<div dir="ltr"><div><div><div><div>Hello Avri,<br><br></div>Thanks for the explanation which was
quite helpful. I must say the more i try to process this, the more it
seem that the proposal attempts to practically create a new operator order than ICANN (re: PTI) being the operator and turns ICANN to a "policy only" organisation. That seem like a major change in the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) mission and purpose. How will this work with ccTLDs who for instance are practically engaging with ICANN just because it is the IANA operator? how about existing gTLD contracts which were signed with the intent of ICANN being the operator?<br><br>Looking at the proposal, how do we achieve accountability of the "community board"? i mean why should one be comfortable that the "community board" will be more accountable than the current ICANN board? even if they are, why can't some of the proposed characteristics of the "community board" be suggested within the CCWG in other to make ICANN board more accountable? I am overly concerned that we may be creating multiple structures and too
many accountability points that could overall cripple the already
efficient IANA department.<br><br>As you have also noted in the proposal; the outcome of the CCWG activities may indeed handle the accountability issues that the proposal attempts to address, just that it seem you don't think the implementation of the outcome will be timely? and i believe you are speaking from experience (re: ATRT). However, i think things may be different this time and one could have faith in the CCWG process considering that NTIA categorically emphasised that outcome of ccwg with that of ICG is a prerequisite to transition. That said, i appreciate the intent of separating IANA operation from the policy side of ICANN. Although one may argue that such septation already exist (with IANA being a department in ICANN) and can be maintained "through relevant addition to the bylaw" in the absence of NTIA contract. <br><br></div>Finally, its good to note that we now have 7 CWG proposals (yes Avri's is practically 3 in 1). From all the proposals, the IAP and CSC seem to cut across (in terms of their role). Maybe we should pick the CSC and review its role and composition to ensure that it transparently provides it outcome to the entirely community. Utilising the outcome of the CSC to keep the board/IANA staff accountable is what CCWG could then worry about. This would avoid duplication of accountability mechanism to ensure maintenance of a stable, secure and resilient IANA<br><br></div>Regards<br></div>PS: These are personal views only!<br></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Sat, Feb 21, 2015 at 6:09 PM, Avri Doria <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:avri@acm.org" target="_blank">avri@acm.org</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#330033"><span class="">
<br>
<div>On 21-Feb-15 01:08, Seun Ojedeji wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p dir="ltr">Hi,</p>
<p dir="ltr">How does this proposal address the few points below:</p>
<p dir="ltr">- ICANN is running IANA properly and should continue
to be the operator<br>
</p>
</blockquote>
<br></span>
This proposal rest upon the same team being able to continue
handling the operator functions. The 12 person IANA team is what is
doing the job properly and what needs protecting in a stewardship
transition.<br>
<br>
In the fully owned subsidiary configuration, ICANN remains the
operator, or rather the owner or the operator.<br>
In the Shared Service Arrangement ICANN remains one of the owners.
In this operational control is shared with the other operational
communities while ICANN remains a co-owner, has SLA/MOUs and a board
seats.<br>
<br>
It is only in the Free Standing configuration that ICANN would cease
being an owner of a subsidiary though would probably remain owners,
perhaps even members, of the Free Standing company. And would
retain Community Board seats.<span class=""><br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p dir="ltr">
- ICANN is purpose built with it's main purpose of centrally
operating IANA for the 3 communities<br>
</p>
</blockquote>
<br></span>
While this may have been the intention at day 0, the evolution of
ICANN over the years has been anything but purpose built. ICANN has
evolved into a much needed policy group that deals with the
political, financial and other issues that grow out of its narrow
technical mandate. The remaining issue that has not been solved in
the Internal models is the one where the policy organization for
gTLDS, the bulk of ICANN's 100+ MUSD operations is not separated
from IANA.<span class=""><br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p dir="ltr">
- The task at hand is to transition IANA stewardship, is the
proposal not doing more than that?<br>
</p>
</blockquote>
<br></span>
Not really. Especially the model is very much about stewardship and
finding ways to distribute that stewardship in the light of losing
NTIA. In one configuration, ICANN retains complete control, just of
a structurally separated internal component that provides greater
transparency. In the Shared Service Arrangement, IANA shares this
ownership with the other 2 communities, if they are interested in
sharing. If they aren't, I figure they will be fine with leaving it
as a full Owned subsidiary of ICANN.<span class=""><br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p dir="ltr">
- Based on the response given by Milton, the practical
implication of this proposal seem to imply absolute separation
between IANA functions so names operation is no longer under
ICANN oversight. If that is correct are we still within scope of
our task by proposing that?<br>
</p>
</blockquote>
<br></span>
