<div dir="ltr"><span id="docs-internal-guid-17fafeba-b293-c2b4-7976-d6588fc135f5"><div><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3">Avri, </font></div><div><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3"><br></font></div><div><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3">I reproduce some previous conversations on this list below that may help have an informed discussion.</font></div><div><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3"><br></font></div><div><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3">I request you to address the points raised by Becky and MM.</font></div><div><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3"><br></font></div><ul style="margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><li dir="ltr" style="list-style-type:disc;vertical-align:baseline;background-color:transparent"><p dir="ltr" style="margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="vertical-align:baseline;background-color:transparent"><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3"><span style="line-height:16px;white-space:pre-wrap"><u>Becky</u>: Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. </span></font></span></p></li><li dir="ltr" style="list-style-type:disc;vertical-align:baseline;background-color:transparent"><p dir="ltr" style="margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><u style="line-height:16px;white-space:pre-wrap;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:'Times New Roman';font-size:medium;background-color:transparent">Greg</u><span style="line-height:16px;white-space:pre-wrap;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:'Times New Roman';font-size:medium;background-color:transparent">: Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected, directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly representative.</span></p></li><li dir="ltr" style="list-style-type:disc;vertical-align:baseline;background-color:transparent"><p dir="ltr" style="margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="vertical-align:baseline;background-color:transparent"><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3"><span style="line-height:16px;white-space:pre-wrap"><u style="background-color:transparent">MM</u><span style="background-color:transparent">: I disagree at the most fundamental level. This position is based on a fallacy. The fallacy is to confuse the accountability and input of ICANN’s policy making process with the accountability of and input into the IANA functions. All stakeholders should have a voice in and fair representation in the process of policy development. But once a policy is agreed, the implementation of policies by the IANA is a derivative technical and operational function in which its direct customers are the primary stakeholders. Broad public oversight would be meaningless at best (because random members of the public would not know what is going on at that level) and dangerous at worst (because there would be temptations to circumvent agreed policies by politically intervening at the implementation level). I suspect that people who argue for broad representation of IANA contracting function are people who want there to be a capability for some kind of political circumvention of the policy process at the IANA level. In other words, they think policy should be made by IANA rather than by ICANN. That’s wrong, fundamentally wrong, and that is why IGP – and many others – have argued as a principle that policy and IANA implementation need to be clearly separated. If you want to change policy, do it in the policy process. If you want to monitor technical implementation of a policy by a registry, the operators of a registry are in the best position to do that. Yes, there should be some public interest representation in a contracting authority (IGP proposed that, too) but mainly for transparency purposes and for keeping them honest. IANA should be primarily accountable to the people who actually use its services and whose basic functions and activities are dependent on those services. Whether or not one thinks they used it, the US government’s authority over modifications to the root zone created the potential for that kind of political intervention at the implementation level. This set a very bad precedent for the world that we are still dealing with. Now some people are trying to reproduce that situation by making IANA oversight a way for interest groups who don’t get what they want in a policy process to get a second, back door bite at the apple. Let’s reject that clearly. If one knows what the performance of the IANA functions actually are, the idea that every stakeholder in the world should be engaged in “oversight” of its performance is pretty ridiculous. You might as well say there should be public, multistakeholder oversight over what secretaries a registry hires, what cars they rent, what buildings they live in. After all if their cars break down you as a customer might be affected, right? If their building power goes out, you might be affected, right? If the ccTLD for .za submits a request for a change in its root zone file data neither you, Greg – nor I – are in a position to say whether the request should happen or whether it has been implemented correctly. You may argue that internet users under .za will be affected if the IANA implementation of a root zone change for .za is performed badly, but the answer is that the .za registry would be affected immediately and far more damagingly than any individual customer would be, and in terms of both incentives and knowledge, is in a much better position to prevent that from happening than any other stakeholder. So if you really care about the security, accuracy and accountability of registry changes, we will be relying on the primary users, no matter what kind of a structure we set up.</span>
</span></font></span></p></li><li dir="ltr" style="list-style-type:disc;font-size:16px;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;background-color:transparent"><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="text-decoration:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">Becky</span><span style="vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues: Things like SLAs, how quickly name server changes are processed, etc. Where a government actually operates the ccTLD, it would be direct consumers of IANA services, like gTLDs and ccTLDs. But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel. </span></p></li><li dir="ltr" style="list-style-type:disc;font-size:16px;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;background-color:transparent"><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="line-height:1;text-decoration:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">MM</span><span style="line-height:1;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">: Totally agree with Becky. I think any IANA transition solution that gives governments a special, privileged role is not meeting the NTIA criteria and could not be implemented. Most governmental concerns arise in the policy development process. As I’ve said before, IANA does not and should not be involved in making policy, nor should it be viewed as a way to veto or circumvent agreed policy. Therefore govts – and we - must not confuse IANA issues with the accountability of ICANN’s policy making process. For that reason I really like Stacey King’s statement: if GAC is represents on an oversight council “that the ICANN Bylaws provision allowing for GAC advice on any policy matter does not apply to IANA. Ie, that the GAC cannot exercise any additional authority over IANA functions through other means/routes.”</span></p></li><li dir="ltr" style="list-style-type:disc;font-size:16px;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;background-color:transparent"><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:6pt"><span style="line-height:1;text-decoration:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">Guru</span><span style="line-height:1;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">: Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.