C	ase 8:15-cv-02025-CJC-KES	Document 29	Filed 05/10/16	Page 1 of 12	Page ID #:305
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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT				
9	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA				
10	SOUTHERN DIVISION				
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12			) Case No.: S	SACV 15-020	25-CJC(KESx)
13	VIRTUALPOINT, INC.,		<pre>{</pre>		
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15	Plaintiff,		ORDER G	RANTING V	VITH LEAVE ANT'S MOTION
16	v.		$\left\{ \begin{array}{c} \mathbf{TO} \mathbf{DISM} \\ \mathbf{TO} \mathbf{DISM} \end{array} \right\}$	ISS	
17	POARCH BAND OF CRI				
18	INDIANS, dba PCI GAM AUTHORITY, et al.,	ING			
19					
20 21	Defendants.				
21			_}		
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24	I. INTRODUCTION				
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26	Plaintiff Virtualpoint, Inc. ("Virtualpoint") brings this action against Defendants				
27	the Poarch Band of Creek Indians ("PBCI" or the "Tribe") and the National Arbitration				
28	Forum, Inc. ("NAF") for violations of the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act				

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("ACPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d); cancellation of trademark registrations pursuant to the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 *et seq.*; and common law fraud. Virtualpoint seeks damages, a permanent injunction, and declaratory relief. Before the Court is the Tribe's motion to dismiss the claims against it for lack of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. (Dkt. 22.) For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED, and Virtualpoint's claims against the Tribe are DISMISSED. Virtualpoint is GRANTED LEAVE TO AMEND.<sup>1</sup>

# II. BACKGROUND

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Virtualpoint is a "premier website developer" that owns and develops website domains. (Dkt. 13 ["FAC"] ¶ 14.)<sup>2</sup> It is the owner of the domain name at issue in this case—<windcreek.com>—as well as a number of related domain names (including <www.windcatcher.com>, <www.windcircle.com>, and others). (*Id.* ¶¶ 15–16.) The <windcreek.com> domain was evidently created in January 2003. (*Id.* ¶ 15.)

The Tribe is a federally recognized Indian tribe with a principal place of business in Atmore, Alabama. (FAC. ¶ 7.) It operates a casino in Alabama and has registered three trademarks related to that casino: "Wind Creek Casino & Hotel," "Escape at Wind Creek," and "Wind Creek." (*Id.* ¶¶ 20; 31.) In 2013, a representative of the Tribe reached out to Virtualpoint to inquire about purchasing the domain <windcreek.com>. (*Id.* ¶ 33.) Virtualpoint informed the Tribe that the domain was not for sale. (*Id.*)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Having read and considered the papers presented by the parties, the Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without a hearing. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; Local Rule 7-15. Accordingly, the hearing set for May 16, 2016 at 1:30 p.m. is hereby vacated and off calendar.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The Tribe describes Virtualpoint as a "domain name reseller." (*See* Dkt. 22 ["Motion"] at 3.)

A little over two years later, in September 2015, the Tribe filed an administrative complaint against Virtualpoint before Defendant NAF, pursuant to the Uniform Domain Resolution Policy ("UDRP"). (FAC ¶ 34.) A court in the Western District of Washington has explained that policy as follows:

The UDRP is a policy adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"), which administers domain name registration matters. The UDRP is incorporated by reference into contractual agreements between registrants of domain names and the party accepting the registration. When third parties challenge a registration, they may seek arbitration under the UDRP even though they are not parties to the registration contract.

*Stenzel v. Pifer*, No. C06-49Z, 2006 WL 1419016, at \*1 (W.D. Wash. May 22, 2006) (internal parentheticals and citations omitted).

