[CWG-Stewardship] Input Needed: Bylaws Matrix Responses and Three Issues

[Martin Boyle]

Thanks for this helpful summary, Grace.  I'm sorry to have missed the call and I hope that my responses to your three questions does not stamp too heavily over ground covered in Thursday's discussion.

For issue 1, I would align with Donna.  It would seem to me to be appropriate to use existing mechanisms for decisions on the CSC charter.

On issue 2:  it's amazing how often you can read texts and miss inconsistencies!  I have a recollection from the discussions (now a very long time ago - this was something discussed for the first draft, wasn't it?)  that we were looking for a degree of flexibility, without allowing slippage.  I liked this concept and wonder whether we could retain it with wording like, "will commence not later than two years after the Transition"?

One reason I would favour this sort of wording is that there might be reasons - a recognition that we got something wrong, concerns over performance raised by the CSC, for example - when we would want to carry out a review earlier.  However, if things are bedding in nicely, introducing a new instability - with the pressures of a review - too quickly seems to be disruptive without necessarily bringing any obvious benefits.

On issue 3, I feel a bit ambivalent - I can see benefits for each approach depending on the circumstances.  The Empowered Community process probably would be most relevant in the case where something was going seriously wrong.  There could be other reasons for promoting a Special IFR:  a need to amend service levels or introduce architectural changes, for example.

Would the best approach be to leave a degree of flexibility?  We have both mechanisms, both can be triggered when needed.  So why not allow the community proposal to use the empowered community escalation mechanisms, should that be appropriate, but also allow the RySG and/or ccNSO to launch a consultation process leading to a review?

Hope this helps

Martin



From: cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Grace Abuhamad
Sent: 25 February 2016 17:42
To: cwg-stewardship at icann.org
Cc: Nathalie Vergnolle <nathalie.vergnolle at icann.org>; Akram Atallah <akram.atallah at icann.org>
Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Input Needed: Bylaws Matrix Responses and Three Issues

Dear CWG-Stewardship and ICANN Implementation Team,

Please see attached the latest version of the responses to the Sidley Bylaws Matrix as well as a list of three currently unresolved issues for CWG-Stewardship input (also copied below for your convenience). The action assigned on the CWG-Stewardship call today was to share these documents with the group, and simultaneously with the ICANN implementation team for any input they may have.

On the CWG-Stewardship call today, we outlined the three issues and had an initial, but non-conclusive, discussion about them. On the thresholds issue, Donna Austin suggests we go with current practices, i.e. simple majority, since Charter amendments will go a public comment process prior to approval by the ccNSO and GNSO. Paul Kane agrees.

Looking forward to your input,
Grace

A recap of the three issues presented on call (also in document attached):

There are three issues for the CWG-Stewardship to address:

Issue #1: Thresholds

For the CSC Charter, the CCNSO and GNSO Councils must approve amendments. The DT leads noted that the intention is that the respective Councils (ccNSO and GNSO) would vote to ratify any proposed charter amendment/s and the threshold would be in accordance with their respective methods of operation. However, the current responses further suggest that, "supermajority of both Councils would seem appropriate if this can be accommodated."

Staff would like to note that supermajority may not be consistent with current practice in the GNSO and CCNSO Councils. In the case of the GNSO, the default voting threshold is simple majority of each house. Should a supermajority vote be deemed appropriate for this purpose, the relevant section in the ICANN bylaws that details voting thresholds that differ from simple majority, would need to be updated.

Does the CWG want to define a higher threshold for the CCNSO and GNSO councils or proceed with existing operating procedures within the Councils?


Issue #2: Timing of the first IANA Function Review

Paragraph (194) of the CWG Final Proposal provides that the IFR "will not commence" until two years after this date, but Paragraph (301) provides that the initial IFR must be completed by this 2-year anniversary

Current response: Paragraph 301 being focused on the IFR while Paragraph 194 being a timetable makes Paragraph 301 the determining one. However, Paragraphs 267/268 seem to confirm the ambiguity. Separately, Paragraph 194 does allow, however for a Special IFR sooner than 2 years if needed.

CWG needs to choose:

1.      The first IFR will not commence until two years after the Transition

2.      The first IFR will be completed by the 2-year anniversary of the Transition


Issue #3: Use of the Empowered Community mechanisms for the Special IFR

The CWG needs to consider specifying a forum and process for the Special IFR. Paragraphs (125) and (303) of the CWG Final Proposal provide that consideration of whether to trigger a Special IFR "may" include a public comment period but is silent on who determines whether there should be a public comment period.

If the CWG-Stewardship adopts the Empowered Community mechanism of the CCWG-Accountability, then the process for escalation includes a discussion forum. Would that be sufficient? If not, the CWG-Stewardship could mandate a standard ICANN public comment period before triggering a Special IFR.

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