<div dir="ltr"><p class="">Dear Maarten <i>et al</i>:</p>
<p class="">Thank you Maarten for your posting dated January 26, 2015.</p>
<p class="">What I have to say in response below, others in
CWG-stewardship may agree with, in whole or in part, and some may vehemently
disagree—and that’s OK—as Phil Corwin pointed out on the CCWG-accountability
list, “we can disagree without being disagreeable.”</p>
<p class="">I am all in favor of simplifying the CWG-stewardship <i><u><a href="https://www.icann.org/public-comments/cwg-naming-transition-2014-12-01-en">draft
proposal</a></u></i> which was published for public comment (1-22 Dec 2014). I
am <u>not</u> in favor of “gutting” the requirement for a contractual
counter-party to ICANN, expressed in the <i><u>draft
proposal</u></i> as “Contract Co.” Indeed, my reading of those public comments
that disagreed with the <i><u>draft proposal</u>
</i>are that most objections go to the complexity of the CSC/MRT/IAP specifics and the <b><i>sense</i></b>
that the <i><u>draft proposal</u></i>
attempts to “fix” ICANN by replicating ICANN’s “internal accountability
mechanisms” at a higher external level. That is<b> <u>not</u> the remit* of this group nor the ICG pursuant to the <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">NTIA
announcement of March 14, 2014</a>:</b></p>
<p class="">“… NTIA is asking the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN) to convene global stakeholders to develop a proposal
to <b>transition</b> <b><u>the current role played by NTIA</u></b> in the coordination of the
Internet’s domain name system (DNS). <b>NTIA’s
responsibility includes</b> the procedural role of administering changes to the
authoritative root zone file – the database containing the lists of names and
addresses of all top-level domains – as well as<b> <u>serving as the historic steward of the DNS</u></b>. <b>NTIA
currently <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/iana-functions-purchase-order">contracts
with ICANN</a></b> to carry out the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) <b>functions <u>and</u> has a <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/verisign-cooperative-agreement">Cooperative
Agreement with Verisign</a></b> under which it performs related root zone
management functions. <b><u>Transitioning NTIA out of its role</u></b>
marks the final phase of the privatization of the DNS as outlined by the U.S.
Government in 1997…”</p>
<p class="">Every individual, every organization and corporation, has
both “internal” and “external” accountability mechanisms. When I drive my car
if I decide, despite my “internal controls” that I will “run that stop sign”
because “I am in a hurry,” society has provided “external controls” in the form
of police to stop me and prevent me from endangering myself and others. <b>Likewise, up to now, ICANN has had both “internal
accountability mechanisms” (flawed though they may be), and an “external
accountability mechanism” in the form of “<u>the current role played by NTIA</u>.”</b></p>
<p class=""><b><u>What is the
NTIA role</u> for which we (as representatives of the “global multistakeholder
community”) are trying to develop a proposal? The NTIA role, </b>as stated
above in the NTIA announcement, has 3 components:</p>
<p class=""><b>1) to serve as “steward
of the DNS;”</b></p>
<p class=""><b>2) to enter into a
contract for operation of “the IANA functions;”</b></p>
<p class=""><b>3) to enter into a
contract for operation of “root zone management functions” which contract also
includes <u>limitations</u> on the fees Verisign may charge domain name registrants
as operator “in perpetuity” of the market-dominant .COM Registry.</b></p>
<p class="">A lightweight “Contract Co” could quickly “<b>transition NTIA out of its role” </b>as
noted above. I have suggested
previously, that “Contract Co” take the form of a Trust—with members of the
Board of Trustees selected by the “global multistakeholder community.” </p>
<p class="">The specifics of ICANN
“accountability mechanisms” as expressed in the CSC/MRT/IAP of the <i><u>draft proposal</u> </i> could (and in my view probably should) be only
outlined generally as requirements that the IANA functions operator implement
in accordance with terms of the IANA contract.</p>
<p class="">To summarize: <b>Should
there continue to be an IANA contract counter-party to ICANN?</b><i> <b><u>Yes</u></b></i>
said the CWG-stewardship (RFP 3) draft proposal. Contracts are a good
thing--they hold people, institutions, and corporations accountable.