The Tribe's UDRP complaint alleged that Virtualpoint was operating <windcreek.com> as a "pay-per-click website" that advertised "competing sites that offer hotel and resort services virtually identical to" those of the Tribe. (Dkt. 22-3 ["Smith Decl."] Exh. 1 ["UDRP Compl."] at 5.) Basically, when Internet users looking for information on the Tribe's Wind Creek properties visit <windcreek.com>, they are directed to the Tribe's competitors. Specifically, the Tribe argued, the <windcreek.com> domain, was "confusingly similar" to its registered trademarks, Virtualpoint had no legitimate interest in the domain name, and Virtualpoint had registered and was using the domain name in bad faith. (*Id.*) Accordingly, the Tribe requested that the domain name be transferred from Virtualpoint to it. (*Id.* at 8.)<sup>3</sup>

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 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The UDRP provides that an arbitrator may transfer a domain name upon hearing and adjudicating a dispute in which a complainant can demonstrate that a domain name is "identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the [c]omplainant has rights," that the respondent has "no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name," and that "the domain name should be considered as having been registered and being used in bad faith." (Smith Decl. Exh. 8 ["UDRP Policy"] at 90–91;

<sup>|| 93.)</sup> 

NAF appointed Antonina Pakharenko-Anderson (the "neutral") to hear the dispute. The neutral considered submissions from the parties and issued a decision on November 13, 2015, finding that "the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to [the Tribe's] earlier trademark," that Virtualpoint "failed to establish that it has rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name," and that Virtualpoint registered and was using the domain "in bad faith." (Smith Decl. Exh. 3 [Decision] at 33; 35–37.) Accordingly, the neutral ordered that the <windcreek.com> domain name be transferred from Virtualpoint to the Tribe. (*Id.* at 38.)

Unhappy with the outcome of the arbitration, Virtualpoint filed its Complaint in this Court on December 4, 2015, and then its FAC on March 25, 2016. (Dkt. 1.) The FAC alleges five counts. The first, Count I, seeks a declaration that Virtualpoint is not infringing the Tribe's trademark rights, unfair competition laws, or the ACPA, that Virtualpoint is using the domain name <windcreek.com> in good faith, and that Virtualpoint is the rightful owner of that domain name, as well as injunctive relief enabling Virtualpoint to "retain ownership" of the domain name. (FAC ¶¶ 40–45.) The second, Count II, alleges a cause of action under the ACPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). Virtualpoint alleges that the Tribe "sought the transfer of [<windcreek.com>] in bad faith," knowing that it had procured its trademarks fraudulently, that it submitted "intentionally manipulated and modified evidence" to the neutral, and that it made "knowing and material misrepresentations" which ultimately prompted the transfer of the domain name. (FAC ¶¶ 46–58.) Based on these allegations, Virtualpoint seeks actual damages, statutory damages, and attorney's fees. (*Id.* ¶ 57–58.)

Count III is for cancellation of trademark registrations pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064 and 1119. Virtualpoint alleges that the Tribe made "knowingly false material representations" in the trademark applications it submitted to the PTO regarding whether "Wind Creek" has geographical significance, and that based on these misrepresentations,

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the Tribe's trademarks should be cancelled. (FAC  $\P\P$  59–61.) Counts IV and V are alleged against Defendant NAF only, and this motion does not pertain to them.

On April 14, 2016, the Tribe moved to dismiss Counts I, II, and III. It argues that it is entitled to tribal sovereign immunity, so the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Virtualpoint's claims against it, and that even if subject-matter jurisdiction existed, the Tribe is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this District.

III. DISCUSSION

1. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

## A. Legal Standard

"Tribal sovereign immunity protects Indian tribes from suit absent express authorization by Congress or clear waiver by the tribe." *Pistor v. Garcia*, 791 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting *Cook v. AVI Casino Enter.*, 548 F.3d 718, 725 (9th Cir. 2008). The issue of tribal sovereign immunity is "quasi jurisdictional," *Alto v. Black*, 738 F.3d 1111, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013), and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is the "proper vehicle for invoking sovereign immunity from suit," *Pistor*, 791 F.3d at 1111.