</span></p></li><li dir="ltr" style="list-style-type:disc;font-size:16px;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;background-color:transparent"><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:6pt"><span style="line-height:1;text-decoration:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">Allan</span><span style="line-height:1;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">: There is a potential problem with having just registries doing the oversight. Particularly for gTLD,s policy is set by a MS group (the GNSO) and it is possible that they can set a policy that the gTLD registries do not approve of (they do not have a veto based on GNSO voting threshholds). If IANA were to not be implementing that policy properly, the oversight body, composed of only registries would have no incentive to call IANA out on the problem</span></p></li><li dir="ltr" style="list-style-type:disc;font-size:16px;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;background-color:transparent"><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:6pt"><span style="line-height:1;text-decoration:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">Becky</span><span style="line-height:1;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">: IANA is a service provider. If you hire a contractor to build a house, it is the contractor’s job to make sure that the plumber and the electrician do their work properly. If your house burns down because the wiring is faulty, you are going to look to the contractor – not the electrician – to make you whole. I fully support multi-stakeholder policy development. Multi-stakeholder oversight of the electrician doesn’t make sense to me.</span></p></li><li dir="ltr" style="list-style-type:disc;font-size:16px;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;background-color:transparent"><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:6pt"><span style="line-height:1;text-decoration:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">Oliver</span><span style="line-height:1;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">: irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected parties, would need a number of seats too</span></p></li><li dir="ltr" style="list-style-type:disc;font-size:16px;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;background-color:transparent"><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:6pt"><span style="line-height:1;text-decoration:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">MM</span><span style="line-height:1;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">: I can’t agree with Olivier and Fouad. Olivier, help me to understand why the directly affected parties shouldn’t have the primary responsibility for operations they are the direct users of and that their own operations depend on. To me your claim that this constitutes a “conflict of interest” is almost self-contradictory and self-refuting – it is a confluence of interest, not a conflict – but perhaps I am missing something. Please explain. What I suspect is happening is that both of you are confusing policy development functions of ICANN with the operational and technical functions of IANA, and applying inappropriate mental models drawn from the former to the latter. In policy development we want “openness, diversity, inclusiveness and the user perspective.” In the DNS IANA functions the users are the registries, it’s an intermediate good, it’s all about implementation, so we want efficiency, security and direct accountability to the primary users, not some playground for different stakeholders to voice their opinions. I do agree with Alan there should be safeguards to prevent the operational and technical functions from being managed in ways that undermine or subvert policy that is made in the MS process. It would be useful to discuss institutional safeguards – including antitrust law – to prevent those kinds of things. But throwing an infinite number of “stakeholders” into looking over the shoulders of those making root zone file modifications accomplishes nothing useful from a public interest perspective, while raising all kinds of risks and inefficiencies. If Alan can recognize the danger that IANA contractors or implementations might compromise the policy process, I hope that he can also recognize the danger that politicized ‘multstakeholdered’ oversight of the technical operations could be abused to circumvent or veto the policies developed by the MS process.</span></p></li></ul></span><div><span id="docs-internal-guid-17fafeba-b292-fe65-434d-d8aa97512d72"></span></div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 1:41 PM, Avri Doria <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:avri@acm.org" target="_blank">avri@acm.org</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#330033">
Hi,<br>
<br>
I think we need to start from principles, as opposed to having a
solution and making sure the principles fit the desired solution.<br>
<br>
And if we are stating that we think 'one Stakeholder Group is more
relevant than all other stakeholder types' and by virtue of that
have primacy in decision making, then that should be stated
explicitly in the principles section. If it is already then I
missed it.<br>
<br>
I prefer the equal-footing multistakeholder principle, but if there
is near consensus for the one stakeholder above all stakeholders
viewpoint, I would like to understand.<br>
<br>
Thanks<br>
<br>
avri<br>
<br>
<div>On 15-Nov-14 01:33, Guru Acharya wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre>Avri
I'm sure your viewpoints are not being ignored. Peace. I forgive you for
your sin.
Nobody is saying multi stakeholder compositions are not applicable or there
is consensus against it. Please look at strawmans 2 and 3.
I intact support a multi-stakeholder composition.
I'm just saying I don't agree there is consensus against a registry only
composition, which you seem to be eliminating by way of the principle that
you are suggesting.
On 15 Nov 2014 11:51, "Avri Doria" <a href="mailto:avri@acm.org" target="_blank"><avri@acm.org></a> wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre> Hi,
Apologies, guess I picked the wrong email. I hope I can be forgiven for
this sin.
I guess that means that my viewpoints will just be ignored.
But if this group is able to decide that multistakeholder models are not
applicable, no matter which thread an email is attached to. I think we may
be in more trouble than I think we are. Are you saying we have consensus
on a principle against commitment to the multistakeholder model? How can
that be when the multistakeholder model is really one of the first
principles we much meet for an NTIA solution
avri
On 14-Nov-14 22:48, Guru Acharya wrote:
Avri - You got the wrong thread. This thread is for RFP2B and not the
principles.
And your suggested principle for a multi-stakeholder composition of the
oversight council appears to be in contradiction to Strawman 1 and ignores
the range of discussions that happened on this list about the composition.
On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 6:13 AM, Avri Doria <a href="mailto:avri@acm.org" target="_blank"><avri@acm.org></a> <a href="mailto:avri@acm.org" target="_blank"><avri@acm.org></a> wrote:
Hi,
I have suggested a few edits to the doc. hope I did it in the mandated
manner.
the changes refer to
- transparency and requirements that any and all audit reports be
published.
- bottom-up modalities
- multistakeholder nature of any committee or oversight arrangements.
Hope I did not mess up any of the formatting.
avri
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</blockquote>
<br>
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