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The typical meaning of Poison pill is a provision to prevent or forestall
a hostile corporate takeover, but it is also used tin reference to a
proposed bill (and in an act of a legislature) where an amendment is made
which causes it to be distasteful to someone who otherwise would have
supported it. I presume that this latter meaning is implied, in that a
provision of the CWG proposal would invalidate it in its entirely if
specific accountability measures were not taken.<br><br>
Alan <br><br>
At 15/01/2015 02:44 PM, Gomes, Chuck wrote:<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">Jonathan,<br>
<br>
I do not understand the ‘poison pill’ point.<br>
<br>
Chuck<br>
<br>
<b>From:</b> cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org
[<a href="mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org" eudora="autourl">
mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of
</b>Jonathan Robinson<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, January 15, 2015 8:16 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> jrobinson@afilias.info; 'Alan Greenberg'; 'CWG IANA'<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by
CWG Proposal(s)<br>
<br>
All,<br>
<br>
Note the reference that Fadi has very recently made to the possible use
of an over-arching conditionality (in the CWG proposal) in the form of a
“poison pill” i.e. our (CWG) proposal being invalid unless certain key
accountability conditions are met.<br>
<br>
Jonathan<br>
<br>
<b>From:</b> Jonathan Robinson
[<a href="mailto:jrobinson@afilias.info" eudora="autourl">
mailto:jrobinson@afilias.info</a>] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> 15 January 2015 12:46<br>
<b>To:</b> 'Alan Greenberg'; 'CWG IANA'<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by
CWG Proposal(s)<br>
<br>
Alan (and the CWG),<br>
<br>
One question that strikes me which we will almost certainly be asked to
clarify is; What is the problem/issue that you (we) are trying to solve
for in each case?<br>
<br>
The purpose for establishing the motivation is that it may be that there
is more than one remedy and that one remedy is more desirable than
another (for whatever reason including but not limited to legal
advice).<br>
<br>
Perhaps a table in the form of issue / proposed resolution 1 / proposed
resolution 2?<br>
<br>
Jonathan<br>
<br>
<b>From:</b> Alan Greenberg
[<a href="mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca">
mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca</a>] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> 15 January 2015 06:12<br>
<b>To:</b> CWG IANA<br>
<b>Subject:</b> [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by CWG
Proposal(s)<br>
<br>
I believe that this is the minimalist list of accountability measures or
accountability-related processes that would be required based on the two
proposals currently under consideration.<br><br>
I have explicitly not included the wider list of measures that the CCWG
is considering for possible inclusion in its WS1, specifically those
which the community would like to see and for which the IANA transition
might provide additional impetus for the Board to approve, but are not
absolutely required to ensure that the IANA transition can occur. I
recognize that this is a judgement call that not all might agree
with.<br><br>
During the last of the four weekend meetings, Chuck mentioned one
additional issue, and referred to a chat exchange between him and Donna
during the third meeting that listed several other potential
accountability issues. Unfortunately, that chat transcript was not
preserved due to an error in saving it.<br><br>
The list of measures for the Contract Co. model is based on the list that
the Co-Chairs created in December, augmented by Chucks suggestion. I do
not believe that the December list has been negated by any work done in
the interim, but perhaps I have missed something. I could not find a
rationale for the inclusion of the first of the three items, but include
it here so that the CWG could decide if it is based on a real need
associated with the proposal or not. If included, I would suggest the CWG
be more specific as to under what conditions it would apply. Chuck's
suggestion seems to conflict with the 2nd measure in that the 2nd measure
is specified as being binding. I am also not sure if it could possibly be
replaced by the more generalized IAP (once the request goes to
IANA).<br><br>
The requirements for the internal-to-ICANN model are based on my
discussions with a number of people over the last weeks.<br><br>
<b>Contract Co. Model Requirements<br><br>
1. Independent Review of Board Actions<br><br>
</b>Change the ICANN Bylaws to specify that under certain circumstances
(to be defined) the determinations of an Independent Review of Board
Actions Panel would be binding and not implemented at the Board's
discretions.<br><br>
<b>2. Independent certification for delegation and re-delegation
requests<br><br>
</b>This would be a replacement for the authorization function for all
changes to the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database currently performed by the
NTIA. The replacement mechanism would have gTLD requests for delegations
and re-delegations authorized by an independent third party and its
decision on these matters would be binding on ICANN/IANA. <br><br>
<b>3. Independent Appeals Panel<br><br>
</b>An independent review panel must be set up to deal with contested
changes to the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database. Although discussions are
still ongoing as to the specifics of such a proposal, it is generally
agreed that the decisions of such a panel would be binding. There may
also be a need for an injunction-like mechanism to defer the change in
question during the appeal process.<br><br>
<b>4. gTLD Delegation or Redelegation Appeal within ICANN prior to the
change request going to IANA<br><br>
</b>A Registry could appeal an ICANN decision to delegate or redelegate
and gTLD, based on policy not being followed (or presumably contractual
terms not being followed).<br><br>
<b>Internal-To-ICANN Model Requirements<br><br>
</b>This model will require all of the above measures plus the
following:<br><br>
<b>5. Control over ICANN Board decisions.<br><br>
</b>The ability for ICANN Stakeholders, potentially augmented by other
non-ICANN entities, to mandate or overrule, a particular Board decision,
or to require that the implementation of such a decision be subject to
consideration of an independent, binding review. These measures might
need to be augmented by advance notice of such decisions and allow the MS
community to react. In the most restricted form, this ability might be
restricted to decisions related to IANA, but in reality, it may not be
practical to define this scope limitation (ie how to recognize an
IANA-related decision).<br><br>
<b>6. Ability to Remove Directors<br><br>
</b>The ability of the overall multi-stakeholder community to remove some
or all of the Board Directors. In the case of a full Board removal, a
mechanism would be required for appointing an Interim Board and then a
replacement regular Board. In addition, ACs and SOs could be given the
right to recall their appointed Director(s).<br><br>
<br><br>
<br>
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