When a tribe moves to dismiss a suit on the ground of sovereign immunity, "the party asserting subject matter jurisdiction"—here, Virtualpoint—"has the burden of proving its existence, i.e. that immunity does not bar the suit." *Pistor*, 791 F.3d at 1111 (citing *Miller v. Wright*, 705 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2012)). Crucially, although tribes may expressly waive their sovereign immunity, there exists a "strong presumption against waiver of tribal sovereign immunity," *Demontiney v. U.S.*, 255 F.3d 801, 811 (9th Cir. 2001), and when a tribe does waive its immunity and consent to suit, "any conditional

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limitation it imposes on that consent" should be "strictly construed and applied," Missouri River Servs., Inc. v. Omaha Tribe of Nebraska, 267 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 2 2001). A tribe's waiver of sovereign immunity therefore may be limited, and a partial 3 waiver may not necessarily encompass matters that are related to the subject of the 4 waiver, "even if those matters arise from the same set of underlying facts." McClendon 5 v. U.S., 885 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1989). 6

#### A. Application

Virtualpoint does not dispute that the Tribe has sovereign immunity, but it argues that that immunity was waived when the Tribe agreed to participate in the UDRP proceedings. Virtualpoint cites to two UDRP documents as support for this position. The first, the UDRP Policy, provides that the administrative proceeding requirements described in the UDRP "shall not prevent" either the complainant or the respondent from "submitting the dispute to a court of competent jurisdiction for independent resolution." (UDRP Policy  $\P$  4(k).) And the second, the UDRP Rules, provides that the UDRP complainant-here, the Tribe-must "submit, with respect to any challenges to a decision in the administrative proceeding canceling or transferring the domain name, to the jurisdiction of the courts in at least one specified [jurisdiction]." (Smith Decl. Exh. 9 ["UDRP Rules"] ¶ 3(xii).) Neither party disputes that the Tribe, by initiating the URDP proceeding, agreed to be bound by these documents, and Viewpoint argues that these two provisions, operating in tandem, establish that the Tribe waived any sovereign immunity challenge to an "independent resolution" of the dispute between the two parties. The Tribe responds that the first provision,  $\P 4(k)$ , is not a waiver of immunity at all, and that the second provision,  $\P$  3(xii), is a limited waiver restricted to "challenges to a decision in the administrative proceeding," and that this action is not such a challenge.

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The Tribe is correct. UDRP Policy  $\P 4(k)$  simply states that the UDRP proceeding will not "prevent" the parties from initiating separate legal proceedings "in court[s] of competent jurisdiction." (UDRP Policy  $\P 4(k)$ .) The Tribe's acknowledgement of this provision is not a waiver of sovereign immunity, but a recognition that the UDRP proceedings are limited in scope and do not prevent parties from attempting to vindicate their rights in court. Indeed, the provision's prominent reference to courts *of competent jurisdiction* indicates that the purpose of the provision is not to force parties to waive jurisdictional challenges to future actions.

The Tribe is also correct that the second provision, UDRP Rules ¶ 3(xii), constitutes a limited waiver. By agreeing to arbitrate under this provision, the Tribe *did* consent to "submit . . . to the jurisdiction of the courts in at least one specified [jurisdiction]," but only "with respect to any *challenges to a decision in the administrative proceedings canceling or transferring the domain name*." UDRP Rules ¶ 3(xii) (emphasis added). The only relevant inquiry here, then, is whether this action can be properly considered to be a challenge to the neutral's decision to transfer the domain name to the Tribe.

