<p dir="ltr">MM:<br>
Thus, replacing NTIA with a nongovernmental entity representative of or accountable to the actual internet community is not reproducing that situation at all, it is correcting it.</p>
<p dir="ltr">SO:<br>
Just to be clear, the legal model is not proposing what you have mentioned above. Instead it is creating a new IANA operator, creating a new mini political setup, indirectly creating an avenue for a mini ICANN community to emerge with a likelihood of slowing up the generally technical work of IANA.</p>
<p dir="ltr">MM:<br>
Conversely, suggesting that no external oversight at all is necessary, as the internal model borders on doing, is equally unsatisfying</p>
<p dir="ltr">SO:<br>
I thought we got passed the external oversight stuff hence the reason for dropping "contract co" and the only issue was whether separability was possible with functional separation. If that is the case, i think we have indeed gotten confirmation from legal that it's possible but with the difficulty clause. If NTIA were to decide to move IANA to another operator today, will it be easy? If it will be then I guess they may have tried it a long time ago. I guess the severability goal we wanted to achieve is possible in functional separation and that's a point we should note!</p>
<p dir="ltr">That said, I think we are taking legal separation of IANA as the sole goal of this working group which is not the case. Keeping the operator of IANA accountable is the main goal and I hope we could focus on this in 90%+</p>
<p dir="ltr">I don't need to wear a life jacket on plane that is yet to give signal of crashing in water but I need to ensure the life jacket is accessible just in case. So what is required is legal terms that allows movement of IANA to another operator when required. Since that is possible, let's then focus firmly on how not to ever get to that stage because it's in our entire interest and not just the operator's</p>
<p dir="ltr">Regards</p>
<p dir="ltr">sent from Google nexus 4<br>
kindly excuse brevity and typos.</p>
<div class="gmail_quote">On 10 Apr 2015 22:53, "Milton L Mueller" <<a href="mailto:mueller@syr.edu">mueller@syr.edu</a>> wrote:<br type="attribution"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
<br>
> -----Original Message-----<br>
> consider stewardship. But I do think it absurd to think that the right thing to<br>
> do is try to re-create an organization to fill the shoes currently occupied by<br>
> NTIA. If we're going to reproduce the dissatisfying structure we have, why<br>
> would we change it at all?<br>
<br>
That depends on why one thinks the current situation is dissatisfying. I, and most of the rest of the world, thought it was unacceptable because a single national government had unilateral control and oversight authority over a global resource, the DNS.<br>
<br>
Thus, replacing NTIA with a nongovernmental entity representative of or accountable to the actual internet community is not reproducing that situation at all, it is correcting it.<br>
<br>
Conversely, suggesting that no external oversight at all is necessary, as the internal model borders on doing, is equally unsatisfying<br>
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