


## Post Transition IANA model - Draft



Above - basic functional representation

### Highlights:

- Post transition IANA (PTI) services sit at the center of the names, numbers and protocols ecosystem
- Parity of relationships between the three policy-making communities and the IANA functions operator
- Enhances separation between policy-making and policy implementation
- Direct accountability of Post Transition IANA to the three communities through a "Community Board"
- Transfer<sup>1</sup> of the ICANN IANA team to the Post Transition IANA to ensure continuity, stability, security and resiliency
- Relationships between IETF and RIR and Post Transition IANA remain substantially the same; additionally ICANN establishes SLAs/MoU with Post Transition IANA

<sup>1</sup> This transfer could be virtual, depending on which configuration of the model was implemented

- Each community appoints an equal number of members to the Post Transition IANA “community board”
- Minimizes opportunity for capture and manipulation
- Uses elements of models already under discussion in CWG Stewardship
- Simplifies overall model design.

## Detail

The overall model is integrated as follows:

1. it integrates the 3 operational communities in the board of Post Transition IANA (PTI)
2. it integrates elements of the current external and internal CWG models

The Integrated model provides functional and structural separation of the IANA functions. The Post Transition IANA community board draws its membership from names, numbers, protocol communities.

### Benefits of overall model

- Blends external/internal models, drawing on various elements of the proposals to date.
- Ensures parity between the names, numbers and protocol policy developing entities (ICANN, RIRs, IETF) and IANA implementation function (Post Transition IANA)
- Ensures the independence of the IANA function and its oversight. Yet, its accountability to the names, numbers and protocols communities is also ensured.
- Ensures a coordinated and coherent IANA function into the future through a Post Transition IANA entity that involves the interested and affected parties directly.
- Enables continued operations for stability, security and resilience of DNS operations
- Consistent with principle of separability, possible for policy development entities to separate their registries from Post Transition IANA if needed, but there is greater opportunity to affect the operations than in the current model
- Consistent with existing numbers and protocol proposals, only requires changing counterparty of MOUs to Post Transition IANA and assigning members to the community board.

### Structure

- The ICANN IANA department transfers from ICANN to Post Transition IANA. This eliminates the need for the **Contract Company (ConCo)**

- A community board comprising representatives from the 3 communities is created to oversee Post Transition IANA operation.<sup>2</sup> Optionally, additional participants, possible as liaisons, may be added from the global multistakeholder community.
- Previously proposed **Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)** is effectively replaced by the Post Transition IANA board (includes representation of RIRs and IETF)
- Previously proposed **Customer Standing Committee (CSC)** exists as largely described and is internal to ICANN, ensures that the SLA/MoU between ICANN and Post Transition IANA are met.
- Previously proposed **Independent Appeals Panel (IAP)** remains part of the model. Work on this continues in the CWG Stewardship and CCWG-Accountability.
- This model adds no new architectural considerations.
- ...

### Role of the community Board

- Oversight of the IANA team, operations
- Addressing escalation issues from IANA customers, i.e those with MOUs with Post Transition IANA.
- Responsible for ensuring funding for operations
- Budget approval for Post Transition IANA

### **Post Transition IANA structure options**

This hybrid Integrated model can be structured in three fundamental configurations, each representing a different degree of separation:

1. fully owned subsidiary of ICANN
2. shared services arrangement between ICANN, IETF and RIRs
3. free-standing entity (e.g, member association or other - ownership between ICANN, IETF and RIRs )



It should be noted that the controlling party(ies) may migrate to a higher degree of separation in the Post Transition IANA model depending on bylaws constraints &c.

See the following pages for model diagrams:


---

<sup>2</sup> While the composition of the Community board is open in the model, one suggestion is an arrangement that allows each of the organizations to pick the number of people they think are required but which normalizes the votes on the community board to 3-5 for each operational community. Other arrangements are possible and as in the discussion of the MRT there are many possible variations. Among the principles that stem from the model, however, is parity among the operational community members. It is also important to remember that this not a policy making board and that there are only 12 employees currently on IANA staff at ICANN.

Current structure:



Risks and advantages as discussed in CWG

ICANN Subsidiary:Benefits


- Provides functional and structural separation
- Increased accountability for IETF and RIRs as they have seats on subsidiary community board
- GNSO, ccNSO can establish SLAs for IANA functions for root zone svcs
- At operational level, oversight by all operational communities

Risks that would need mitigation

- If ICANN captured there is no defense against IANA capture since ICANN is the parent company for IANA,
- Primary IANA accountability mechanism for IETF and RIRs is cessation of MOU and moving elsewhere
- Strong reliance on outcomes of the ICANN CCWG Accountability

### Shared Services Arrangement<sup>3</sup> among ICANN, IETF<sup>4</sup> and RIRs

#### Shared Services Arrangement between ICANN, IETF, RIRs



#### Benefits


- Advantages as described in Subsidiary model above
- Structure least susceptible to capture through parity of oversight and ownership - all three parties would need to be captured
- Enhanced separation between policy development and policy implementation mitigating manipulation
- Equal accountability to each community ensuring checks and balances
- Stable due to all three parties needing to agree to substantive changes in Post Transition IANA governance
- Little reliance on outcomes of ICANN CCWG Accountability

#### Risks that would need mitigation

- Possible instability due to one of the parties leaving the services arrangement
- Expectation of shared funding
- Additional overhead to manage

<sup>3</sup> Preferred configuration of the model by the authors

<sup>4</sup> It is noted that since the IETF is not an established legal entity, it may be the Internet society that formalizes the role on the IETF/IAB's behalf.

Free StandingBenefits:

- Greatest degree of separation between policy development and policy implementation
- Enhanced separation between policy development and policy implementation mitigating manipulation
- Equal accountability to each community ensuring checks and balances
- Stable due to all three parties needing to agree to substantive changes in Post Transition IANA governance
- Little reliance on outcomes of ICANN CCWG Accountability

Risks that would need mitigation:

- Possible instability due to one of the parties leaving the services arrangement
- Expectation of shared funding
- Additional overhead to manage
- Entity management and administration will add costs to overall function and would probably require additional staff.
- Additional accountability mechanisms may be needed due to independence of entity.
- Major organizational and legal change

- As the Board is the only mechanism for checks and balances, less defence against capture.