The Tribe insists that it cannot. It points out that the *only* issue before the neutral arbitrator in the UDRP proceeding was whether the domain name should be transferred from Virtualpoint to the Tribe. This main issue was a function of three smaller subissues: (1) whether Virtualpoint's domain name is "identical or confusingly similar" to the Tribe's trademarks, (2) whether Virtualpoint has "rights or legitimate interests" in the domain, and (3) whether Virtualpoint registered or is using the domain name in bad faith. (Decision at 31.) The neutral explicitly refused to take up other issues, including whether the Tribe's trademarks should be cancelled. (*See* Decision at 35 (describing Virtualpoint's "attack on [the Tribe's] trademark on the basis of fraud and geographic descriptiveness" as being "well outside the scope of UDRP proceedings" and quoting a

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prior UDRP panel's description of the UDRP's "very limited and focused jurisdiction"). Accordingly, the Tribe says, any possible "challenge to [the] decision in the 2 administrative proceedings" could only possibly seek alternative resolutions of the 3 limited questions the UDRP neutral took up. Because each of Virtualpoint's causes of 4 action against the Tribe requires the Court to consider much broader questions, the Tribe 5 argues, this action is not a challenge to the UDRP proceeding and therefore the Tribe did 6 not waive its sovereign immunity to be sued here, on these counts. 7

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The Tribe does not devote significant effort to describing what a "challenge to [the] decision in the administrative proceedings" would actually look like. However, the Lanham Act explicitly provides for such challenges. "The Lanham Act permits UDRP Respondents to challenge a[n] adverse decision in court." Domain Vault LLC v. Bush, No. 14-cv-2621-WJM-CBS, 2015 WL 1598099, at \*2 (D. Colo. April 8, 2015). Specifically, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v) provides,

A domain name registrant whose domain name has been suspended, disabled, or transferred under a policy [such as the UDRP] may, upon notice to the mark owner, file a civil action to establish that the registration or use of the domain name by such registrant is not unlawful under this chapter. The court may grant injunctive relief to the domain name registrant, including the reactivation of the domain name or transfer of the domain name to the domain name registrant.

Additionally, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(iv) provides that if an authority like UDRP transfers a domain name

based on a knowing and material misrepresentation by any other person that a domain name is identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of a mark, the person making the knowing and material misrepresentation shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorney's fees, incurred by the domain name registrant as a result of such action. The court may also grant injunctive relief to the domain name registrant, including the reactivation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the domain name registrant.

Consistent with these statutory provisions, a number of district courts have entertained claims brought under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D) that have been aimed at reversing actions by UDRP panels. *See, e.g., Domain Vault,* 2015 WL 1598099, at \*2; *Barcelona.com, Incorporated v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona,* 330 F.3d 617, 622 (4th Cir. 2003) (describing § 1114(2)(D)(v) as "the provision of the [ACPA] that authorizes a domain name owner to seek recovery or restoration of its domain name when a trademark owner has overstepped its authority in causing the domain name to be suspended, disabled, or transferred"); *Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C.,* 347 F.3d 370, 379 (2d Cir. 2003).

Virtualpoint has not taken the usual statutory course in challenging the UDRP decision, since its FAC does not contain a cause of action for a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1114. The Court will therefore examine the causes of action that the FAC does include to see whether those causes of action seek substantially the same remedies as § 1114 and can therefore be construed as challenges to the UDRP proceeding or if, by contrast, they concern matters beyond the scope of the UDRP proceeding.

## 1. Count I

Count I of the FAC seeks

a declaration and judgment that [Virtualpoint] is not infringing [the Tribe's] trademark rights, that [Virtualpoint] is not violating unfair competition laws and/or the ACPA, that [Virtualpoint's] registration and use of [<windcreek.com>] is in good faith, that [Virtualpoint] has a legitimate interest in, and is the rightful owner of, [<windcreek.com>], and injunctive relief to retain ownership of [<windcreek.com>].

Some of this requested relief could be consistent with a challenge to the UDRP proceedings—for example, findings that Virtualpoint's domain name is not confusingly

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similar to the Tribe's marks, that Virtualpoint is operating the domain name in good faith,
and that ownership of the domain name should remain with Virtualpoint. But other parts
of this requested relief require examination of issues not before the arbitrator: whether
Virtualpoint is violating unfair competition laws, for example. The Tribe did not waive
its sovereign immunity to be sued over those issues. Accordingly, Count I seeks relief
beyond what the Tribe's waiver would permit.

