[Gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg] For review - updated templates Cat B, questions 1 and 2

Fri Feb 28 18:47:51 UTC 2014

Hi Volker,

Sure, happy to clarify, and also provide a few comments in response to
yours. I think re-verification actually does serve a purpose.

One of the questions before the group is whether "ICANN-accredited
privacy/proxy service providers (should) be required to conduct periodic
checks to ensure accuracy of customer contact information; and if so,
how?" There has been some argument that criminals always falsify their
Whois information, and therefore re-verification in general is pointless
because criminals would lie anyway. My first point is that that isn't true:
rather, it depends on the type of criminal activity in question. So, to the
extent that's being used as an argument against re-verification (or, for
that matter, against verification), it shouldn't be.

My second point is that there is value in re-verification or periodic
checks. Let me offer some thoughts on the value of re-verification at some
intervals.

   - First -- and certainly let me know if I'm wrong on this, since I think
   you helped negotiate the 2013 RAA and surely are more familiar with it than
   I am! -- I think it's fair to say that the Registrar's verification
   requirement as specified in the *Whois Accuracy Program Specification
   <http://www.icann.org/en/resources/registrars/raa/approved-with-specs-27jun13-en.htm#whois-accuracy>*doesn't
constitute comprehensive verification of all fields. That is, most
   of the verification requirements pertain to the format of the data, with
   additional verification that the email and telephone numbers are responsive
   correlated with the registrant. One of the questions before the group is
   whether P/P entities should engage in the same level of verification, or
   some different level. Reasonable minds can differ on this, but some members
   of this group have suggested an additional level of verification.
   - Second, addresses can change over time: people and businesses move,
   and they may forget to update their registration data. Re-verification
   serves to highlight cases where the contact information has changed and,
   even if not malicious, is no longer accurate. (So, although data can't
   become "more accurate" as you point out, it can certainly become "more
   inaccurate" over time.)
   - Third, I would also assume (as you do) that verification and
   re-verification will need to be heavily automated, and to the extent that
   external data sets (for example, here in the US, postal data) are used to
   help highlight -- for example -- non-existent addresses or inaccurate
   correlations, those external data sets are likely being improved or updated
   over time. So, if errors or inaccurate data aren't caught in the first
   round, re-verification may catch them simply due to the verification tools
   being improved, or the underlying data being updated, over time.
   - Fourth, in an ideal world, the verification process used by Registrars
   would catch 100% of inaccuracies, but that probably won't be the real-world
   result. Additional and periodic re-verification by P/P providers provides
   another layer of assurance.
   - Fifth, as to the problem of inaccurate correlations with real data
   (what you correctly refer to as "the data is accurate, but stolen") I would
   concur that this might present more of a challenge, but I don't think I'd
   agree that the inaccurate correlation wouldn't ever be uncovered, depending
   upon the verification algorithm and approach. We actually do look for this
   in our ongoing monitoring and have seen instances of inaccurate
   correlations but with real data.

I think that those are some arguments in favor of why re-verification by
the P/P provider has merit at periodic intervals. I think there's a
reasonable question of whether the Registrar's verification of the email
and phone number should be sufficient for those portions of the P/P service
provider's verification process within a limited time frame after the
Registrar's verification occurs. (Perhaps that eliminates some redundancy.)

John Horton
President, LegitScript

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On Fri, Feb 28, 2014 at 3:29 AM, Volker Greimann
<vgreimann at key-systems.net>wrote:

