<div dir="ltr">I forward below a vital discussion that is happening outside CWG but relates to the names proposal.<div><br></div><div>I've added Avri's suggestion as Option 5 here:</div><div><a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing">https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing</a><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote">---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>From: <b class="gmail_sendername">Avri Doria</b> <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:avri@acm.org">avri@acm.org</a>></span><br>Date: Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:07 AM<br>Subject: Re: [ianatransition] [] A thought re accountability...<br>To: <a href="mailto:ianatransition@icann.org">ianatransition@icann.org</a><br><br><br>
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#330033">
Hi,<br>
<br>
Well if the GNSO and ccNSO can't leave ICANN, maybe the IANA could
leave if necessary. Wasn't that always the point of the NTIA being
able to transfer the contract? So if we want to keep things
similar, we need to maintain the ability for the contract to move
from ICANN to another organization, or perhaps to a standalone
organization. We need 'separability' of the IANA function to remain
one of its attributes.<br>
<br>
Stability and security demand that it stay where it is for the
moment. But I believe that one outcome of the transition should be
that it remains as separable as it is now. It must be separable
from ICANN if things go badly. Just as IETF can move its data to
somewhere else it the relationship with ICANN turns sour, the GNSO
and ccNSO should be able to move their data to somewhere else.
Personally I do not believe multiple little IANAs is the best
solution so perhaps we need something similar to the ICG on a
periodic basis (e.g. 5 years) to be created from the various parts
of the community to review the performance, the audit reports,
consultation based evidence &c. and to decide whether changes
are required. These changes could be minor fixes or could be major
and involve transfering the responsibility.<br>
<br>
Such a mechanism based solution would be easier to craft than one
that invovles creating yet another permanent superstructure that
serves the same set of stakeholders involved in the current
operational communities. The idea that we would create an oversight
for ICANN somewhat like ICANN itself reminds me of tortoises stacked
on the backs of tortoises all the way up as we reach for true
accountabity. It would also not create a new organization with the
risk that brings of recapitulating ICANNs all the way up.<br>
<br>
A separability mechanism gives the GNSO and ccNSO the same ability
that the IETF and the RIRs have of finding another provider if
necessary. And working together with the advice and participation
of global stakeholders, a decision can be made periodically on
whether it has become necessary to do so. One thing we have to
remember, it is not ICANN the corporation that is the operational
policy community for names. It is the GNSO and the ccNSO and the
advising AC's that are. Just as the ICG does not require the ICANN
Board's approval before sending its decision to the NTIA, so to this
periodic review committee of IETF, RIRs, GNSO ccNSO and related
policy advice mechanisms from the I* ecosystem, like ISOC, ALAC,
GAC, SSAC, RSSAC, & others, would not require ICANN Board
approval to move the IANA function.<br>
<br>
There may be some legal issues to be resolved in the creation of
such a mechanism, again the problem of how does one make ICANN
corporate do what ICANN corporate doesn't want to do. Perhaps the
construction of an IANA trust to hold the contract, could solve that
problem.<br>
<br>
Just a thought.<br>
<br>
avri<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<div>On 18-Oct-14 12:39, Milton L Mueller
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre>I'm not Jordan but will answer this anyway ;-)
I would say it is _possible_.
The problem is that moving GNSO and CCNSO out of ICANN at this point would involve such a complex set of organizational arrangements and such destabilizing potential for power shifts among the stakeholder groups involved that it could not be contemplated within anything like the time frame we have.
Would it involve the creation of a new board? What would happen to GAC and ALAC? Just 2 examples of the kind of knotty questions that would have to be answered.
--MM
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre>-----Original Message-----
On Oct 15, 2014, at 3:18 PM, Jordan Carter <a href="mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz" target="_blank"><jordan@internetnz.net.nz></a>
wrote:
</pre><span class="">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre>If we are going to have a successful transition, it's really important for the
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre>numbers and protocols folks to understand that:
</pre>
</span><blockquote type="cite">
<pre>...
b) the names people cannot copy number/protocol accountability
mechanisms because they aren't organised outside ICANN
c) it isn't possible for names to organise outside ICANN in the way
numbers/protocol people do
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre>Jordan -
Could you elaborate on why "c" isn't possible?
</pre><pre><br></pre><pre><br></pre></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite"><span class=""><pre>-----Original Message-----
On Oct 15, 2014, at 3:18 PM, Jordan Carter <a href="mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz" target="_blank"><jordan@internetnz.net.nz></a>
wrote:
</pre><span class=""><blockquote type="cite"></blockquote></span></span></blockquote></blockquote><pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><br></pre><pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;color:rgb(0,0,0)">A thought that has been bubbling away here at ICANN LA this week for me:
If we are going to have a successful transition, it's really important for
the numbers and protocols folks to understand that:
a) they have superior accountability situations to the names people today
b) the names people cannot copy number/protocol accountability mechanisms
because they aren't organised outside ICANN
c) it isn't possible for names to organise outside ICANN in the way
numbers/protocol people do
d) there may need to be structural changes or new bodies to provide a
workable settlement for names
e) without a workable settlement for names, there isn't going to be a
transition.
I raise this now because both for numbers and protocols there's a clear
direction to try and rule out any institutional changes.
I strongly caution against any part of the community being dogmatic about
any of these, because it will a) attract some attention that'll risk the
whole transition process failing (esp. from governments), and b) means that
a negotiated outcome is harder to achieve, also risking failure.
Wonder how others feel about this.
cheers
Jordan</pre><pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><br></pre></div>_______________________________________________<br>
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