#### 2. Count II

Count II is for a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), which provides that the owner of a mark may bring a civil action against any individual who has "a bad faith intent to profit from that mark" and who "registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name" that is, among other things, identical or confusingly similar to the mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A). Here again, adjudicating this claim would require the consideration of issues beyond the scope of the Tribe's waiver, including (1) whether Virtualpoint owns any marks, and (2) whether the Tribe is attempting to profit off those marks in bad faith. Accordingly, this claim too would infringe upon the sovereign immunity of the Tribe.<sup>4</sup>

## 3. Count III

Virtualpoint's third count is the clearest example of a claim that is not a "challenge[] to the decision in the administrative proceeding" at issue here. It seeks cancellation of the Tribe's trademark registrations, an issue the arbitrator explicitly refused to take up. (*See* Decision at 35.) The Tribe did not waive its sovereign immunity against challenges to its trademarks.

<sup>4</sup> Virtualpoint does not argue that the Lanham Act abrogates tribal sovereign immunity such that it could bring this claim against the Tribe in the normal course.

For the above reasons, each of the three claims alleged against the Tribe seeks to adjudicate issues that go beyond those considered by the neutral in the UDRP proceedings. Tribal sovereign immunity therefore bars this Court from considering any of those claims, and they are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Should Virtualpoint wish to allege an appropriate cause of action challenging the UDRP neutral's findings and decision to transfer the domain—either under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D) or by seeking corresponding declaratory relief—it may do so.

## **B.** Personal Jurisdiction

The Tribe also argues that Counts I–III should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. As the Court has dismissed those claims on subject-matter jurisdiction grounds, there is no need to take up the issue in detail. However, as Virtualpoint points out, the Tribe agreed to submit to jurisdiction *in the Central District* "with respect to any challenges to a decision in the administrative proceeding." (UDRP Complaint at 11 (identifying the Central District of California as "the court having jurisdiction" over challenges to the Decision).) As a result, should Virtualpoint adequately mount such a challenge, the Tribe will be bound by its agreement to be subject to jurisdiction in this District.

## C. Stay on UDRP Order Enforcement

Finally, the Tribe requests that this Court lift the stay that ICANN imposed upon enforcement of its order to transfer ownership of <windcreek.com> to the Tribe. The UDRP Policy imposes a ten-day waiting period in between a neutral's decision to transfer a domain and ICANN's enforcement of that decision. If the losing party before the neutral provides ICANN with "official documentation (such as a copy of a complaint, file-stamped by the clerk of the court) that [the losing party has] commenced a lawsuit

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against the complainant" challenging the administrative decision, then ICANN will stay 1 enforcement of the transfer or cancellation until the conclusion of the court proceedings. 2 (UDRP Policy  $\P$  4(k).) Here, Virtualpoint filed the Complaint and gave a copy to 3 ICANN within the ten-day waiting period, but did not timely serve the Tribe and 4 ultimately had to file its FAC and serve a new summons. The Tribe argues that the Court 5 should accordingly order ICANN to lift the stay and immediately enforce the transfer of 6 <windcreek.com>. However, as Virtualpoint points out, ICANN's procedure requires the 7 commencement of a lawsuit, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 specifies that a "civil 8 action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." Virtualpoint evidently filed 9 the complaint within the requisite time period and therefore met ICANN's procedural 10 requirements. The Tribe's request for an order lifting the stay is DENIED. 11

### **IV. CONCLUSION**

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For the foregoing reasons, the Tribe's motion to dismiss Counts I–III is GRANTED, and those causes of action are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Virtualpoint's filing an amended complaint which appropriately mounts a challenge to the underlying UDRP proceeding. Virtualpoint will have 21 days from the issuance of this Order to do so.

DATED: May 10, 2016

CORMAC J. CARNEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE