<p>Hi,<br>
I think, formation of ICG, independent of ICANN with its present modus operand enough and a good model, for transfering from NTIA. But, if that's to be adopted, should there bylaw?</p>
<p>Regards</p>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Oct 23, 2014 4:26 PM, "Fouad Bajwa" <<a href="mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com">fouadbajwa@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br type="attribution"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">There is a lot of sense in here.<br>
<br>
Its very close to what I personally feel that IANA at this stage<br>
should not evolve into a separate entity without a good deal of<br>
working that is not achievable in an open community process by<br>
September 2015 however if a clause for separability was developed and<br>
kept in the proposal and then later and somehow a consensus process or<br>
approach was to approve such, it can be considered.<br>
<br>
Lets strip it out of ICANN isn't workable and I would not support it.<br>
The proposal should show a way forward for the longterm and that<br>
should include a mechanism (however hard it may be). One fact remains,<br>
ICANN is a non-profit under US law. Putting IANA completely under it<br>
is again prone to law affects on ICANN and vice versa. That discussion<br>
has somehow disappeared to the ATRT process.<br>
<br>
For the IANA function transition in an open and inclusive manner, it<br>
does have to move out of under ICANN's complete remit, but how,<br>
remains the big question.<br>
<br>
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 10:31 AM, Guru Acharya <<a href="mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com">gurcharya@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
> I forward below a vital discussion that is happening outside CWG but relates<br>
> to the names proposal.<br>
><br>
> I've added Avri's suggestion as Option 5 here:<br>
> <a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing" target="_blank">https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing</a><br>
><br>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>
> From: Avri Doria <<a href="mailto:avri@acm.org">avri@acm.org</a>><br>
> Date: Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:07 AM<br>
> Subject: Re: [ianatransition] [] A thought re accountability...<br>
> To: <a href="mailto:ianatransition@icann.org">ianatransition@icann.org</a><br>
><br>
><br>
> Hi,<br>
><br>
> Well if the GNSO and ccNSO can't leave ICANN, maybe the IANA could leave if<br>
> necessary. Wasn't that always the point of the NTIA being able to transfer<br>
> the contract? So if we want to keep things similar, we need to maintain the<br>
> ability for the contract to move from ICANN to another organization, or<br>
> perhaps to a standalone organization. We need 'separability' of the IANA<br>
> function to remain one of its attributes.<br>
><br>
> Stability and security demand that it stay where it is for the moment. But<br>
> I believe that one outcome of the transition should be that it remains as<br>
> separable as it is now. It must be separable from ICANN if things go<br>
> badly. Just as IETF can move its data to somewhere else it the relationship<br>
> with ICANN turns sour, the GNSO and ccNSO should be able to move their data<br>
> to somewhere else. Personally I do not believe multiple little IANAs is the<br>
> best solution so perhaps we need something similar to the ICG on a periodic<br>
> basis (e.g. 5 years) to be created from the various parts of the community<br>
> to review the performance, the audit reports, consultation based evidence<br>
> &c. and to decide whether changes are required. These changes could be<br>
> minor fixes or could be major and involve transfering the responsibility.<br>
><br>
> Such a mechanism based solution would be easier to craft than one that<br>
> invovles creating yet another permanent superstructure that serves the same<br>
> set of stakeholders involved in the current operational communities. The<br>
> idea that we would create an oversight for ICANN somewhat like ICANN itself<br>
> reminds me of tortoises stacked on the backs of tortoises all the way up as<br>
> we reach for true accountabity. It would also not create a new organization<br>
> with the risk that brings of recapitulating ICANNs all the way up.<br>
><br>
> A separability mechanism gives the GNSO and ccNSO the same ability that the<br>
> IETF and the RIRs have of finding another provider if necessary. And<br>