Accountability is key here, and any internal solution will be inferior in this
regard. The "external solution" may also provide legal advantages to
ICANN in the future (e.g., legal defenses in antitrust litigation, etc.) that
an “internal solution” would not provide and any "internal solution" might in fact expose ICANN to
greater potential liability in the future. I also think it is in the global multistakeholder
community's best interests to "disperse authority and control" of the
Internet, with an independent Root Zone Maintainer (Verisign) and other
"multiple points of failure" to avoid having a fragile system with a
"single point of failure" (ICANN) in total control. Finally, the
"external solution" lessens or even obviates dependency upon
CCWG-accountability’s work. (Personally, I wish the CCWG-accountability group
"the best" in trying to “fix” ICANN, but that committee’s work should
<u>not</u> impede <u>replacing the US government</u> with an <u>entity of the
global multistakeholder community</u>, as soon as possible, in response to NTIA’s
announcement of March, 2014.) Even if CCWG-accountability comes up with WS-1
“fixes,” it will take <u>years</u> to both implement those fixes <u>and</u>
then be able to judge whether problems with ICANN accountability have been resolved.
Indeed, in the unlikely event ICANN proves to be “unfixable" for whatever
reason, then, in that case, "Contract Co" would have the authority to
contract with another entity to carry out the IANA functions in the wider public interest of
the global multistakeholder community. Remember, that while it had always been the "intention" to transition "NTIA out of its role," no one, including ICANN, had been actively engaged in that process until the NTIA announcement was dropped like a "bombshell" upon the global multistakeholder community as a result of the Snowden revelations.</p>
<p class="">Finally, I caution all fellow participants in this
process to remember that they are all representatives of “the global
multistakeholder community” in fashioning a proposal to transition “NTIA out of
its role.” That “global multistakeholder community” is much broader than just
the stakeholders represented within ICANN. The global multistakeholder
community is watching this process very closely. Any indication that the “IANA
stewardship transition process” has been hijacked by the ICANN Board of
Directors or “ICANN insiders” will likely doom all the good work that has
already been done. <b>Please remember that when (most of) you are in Singapore
next month at ICANN 52.</b> I won’t be there—I am just a domain name registrant,
and there is no “domain name registrants” stakeholder group within ICANN.</p>
<p class="">Best regards,</p>
<p class="">John Poole</p>
<p class="">*<b><a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=remit">remit<span style="font-weight:normal"> as defined by Google</span></a></b> in this context: (noun) <b>the task or area of activity officially
assigned to an individual or organization</b>. -- <i>"the committee was becoming caught up in issues that did not fall
within its remit"</i></p>
<p class=""><br></p>
<p class=""><i>On Mon, Jan 26,
2015 at 6:00 AM, Maarten Simon <<a href="mailto:maarten.simon@sidn.nl">maarten.simon@sidn.nl</a>>wrote:</i></p>
<p class=""><i>All,</i></p>
<p class=""><i>I have read the
CCWG-Accountability Chairs? statement and wonder if we should not also discuss
a scenario for the situation where the CCWG-Accountability will be successful
in reaching their first requirement:</i></p>
<p class=""><i>?Enabling community
empowerment over ICANN Board decisions with limited, strictly enumerated, last
resort powers;"</i></p>
<p class=""><i>As far as I
understand, these last resort powers are meant to include the powers with
regard to the IANA functions. I figure that if the community will already have
the final say over the IANA functions through these last resort powers, that:</i></p>
<p class=""><i> 1. There will be no need for an external
solution where the same community will be given the final say over the IANA
functions;</i></p>
<p class=""><i> 2. There is no need for an MRT;</i></p>
<p class=""><i> 3. There might be a need for a CSC (maybe a
CSC plus);</i></p>
<p class=""><i> </i><i> But maybe I am oversimplifying things here
?</i></p>
<p class=""><i> Best,</i></p>
<p class=""><i> Maarten</i></p>
</div>