[Gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg] LE/Ops Sec community input- section 3.18 2013 RAA

[Marika Konings]

Hi Kathy,

Comment #1 was sent by Terri Stumme of the DEA. Comment #2 was sent by
Daniel Burke of the FDA. I've suggested to my colleagues in the SSR team
that they share the information about the PPSAI F2F meeting in London with
their LE/Ops Sec contacts so that if some of the representatives are
available they could join the discussions there.

Best regards,

Marika

From:  Kathy Kleiman <kathy at kathykleiman.com>
Date:  Friday 13 June 2014 14:22
To:  "gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg at icann.org" <gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg at icann.org>
Subject:  Re: [Gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg] LE/Ops Sec community input- section 3.18
2013 RAA

Tx Marika, but are there any names associated with these comments - people
we can reach out to explore their ideas and comments further?
Best,
Kathy
:
> Hereby please find two additional comments that were received in relation to
> this topic from law enforcement:
> 
> 1. Privacy/proxy service providers should absolutely be held to the same
> standards and requirements placed on Registrars in Section 3.18.1 and 3.18.2 .
> Privacy/Proxy services attract those individuals who utilize the Internet to
> conduct criminal activity; therefore, it is imperative that these P/P entities
> are accredited and held to the same standards to that of Registrars, and that
> ICANN have mechanisms in place to enforce action expeditiously when required.
> 
> 2. Proxy/privacy providers should absolutely be bound by a similar provision
> to RAA 3.18.  The simple answer is in my experience, criminal activity on the
> internet is flourishing because of the ability to be anonymous.  Although
> there are very legitimate uses for such services, they absolutely attract and
> cater to criminal conduct on all fronts, not just illegal online drug
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> Marika
> 
> From: Marika Konings <marika.konings at icann.org>
> Date: Monday 9 June 2014 20:32
> To: "gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg at icann.org" <gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg at icann.org>
> Subject: [Gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg] LE/Ops Sec community input- section 3.18 2013 RAA
> 
> Dear All,
> 
> As requested a couple of meetings ago, please find below some feedback
> received from our Security Stability Resiliency Team colleagues from the
> LE/Ops Sec community in relation to section 3.18 of the 2013 RAA which is
> being reviewed by the WG in the context of question D-2.
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> Marika
> 
> ____________________________
> 
> For domains that are tied to malware or tied directly to brand mis-use
> associated with malicious or criminal activity, almost all registrars have no
> problem suspending the domains via Section 3.18 of the 2013 RAA. LE agencies
> have difficulty only with a handful of registrars.
> 
> There are cases in which some registrars provide a standard response back to
> the agencies to the effect that they should contact the hosting provider since
> the registrar does "not have the ability to oversee what data are being
> transmitted through its site". If the hosting provider stops providing its
> services, the criminals can simply move to a new hosting provider. Suspending
> the domain itself has value for the LE agencies for several reasons, not least
> of which some providers unmask the private Whois information when the domain
> is suspended.
> 
> Agencies encounter p/p domains used for malicious or criminal activity in
> ranges that go from small batches (i.e., associated with scams where
> fraudsters target hundreds or thousands of investors or phishing victims and
> generate millions in losses, however only a few domains are created) to large
> numbers where thousands of users are victimized in several countries. Making
> the privacy/proxy services accountable with a provision similar to 3.18 of the
> 2013 RAA would add another layer of protection to help contain and mitigate
> the harm caused to consumers on a global scale. It¹s a consumer protection
> issue, however any such new obligation to make p/p providers accountable with
> regards to abuse and reports of abuse, should not, in any way whatsoever,
> dilute contractually or in practice the registrars¹ obligations as they are
> currently provided by 3.18.
> 
> If an agency presents to a registrar or p/p provider evidence that there is
> criminal or malicious activity that is harming users or has the potential to
> harm users (such as spamming, spreading malware or distributing child abuse
> material), the registrar or p/p provider should suspend that domain and unmask
> the Whois. The agencies are not requesting subscriber information. The
> agencies are reporting abuse of the DNS that implies violations of the
> registration agreement between the registrars and the registrants, and that
> also imply violations of the agreement between the p/p providers and their
> customers (including all cases of criminal and malicious activity as well as
> those cases in which the LE agencies¹ own brands are used by criminals in
> association with criminal or malicious activity).
> 
> The burden should not be higher on the agencies than it was on the registrant
> to register the domain (e.g., obtaining a court order to have a domain
> suspended).  Since the victims are located in several different countries, it
> is *very* difficult to obtain any kind of legal process to effect takedown.
> Both registrars and p/p providers must have adequate provisions in their
> agreements with their customers that allow them to take action - on a
> contractual basis - and suspend domain names when there is malicious or
> criminal activity.
> 
> Additionally, for those cases in which registrars and p/p providers can verify
> the evidence provided by the LE agencies that there is indeed criminal or
> malicious activity involving domain names that they sponsor, there should be
> no territorial restrictions for LE agencies to submit reports to them,
> regardless of whether they are in the same or in a different country as the
> registrar or p/p provider. In these cases, registrars and p/p providers should
> simply enforce their own agreements with their registrants/customers and
> suspend the domain names accordingly and unmask the Whois information.
> 
> 
> 
>  
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