> working together with the advice and participation of global stakeholders, a<br>
> decision can be made periodically on whether it has become necessary to do<br>
> so. One thing we have to remember, it is not ICANN the corporation that is<br>
> the operational policy community for names. It is the GNSO and the ccNSO<br>
> and the advising AC's that are. Just as the ICG does not require the ICANN<br>
> Board's approval before sending its decision to the NTIA, so to this<br>
> periodic review committee of IETF, RIRs, GNSO ccNSO and related policy<br>
> advice mechanisms from the I* ecosystem, like ISOC, ALAC, GAC, SSAC, RSSAC,<br>
> & others, would not require ICANN Board approval to move the IANA function.<br>
><br>
> There may be some legal issues to be resolved in the creation of such a<br>
> mechanism, again the problem of how does one make ICANN corporate do what<br>
> ICANN corporate doesn't want to do. Perhaps the construction of an IANA<br>
> trust to hold the contract, could solve that problem.<br>
><br>
> Just a thought.<br>
><br>
> avri<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> On 18-Oct-14 12:39, Milton L Mueller wrote:<br>
><br>
> I'm not Jordan but will answer this anyway ;-)<br>
><br>
> I would say it is _possible_.<br>
><br>
> The problem is that moving GNSO and CCNSO out of ICANN at this point would<br>
> involve such a complex set of organizational arrangements and such<br>
> destabilizing potential for power shifts among the stakeholder groups<br>
> involved that it could not be contemplated within anything like the time<br>
> frame we have.<br>
> Would it involve the creation of a new board? What would happen to GAC and<br>
> ALAC? Just 2 examples of the kind of knotty questions that would have to be<br>
> answered.<br>
><br>
> --MM<br>
><br>
> -----Original Message-----<br>
> On Oct 15, 2014, at 3:18 PM, Jordan Carter <<a href="mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz">jordan@internetnz.net.nz</a>><br>
> wrote:<br>
><br>
> If we are going to have a successful transition, it's really important for<br>
> the<br>
><br>
> numbers and protocols folks to understand that:<br>
><br>
> ...<br>
> b) the names people cannot copy number/protocol accountability<br>
> mechanisms because they aren't organised outside ICANN<br>
> c) it isn't possible for names to organise outside ICANN in the way<br>
> numbers/protocol people do<br>
><br>
> Jordan -<br>
><br>
> Could you elaborate on why "c" isn't possible?<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> -----Original Message-----<br>
> On Oct 15, 2014, at 3:18 PM, Jordan Carter <<a href="mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz">jordan@internetnz.net.nz</a>><br>
> wrote:<br>
><br>
><br>
> A thought that has been bubbling away here at ICANN LA this week for me:<br>
><br>
> If we are going to have a successful transition, it's really important for<br>
> the numbers and protocols folks to understand that:<br>
><br>
> a) they have superior accountability situations to the names people today<br>
> b) the names people cannot copy number/protocol accountability mechanisms<br>
> because they aren't organised outside ICANN<br>
> c) it isn't possible for names to organise outside ICANN in the way<br>
> numbers/protocol people do<br>
> d) there may need to be structural changes or new bodies to provide a<br>
> workable settlement for names<br>
> e) without a workable settlement for names, there isn't going to be a<br>
> transition.<br>
><br>
> I raise this now because both for numbers and protocols there's a clear<br>
> direction to try and rule out any institutional changes.<br>
><br>
> I strongly caution against any part of the community being dogmatic about<br>
> any of these, because it will a) attract some attention that'll risk the<br>
> whole transition process failing (esp. from governments), and b) means that<br>
> a negotiated outcome is harder to achieve, also risking failure.<br>
><br>
> Wonder how others feel about this.<br>
><br>
> cheers<br>
> Jordan<br>
><br>
><br>
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<br>
--<br>
Regards.<br>
--------------------------<br>
Fouad Bajwa<br>
ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor<br>
My Blog: Internet's Governance: <a href="http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/" target="_blank">http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/</a><br>
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</blockquote></div>