<div dir="ltr"><div>Dear Greg <i>et al</i>:<br></div><div><div><u>I very much <b>object</b> to the Legal Scoping Document (Version 3)</u> in that it confuses the question I asked to be included (and was the first to ever raise, to my knowledge, in this whole process--see my comment to the proposal draft in December): the idea, in the context of Contract Co, of a Trust and Board of Trustees to replace the Stewardship role played by NTIA. Draft 3 now includes parts of my question mixed up with an internal solution, proposed lately, to somehow make ICANN a trustee. That is not what I asked. The Legal Scoping Document (Version 3) as now drafted, is confusing and misleading as to the two separate sets of issues being raised. Please separate out my question, you may add it at the end of the Legal Scoping Document:<br><br>"Could, or should, Contract Co. take the form of a Trust established under American law, registered with a state court (e.g., California or New York) [which ensures that the terms of the Trust will at all times in the future be met, see:<span style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><font> <a href="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ny-court-of-appeals/1418851.html" target="_blank">http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ny-court-of-appeals/1418851.html</a></font></span> ], the Trust to have a Board of Trustees (incorporated in the same state the Trust is registered), selected from, and representing, the global multistakeholder community, and the Trust receiving an assignment and/or conveyance from the US government, Department of Commerce (NTIA), of all the US government's rights and duties included within its Stewardship role over the Internet and DNS, under existing contracts with ICANN, and Versign, or otherwise. Further, that the Trust have as its primary purpose and duty, to ensure the continuous operation of a free, open, secure, and stable global internet DNS, including the Internet Root Zone, by the selection of an IANA functions operator (presently ICANN), and Internet Root Zone maintainer (presently Verisign), each for a term of years (subject to termination for cause), and such other terms, conditions, and covenants necessary or convenient (such as limitation of registration/renewal fees charged by a market-dominant gTLD registry operator), in order to carry out the purpose of the Trust and the duty of the Trustees thereof to act at all times in the wider public interest of the global multistakeholder community."<br><br>I do appreciate all the work you and others are doing for the CWG, but since, apparently, the choice of, and all communication thereafter with
the yet-to-be-retained independent legal counsel will now be controlled by,
and filtered through, a self-appointed Committee of Four - Jonathan Robinson, Lise
Fuhr, Maarten Simon and you - I do not want independent legal counsel confused, or to misunderstand the legal issue I have raised on behalf of the global multistakeholder community. To illustrate, in regard to the Verisign .COM registry operator agreement, there are actually two agreements - one agreement is between ICANN and Verisign that grants Verisign, in effect, a right in perpetuity to operate the market-dominant .COM registry with no limitation on the registration and renewal fees that Verisign can charge registrants; the other agreement is between Verisign and NTIA that caps, or limits, the registration and renewal fees Verisign can charge registrants of .COM domain names. Therefore, idea that ICANN can fulfill the stewardship role over the DNS played by NTIA is ludicrous based on ICANN's own track record. Even ICANN's own original Board Chairman, Esther Dyson, has lost faith in ICANN's ability to operate in the public interest, see: <a href="http://www.technologyreview.com/review/428911/icanns-boondoggle/">http://www.technologyreview.com/review/428911/icanns-boondoggle/</a><br><br></div><div>Best regards,<br></div><div>John Poole<br></div><div><br></div></div></div>