I do not speak for Milton, that is beyond my pay grade. <br>
<br>
While there is structural separation it is not absolute - currently
some try to argue that there is functional separation at ICANN as
required by NTIA in the RFP, though some of us have our doubts on
this actually being the case, especially since IANA isn't even as
separated as is GDD. Not all separation is the same or absolute.<br>
<br>
In two of the configurations, that structural separation is
contained within the existing organizations and remains under ICANN
protection. Even in the Free Standing configuration, ICANN remains
on of the controling voices on the Community Board. ICANN retains
its share of the stewardship role in all of the configurations in
the model. In no part of the model, and in none of it
configurations is the separation complete or absolute. And remember
we allegedly have functional separation today. This model is just
an evolution of current realities with as little disruption as
possible.<br>
<br>
In fact for absolute or complete separation in this model, ICANN
would have to utilize the same so-called nuclear option the other
two operational communities are posting, the ability to take their
business elsewhere. None of the configurations offered provides
absolute separation.<br>
<br>
I see nothing that excludes this from our scope to find the best
stewardship solution we can given the constraint of multistakeholder
general agreement. We face an impasse with strong smart people
insisting they are correct on two very opposed sides of the
discussion. We can continue the tug of war about who is right;
constantly worrying over who has the better argument of the day or
the best allies. Perhaps we can even engage in some brinkmanship -
just like US political leaders. We decided to try to find a
solution that satisfies many of the concerns of both camps without
scaring those who are watching.<span class=""><br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p dir="ltr">
- What does the proposal intend to address; separability OR
separation?</p>
</blockquote>
<br></span>
It is attempting to balance the most critical requirements for a
multistakeholder solution, an Internal solution and also for an
External solution, and one that is solid, stable and safe from
International capture enough to satisfy Republicans in Congress as
well. It is meant to be a reasonable and based on a relatively
standard business relationship that provides the multistakeholder
control through ownership, sla/mous, and membership in the Post
Transition Board. Separability is a principle that all solutions
must satisfy, but it is not a goal. The goal is stewardship for a
multistakeholder, stable, secure and resilient IANA. The secondary
goal was making the solution as simple as possible with as little
reliance on CCWG-Accountabilty fundamental change as possible.<br>
<br>
thanks<span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br>
<br>
avri</font></span><span class=""><br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p dir="ltr">Thanks</p>
<p dir="ltr">Regards<br>
sent from Google nexus 4<br>
kindly excuse brevity and typos.</p>
<div class="gmail_quote">On 21 Feb 2015 00:19, "Avri Doria" <<a href="mailto:avri@acm.org" target="_blank">avri@acm.org</a>>
wrote:<br type="attribution">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote">
<div> <br>
<div>On 20-Feb-15 16:50, Milton L Mueller wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>My question: </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>Does this model provide for
separability?</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span> </span></p>
</blockquote>
<br>
First it provides structural separation in all
configurations. That is a first level of severability and
hopefully as much as really is ever needed. Additionally,
in this model, ICANN would have the same ability to pick
another provider, or perhaps a redundant provider, just as
the names or protocols can now. This is made possible by
virtue of structural separation and the defintion of
SLA/MOUs across a corporate boundary.<br>
<br>
Further levels of separability can, however, be obtained in
the Shared Service Arrangement configuration or the finally
in the Free Standing configuration. <br>
<br>
Finally<br>
<br>
<br>
</div>
<br>
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</blockquote>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
</span></div>
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<br></blockquote></div><br><br clear="all"><br>-- <br><div class="gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr">------------------------------------------------------------------------<br><font color="#888888"><blockquote style="margin:0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex;font-family:garamond,serif">
<i><span style="color:rgb(0,102,0)">Seun Ojedeji,<br style="color:rgb(0,102,0)"></span><span style="color:rgb(0,102,0)">Federal University Oye-Ekiti<br style="color:rgb(0,102,0)"></span><span style="color:rgb(0,102,0)">web: </span><a href="http://www.fuoye.edu.ng" target="_blank">http://www.fuoye.edu.ng</a><br>
<span style="color:rgb(0,102,0)"></span><span style="color:rgb(0,102,0)">Mobile: <a value="+2348035233535">+2348035233535</a></span><span style="color:rgb(0,102,0)"></span><br></i><i><span style="color:rgb(0,102,0)">alt email:<a href="http://goog_1872880453" target="_blank"> </a><a href="mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng" target="_blank">seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng</a></span></i><br><br><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">The key to understanding is humility - my view !<br></blockquote></blockquote></font><br></div></div>
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