proposal(s)
>
>
>
> I believe that this is the minimalist list of accountability measures or
> accountability-related processes that would be required based on the two
> proposals currently under consideration.
>
> I have explicitly not included the wider list of measures that the CCWG is
> considering for possible inclusion in its WS1, specifically those which the
> community would like to see and for which the IANA transition might provide
> additional impetus for the Board to approve, but are not absolutely
> required to ensure that the IANA transition can occur. I recognize that
> this is a judgement call that not all might agree with.
>
> During the last of the four weekend meetings, Chuck mentioned one
> additional issue, and referred to a chat exchange between him and Donna
> during the third meeting that listed several other potential accountability
> issues. Unfortunately, that chat transcript was not preserved due to an
> error in saving it.
>
> The list of measures for the Contract Co. model is based on the list that
> the Co-Chairs created in December, augmented by Chucks suggestion. I do not
> believe that the December list has been negated by any work done in the
> interim, but perhaps I have missed something. I could not find a rationale
> for the inclusion of the first of the three items, but include it here so
> that the CWG could decide if it is based on a real need associated with the
> proposal or not. If included, I would suggest the CWG be more specific as
> to under what conditions it would apply. Chuck's suggestion seems to
> conflict with the 2nd measure in that the 2nd measure is specified as being
> binding. I am also not sure if it could possibly be replaced by the more
> generalized IAP (once the request goes to IANA).
>
> The requirements for the internal-to-ICANN model are based on my
> discussions with a number of people over the last weeks.
>
>
>
> *Contract Co. Model Requirements *
>
> *1. Independent Review of Board Actions *Change the ICANN Bylaws to
> specify that under certain circumstances (to be defined) the determinations
> of an Independent Review of Board Actions Panel would be binding and not
> implemented at the Board's discretions.
>
>
>
> *2. Independent certification for delegation and re-delegation requests *This
> would be a replacement for the authorization function for all changes to
> the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database currently performed by the NTIA. The
> replacement mechanism would have gTLD requests for delegations and
> re-delegations authorized by an independent third party and its decision on
> these matters would be binding on ICANN/IANA.
>
>
>
> *3. Independent Appeals Panel *An independent review panel must be set up
> to deal with contested changes to the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database.
> Although discussions are still ongoing as to the specifics of such a
> proposal, it is generally agreed that the decisions of such a panel would
> be binding. There may also be a need for an injunction-like mechanism to
> defer the change in question during the appeal process.
>
>
>
> *4. gTLD Delegation or Redelegation Appeal within ICANN prior to the
> change request going to IANA *A Registry could appeal an ICANN decision
> to delegate or redelegate and gTLD, based on policy not being followed (or
> presumably contractual terms not being followed).
>
>
>
> *Internal-To-ICANN Model Requirements *This model will require all of the
> above measures plus the following:
>
>
>
> *5. Control over ICANN Board decisions. *The ability for ICANN
> Stakeholders, potentially augmented by other non-ICANN entities, to mandate
> or overrule, a particular Board decision, or to require that the
> implementation of such a decision be subject to consideration of an
> independent, binding review. These measures might need to be augmented by
> advance notice of such decisions and allow the MS community to react. In
> the most restricted form, this ability might be restricted to decisions
> related to IANA, but in reality, it may not be practical to define this
> scope limitation (ie how to recognize an IANA-related decision).
>
>
>
> *6. Ability to Remove Directors *The ability of the overall
> multi-stakeholder community to remove some or all of the Board Directors.
> In the case of a full Board removal, a mechanism would be required for
> appointing an Interim Board and then a replacement regular Board. In
> addition, ACs and SOs could be given the right to recall their appointed
> Director(s).
>
>
>
>
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/cwg-stewardship/attachments/20150115/cc476c75/attachment.html>