[CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by CWG Proposal(s)
alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca
Thu Jan 15 21:53:05 UTC 2015
The typical meaning of Poison pill is a provision to prevent or
forestall a hostile corporate takeover, but it is also used tin
reference to a proposed bill (and in an act of a legislature) where
an amendment is made which causes it to be distasteful to someone who
otherwise would have supported it. I presume that this latter meaning
is implied, in that a provision of the CWG proposal would invalidate
it in its entirely if specific accountability measures were not taken.
At 15/01/2015 02:44 PM, Gomes, Chuck wrote:
>I do not understand the 'poison pill' point.
>From: cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org
>[mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Jonathan Robinson
>Sent: Thursday, January 15, 2015 8:16 AM
>To: jrobinson at afilias.info; 'Alan Greenberg'; 'CWG IANA'
>Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by
>Note the reference that Fadi has very recently made to the possible
>use of an over-arching conditionality (in the CWG proposal) in the
>form of a "poison pill" i.e. our (CWG) proposal being invalid unless
>certain key accountability conditions are met.
>From: Jonathan Robinson [mailto:jrobinson at afilias.info]
>Sent: 15 January 2015 12:46
>To: 'Alan Greenberg'; 'CWG IANA'
>Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by
>Alan (and the CWG),
>One question that strikes me which we will almost certainly be asked
>to clarify is; What is the problem/issue that you (we) are trying to
>solve for in each case?
>The purpose for establishing the motivation is that it may be that
>there is more than one remedy and that one remedy is more desirable
>than another (for whatever reason including but not limited to legal advice).
>Perhaps a table in the form of issue / proposed resolution 1 /
>proposed resolution 2?
>From: Alan Greenberg
>[<mailto:alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca>mailto:alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca]
>Sent: 15 January 2015 06:12
>To: CWG IANA
>Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by CWG Proposal(s)
>I believe that this is the minimalist list of accountability
>measures or accountability-related processes that would be required
>based on the two proposals currently under consideration.
>I have explicitly not included the wider list of measures that the
>CCWG is considering for possible inclusion in its WS1, specifically
>those which the community would like to see and for which the IANA
>transition might provide additional impetus for the Board to
>approve, but are not absolutely required to ensure that the IANA
>transition can occur. I recognize that this is a judgement call that
>not all might agree with.
>During the last of the four weekend meetings, Chuck mentioned one
>additional issue, and referred to a chat exchange between him and
>Donna during the third meeting that listed several other potential
>accountability issues. Unfortunately, that chat transcript was not
>preserved due to an error in saving it.
>The list of measures for the Contract Co. model is based on the list
>that the Co-Chairs created in December, augmented by Chucks
>suggestion. I do not believe that the December list has been negated
>by any work done in the interim, but perhaps I have missed
>something. I could not find a rationale for the inclusion of the
>first of the three items, but include it here so that the CWG could
>decide if it is based on a real need associated with the proposal or
>not. If included, I would suggest the CWG be more specific as to
>under what conditions it would apply. Chuck's suggestion seems to
>conflict with the 2nd measure in that the 2nd measure is specified
>as being binding. I am also not sure if it could possibly be
>replaced by the more generalized IAP (once the request goes to IANA).
>The requirements for the internal-to-ICANN model are based on my
>discussions with a number of people over the last weeks.
>Contract Co. Model Requirements
>1. Independent Review of Board Actions
>Change the ICANN Bylaws to specify that under certain circumstances
>(to be defined) the determinations of an Independent Review of Board
>Actions Panel would be binding and not implemented at the Board's discretions.
>2. Independent certification for delegation and re-delegation requests
>This would be a replacement for the authorization function for all
>changes to the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database currently performed
>by the NTIA. The replacement mechanism would have gTLD requests for
>delegations and re-delegations authorized by an independent third
>party and its decision on these matters would be binding on ICANN/IANA.
>3. Independent Appeals Panel
>An independent review panel must be set up to deal with contested
>changes to the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database. Although discussions
>are still ongoing as to the specifics of such a proposal, it is
>generally agreed that the decisions of such a panel would be
>binding. There may also be a need for an injunction-like mechanism
>to defer the change in question during the appeal process.
>4. gTLD Delegation or Redelegation Appeal within ICANN prior to the
>change request going to IANA
>A Registry could appeal an ICANN decision to delegate or redelegate
>and gTLD, based on policy not being followed (or presumably
>contractual terms not being followed).
>Internal-To-ICANN Model Requirements
>This model will require all of the above measures plus the following:
>5. Control over ICANN Board decisions.
>The ability for ICANN Stakeholders, potentially augmented by other
>non-ICANN entities, to mandate or overrule, a particular Board
>decision, or to require that the implementation of such a decision
>be subject to consideration of an independent, binding review. These
>measures might need to be augmented by advance notice of such
>decisions and allow the MS community to react. In the most
>restricted form, this ability might be restricted to decisions
>related to IANA, but in reality, it may not be practical to define
>this scope limitation (ie how to recognize an IANA-related decision).
>6. Ability to Remove Directors
>The ability of the overall multi-stakeholder community to remove
>some or all of the Board Directors. In the case of a full Board
>removal, a mechanism would be required for appointing an Interim
>Board and then a replacement regular Board. In addition, ACs and SOs
>could be given the right to recall their appointed Director(s).
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