>  Hi John,
>
> I am having a bit of a hard time understanding your point here.
>
> You are describing three different cases here, two of which will not
> benefit from verification in the least bit and one might, but only in some
> cases:
>
> a) The data is accurate, but stolen: Here verification would not uncover
> any issues with the data as it is essentially correct and will most likely
> be identified as accurate.
> b) The data is false: Here, depending on the methods used, the inaccuracy
> may be uncovered and would lead to an automated request to provide updated
> data or deactivation after a set time. Remember, in order to keep providing
> services in a sensible manner, this needs to be automated in some form,
> i.e. no individual record would likely see any manual review.
> c) The data is already accurate: If the data is already correct, what
> purpose does verification fulfill?  The data cannot become more accurate.
> Verification in this case seems like an exercise in self-gratification.
>
> That said, even if there is a benefit to be derived from verification,
> such benefits are achieved once verification concludes. Re-verification of
> already verified data fulfills no purpose whatsoever. So if a set of data
> has already been verified by the registrar, there is no need for the p/p
> provider to again verify the same data. Only if no verification is or can
> be performed on the registrar level does verification by providers come
> into play.
>
> Volker
>
> Am 28.02.2014 00:32, schrieb John Horton:
>
>  Thanks, Marika. I also wanted to provide a comment pertaining to
> Question 2 in the attachments (relating to periodic checks).
>
>  In a few of the recent discussions, there's been some reference to
> criminals always or nearly always being untruthful in their Whois records
> (even if privacy-protected), leading to the conclusion that there is little
> purpose in having a registrar or any third party have to verify or
> re-verify the information (especially if it is difficult to prove that the
> data is falsified). I wanted to share our experience and observations on
> that point, in the hope that it's relevant to future discussion regarding
> Question 2.
>
>  Our consistent observation has been that when it comes to a particular
> sub-category of criminal activity, spam, phishing, malware, and so forth,
> it's probably safe to say that that statement is true -- the registrant's
> Whois information is nearly always inaccurate. Even in cases, such as some
> where we've worked with law enforcement, when the Whois record for a domain
> name involved in spam, phishing or malware is privacy-protected and is
> subsequently unmasked, the Whois record is still not accurate behind the
> privacy curtain. There are probably exceptions, but that's what we've seen
> well over 95% of the time. On occasion, it's a real address and phone
> number, just not one genuinely connected to the registrant.
>
>  But there are other types of criminal activity where the Whois record is
> not so regularly obfuscated. For example, we investigate a lot of websites
> selling tainted dietary supplements that end up containing some toxin or
> adulterant that harms people. In those cases, we've overwhelmingly seen
> that even if the Whois record is privacy-protected, the trend is that the
> underlying Whois record is accurate. The same has been true for illegal or
> counterfeit medical device websites that we've researched. On illegal
> Internet pharmacies not engaged in spam, it's probably 50-50. (It might be
> a shell corporation, but that's still valuable information.)
>
>  One important point to consider is that the Whois registration can be
> relevant information from a banking perspective for commercial entities.
> That is, some banks are going to look at an online merchant's domain name
> registration record and if it's either inaccurate or protected, they may
> require disclosure, or ask about any discrepancy, which can be an incentive
> for criminals selling products online who nevertheless want to get paid via
> credit card to have an accurate Whois. Hackers, malware providers and
> spammers will find a way around that, but they don't necessarily constitute
> "most" criminal activity.
>
>  The point here is, I think verification can still be a useful and
> necessary tool in either scenario, even if it doesn't uncover useful
> information a portion of the time. I realize that only pertains to a
> portion of the issues related to Question 2, but I hope that our
> observations on that are relevant.
>
>  Thanks,
>
>  John Horton
> President, LegitScript
>
>
>
>  *Follow LegitScript*: LinkedIn<http://www.linkedin.com/company/legitscript-com>
> |  Facebook <https://www.facebook.com/LegitScript>  |  Twitter<https://twitter.com/legitscript>
> |  YouTube <https://www.youtube.com/user/LegitScript>  |  *Blog
> <http://blog.legitscript.com>*  |  Google+<https://plus.google.com/112436813474708014933/posts>
>
>
> On Wed, Feb 26, 2014 at 2:39 AM, Marika Konings <marika.konings at icann.org>wrote:
>
>>  Dear All,
>>
>>  Following our call yesterday, please find attached the updated
>> templates for Category B - questions 1 & 2. Please review these templates
>> to make sure the WG discussions have been accurately reflected and feel
>> free to share any comments / edits you may have with the mailing list.
>> We've created a page on the wiki where we'll post the templates that have
>> been finalised for now (noting that for some of these the WG will need to
>> come back to the template at a later date), see
>> https://community.icann.org/x/ihLRAg.
>>
>>  The WG will continue its deliberations on Category B - Question 2 next
>> week. Some of the questions that came up during the conversation yesterday
>> and which you are encouraged to share your views on (and/or add additional
>> questions that need to be considered in this context) are:
>>
>>    - What would be the arguments for not using the same standards /
>>    requirements for validation and verification as per the 2013 RAA?
>>    - Should there be a requirement for re-verification, and if so, what
>>    instances would trigger such re-verification?
>>    - In case of affliction between the P/P service and the registrar, if
>>    the registration information has already been verified by the registrar,
>>    should this exempt the P/P provider from doing so?
>>    - Should the same requirements apply to privacy and proxy services or
>>    is there a reason to distinguish between the two?
>>
>> Best regards,
>>
>>  Marika
>>
>> _______________________________________________
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>
>
>
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> Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
>
> Volker A. Greimann
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>
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