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Hi,<br>
<br>
In answer to the questions:<br>
<br>
First on Nomcom. This model rest on a notion of subsidiarity
acccording to operational community; if a nomcom were used it should
be the nomcom of the operational community. The idea of creating a
new nomcom that was 3 operational communities wide scares me more
than the creation of the Contracting Co. would - then again I once
chaired a WG that rewrote the rules for a single operational
community Nomcom. I share some of the concerns Chuck mentioned. I
also worry that if a 3 community nomcom were established, it would
be uncertan who they were accountable to and who their appointees
were accountable to. That shared Board Community shared
accountability is one of the important accountabilty anchors in the
model. I have seen in the ICANN results an uncertainty at times of
whom Nomcom Appointees were accountable to.<br>
<br>
In terms of the question about a different formulation of the ICANN
subsidiary configuration. Sure, as I mentioned in a email to Chuck
earlier this is one option, ICANN can remain the contractor for the
protocols and numbers if necessary and just use the subsidiary to do
the work. While I think that this can work, the accountability
anchor, while as strong as any internal model, would not be as
strong as if the SLA were moved to the Post Transition IANA (PTI).
I think it is worthwhile as a fall back positon if the model gets
some degree of traction in the CWG. I guess I would prefer to see
a higher degree of particpation offered and to have the ICG pass on
a request to consider the invitation to share a greater degree of
IANA responsibility and accountability. But if the more modest
configuration was needed, it could work.<br>
<br>
In terms of the Community Board, I do not think of this Board as
doing that much more than the NTIA, except maybe the part where they
oversee IANA as a business and make sure it has sustainable
financing from the parent company(ies). Perhaps this could be done
as a independent board (though I am not sure such really exists). As
we see now with the Congress, the NTIA does have its own
accountability issues that control its activities, so I hardly think
of it as an the equivalent of an independent board. NTIA is a
component in a system of check and balances. I think the Community
Board needs to do that as well for this model to work. If the ICANN
CWG can decides to take an Integrated model further, I would like to
see the offer extended to the operational communuites to share the
stewardship of IANA. I think it would have been hard for the IETF
or CRISP to come up with their own Integratede model where they
grabbed partial control of IANA from within ICANN. I think that if
we can produce an Integrated model that allows us to invite them to
do so, they might just give it serious consideration.<br>
<br>
avri<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 22-Feb-15 10:44, Andrew Sullivan
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote cite="mid:20150222154447.GB18747@mx1.yitter.info"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Hi,
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 02:06:08PM +0000, Gomes, Chuck wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap=""> One concern I have about your proposed variation is the use of a
NomCom like approach. The NomCom as it is configured today is made
up of people who are selected by the multi-stakeholder community but
once they are selected they are really not accountability to the
groups that select them. They are presumably accountable to the
public interest but that is an ill-defined concept that means
different things to different people and I am not sure that will
ever change and maybe it shouldn't except with regard to the issues
of security and stability, which I think there is broad agreement.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
I probably don't fully understand the worry here, but before I start I
should note that this was sort of a throw-away. The real point I was
trying to make is that the proposal as circulated is partly gated on
getting the RIRs and IETF to appoint people to a newly-created board,
on hammering out agreements (across three organizations) about how to
structure that board, and maybe even on working out new legal
agreements and so on. I am not convinced this will be easy. So, I
was suggesting that, by using the straight subsidiary approach we
might be able to skirt all those problems, and I said "nomcom" becuase
it's a mechanism we're all at least somewhat familiar with. (Note
that it needn't be the same nomcom as is used to build the ICANN
board. These two boards ought to have different functions.)
Anyway, your worry suggests that the point of the PTI board is to
represent the various groups. I suppose that's one approach, but
another is to decide that the PTI board is just a board of PTI, and
that representativity is not that important. This might be a
practical answer if the IANA's remit is conceived narrowly enough. On
the other hand, if various groups think that representativity is
important enough, maybe the right thing to do is direct appointment
from all the ICANN stakeholder communities, with right of recall. I
wouldn't be opposed to that, _provided that_ the IANA board was
clearly disempowered to be used as an appeals mechanism for policy
disputes. That is, the PTI could function the way NTIA officially
does in asking, "Did the ICANN process follow its own rules?" It
should _not_ be permitted to try to re-examine the policy
considerations that went into a decision. This is exactly the way the
IANA works now. In my opinion, completely independent board
appointments that cannot be recalled are actually more likely to
ensure that sort of behaviour, but I can imagine an argument for the
opposite conclusion.
Best regards,
A
</pre>
</blockquote>
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