<div dir="ltr">My further responses are inline.<div><br></div><div>Greg</div><div class="gmail_extra"><br clear="all"><div><div class="gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><p style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-repeat:initial"><br></p></div></div></div></div></div>
<br><div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 9:43 PM, Alan Greenberg <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca" target="_blank">alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div><span class="">
At 10/12/2014 07:12 PM, Milton L Mueller wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><a name="14a375e5ad9d00b0__MailEndCompose"></a>
<br>
<b>From:</b> <a href="mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org" target="_blank">cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org</a>
[<a href="mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org" target="_blank">
mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Olivier
MJ Crepin-Leblond<br><br>
I would say that this has already been demonstrated in the making up of
the ICG and the current CWG, both of which include non ICANN participants
from the global multistakeholder community.<br><br>
MM: Hello Olivier. Both the ICG and this CWG have been empowered by an
external entity – the NTIA. It was the NTIA that kicked off the process
by signaling its willingness to let go. It was NTIA that told ICANN to
convene but not control the process. It was the NTIA that set the
parameters and basic criteria a transition proposal had to meet. It is
the NTIA, and the US government more broadly, that will ultimately
determine whether the proposals we develop will be implemented. To look
at these processes as outgrowths of processes internal to ICANN is to be
fundamentally out of touch with what is going on here. As Jordan Carter
pointed out in a message a few minutes ago, given the concessions we had
to wring out of ICANN to make these processes as independent as they are,
it is evident that these examples you hold up would have been very
different had they been internal to ICANN. </blockquote><br></span>
You seem to ignore the powerful draw of keeping IANA without the Contract
Co. complexity, cost and potential for instability. Those are strong
reason for ICANN to adapt.</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>GSS: Having spent some time thinking through the consequences of an "internal to ICANN" concept, I think it is just as complex, if not more so, than the CWG draft proposal. Further, I think that the "potential for instability" is the hallmark of effective accountability. If heads won't roll, then the chances that oversight and accountability will be effective drop dramatically.</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><span class=""><br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Similarly, I would point out
that a totally independent MRT that does not make use of ICANN's existing
structures as a convenor would be missing a coordinated Governmental
involvement. Indeed, only ICANN has the ability to make use of its
members to relate back to the GAC and for the GAC to express points. A
totally independent MRT would have individual governments speaking. Of
course, individual governments were able to speak outside of ICANN at,
say ITU meetings or at NetMundial - but they were not restricted to a
handful of seats for the whole world.<br><br>
MM: The MRT _<i>will</i>_ make use of ICANN’s institutionalized
representational structures. No one who has thought seriously about the
composition of the MRT has proposed anything different from that. The
GNSO SGs will be putting people on to the MRT, so will the ccNSO, so will
the GAC, so will SSAC, so will ALAC. So will entities outside of ICANN.
But it will be independent of ICANN legally, which as Greg explained is
essential.</blockquote></span></div></blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><span class=""><br></span>
But we have not yet explored exactly who will be convening this body, or
what exact structure it has. Greg has explained that for a body to have
contractual terms which it will be compelled to honour (whether by
contract or MoU), it has to have some formal status, but this undefined
body will have a very complex relationship with Contract Co and I have
seen no discussion about how that will happen. <br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>GSS: I'm not sure I understand your concern about a "convenor" for the MRT. It would be put in place as a necessary part of the IANA transition plan accepted by the NTIA and the global multistakeholder community (as represented by the ICG). I don't think it needs a formal "convenor" beyond that. As for the structure, we have discussed that it will be a broadly multistakeholder group, with members formally selected by and acting as representatives of their communities. Getting the details of this right is not a small task, but it is an implementation-level task. The policy-level concept is clear. Frankly, I don't think the relationship between the MRT and Contract Co. is all that complex. The fundamentals of that relationship can be clearly expressed in the MRT's charter and in the articles of incorporation and bylaws of Contract Co.. </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><span class=""><br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">MM: As a sideline, I am a bit
disturbed by the special emphasis you are placing on governmental
involvement. Outside of their jurisdiction, Governments’ only claim to
involvement in ICANN is as one of many voices in the policy development
process. I do hope you, and all ALAC members, understand that the IANA
functions contractor is not a policy making institution, nor is it
supposed to be a vehicle for circumventing or vetoing
policy.</blockquote><br></span>
Are you saying that in this case, a MS body will not have any government
involvement. <br><br>
I am more than a bit troubled that now "multistakeholder" means
the multistakeholders that someone decide need to be involved, but not
others.<br><br>
If that is indeed true, I would suggest that this be said VERY clearly
and openly.<span class=""><br><br>
GSS: I won't presume to speak for Milton, but reading all of this segment together, it's clear to me that he is not saying that the MRT will not have any government involvement. Rather, I believe he is saying that the GAC will have representatives on the MRT who will participate on an equal footing with other stakeholders. So, I think you are "troubled" here for no reason.<br>
<blockquote type="cite">MM: When it comes to the IANA
functions, we do not need governments “speaking,” collectively or
individually, about implementation. We need them in their role as ccTLD
administrators, in which case they are just another IANA customer.
Insofar as they are indirectly affected by the IANA functions, they are
just another internet user stakeholder group – no different from or more
important than noncommercial organizations or business users. There is no
legitimate reason to afford governments a special collective voice in the
MRT. Even in the terms of the Tunis Agenda, a document written by and for
governments, IANA qualifies as “day to day technical and operational
matters” and thus as something to be left to the private sector.<br><br>
At this stage, I could use exactly the same wording about the current CWG
first draft, replacing "other than to be 'internal-to-ICANN"
with "other than to be separable from ICANN".<br><br>
MM: The rationale for separability has been explained countless times. It
is an accountability measure, a way of giving the community the most
meaningful form of redress in case the functions are abused or not
performed well. Moreover, the IANA functions have always been under a
contractual relationship. The burden of proof is on those who would say
IANA functions should be perpetually locked in to one corporation. And I
completely agree with Greg on this question: we hear your discomfort with
Contract Co but we have no idea what positive value you are seeking to
advance by opposing it, other than to keep everything within ICANN.
</blockquote><br></span>
Yes, separability *IS* a method of forcing accountability. But it is not
the ONLY such method.</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>GSS: It may not be the only method, but it is the ultimate method. Like other ultimate methods it should not be used lightly -- but it should be available. </div><div><br></div><div>Greg</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br><br>
Alan</font></span><span class=""><br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Clearly we have some work ahead
of us to make either proposal, or a mix, workable.<br><br>
There will be and can be no mix; either ICANN owns IANA or it is
contracted. I think there is work to be done on this plan, but have seen
no serious challenges to its inherent workability. On the other hand, the
workability of an internal to ICANN option is lying in a heap of rubble
at the bottom of Greg’s last message. </blockquote></span></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>