|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Change Area Requested | 1st Reading | 2nd Reading | Outcome | Comments |
| Community Mechanism Escalation Process (Recommendation #2) and Board Removal (Recommendation #4):  *The CWG-Stewardship recognizes that the escalation processes need to happen in a timely manner but they must also allow sufficient time to accommodate the diverse and complex makeup of SOs and ACs.* | [7 January](http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2016-January/009307.html) – Escalation Timeframes  [5 January](https://community.icann.org/x/_ItlAw) –Board Removal | [14 January](http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2016-January/009545.html) – Escalation timeframes  [12 January](https://community.icann.org/x/FZVlAw) & [19 January](http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2016-January/009645.html) –Board Removal | **✔On escalation**: removed the Conference Call stage and extended timeframes for SO/AC decision (21 day cycles with the longest possible time totaling 70 days).  **✔On Board Removal**: Added requirements for dialogue and for a written rationale for Director removal. The CCWG concluded and instructed legal counsels to develop language for pre-service letters. |  |
| Budget (Recommendation #4):  *[…] however, we require that the CCWG-Accountability proposal or the implementation process address the matters that are not sufficiently specified in the Third Draft Proposal (i.e., those relating to budget transparency, grounds for rejection of a budget/plan, timing of budget preparation and development of the caretaker budget, each of which were described in the Second Draft Proposal). In addition, we note, that the CWG-Stewardship (or a successor implementation group) is required to develop a proposed process for the IANA Functions Operations-specific budget review. We require that the proposal specifically acknowledge this.* | [7 January](http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2016-January/009308.html) | [14 January](http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2016-January/009429.html) | **✔**Following comments from CWG-Stewardship, the budget document received additional edits. The latest document is available [here](https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/49351404/Formatted-Annex%204-PROOFED-2nd%20READ%20Budget%20--%20CWG%20ADDITIONS%20JTC-v2.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1453915579000&api=v2), but there are still some items that need to be cleaned up before considered final. |  |
| Separation Process (Recommendation #4):  *The community’s ability to reject ICANN Board decisions on Special IFR/SCWG recommendations, which would include the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator or any other separation process will meet the CWG-Stewardship requirements, provided that (i) the final version of the CCWG-Accountability proposal provide that the right to reject can be exercised an unlimited number of times* | [14 January](http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2016-January/009551.html) | [21 January](https://community.icann.org/x/jJxlAw) | **✔**On Separation Process, no comments in first reading, so changes expected for second reading. Below is an overview of the separation process proposal for the first reading (see page 24):   * Clarification that separation process applies only to domain name function of IANA. * Unlimited right to reject Board decisions relating to reviews of IANA Functions |  |
| IRP (Recommendation #7):  *As we noted in our comment letter to the Second Draft Proposal, the Third Draft Proposal does not explicitly address the CWG-Stewardship requirement that an independent review process be available for claims relating to actions or inactions of PTI.* | [12 January](http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2016-January/009486.html) | [19 January](https://community.icann.org/x/ipxlAw) | **✔**Agreement to move forward with a combination of solutions to address the IRP scope issue with PTI: include general provision regarding ICANN’s obligation to cause the PTI to fulfill its obligations (the failure to do so would give rise to a standard IRP) and text to address SLA failures, etc. with an operational (rather than constitutional) standard of review. |  |