[Gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg] LE/Ops Sec community input- section 3.18 2013 RAA

Volker Greimann vgreimann at key-systems.net
Mon Jun 16 13:34:57 UTC 2014


Die Kristina,

I find it hard to rely on the GAC on such matters, especially given the 
experience with the RAA negotiations where many GAC members neglected to 
check witth their local data protection officers about the suggestions 
of the LEAs. Having talked with a number of GAC members it seemed they 
simply did not have the time to check with all institutions and branches 
in time.

I therefore support any direct outreach.

Best,

Volker



Am 16.06.2014 15:31, schrieb Rosette, Kristina:
>
> If I remember correctly the last time this type of request/interest 
> came up, the GAC made it clear that any such outreach should come 
> through them.  Perhaps best to direct the request to the GAC.
>
> *From:*gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org 
> [mailto:gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Kathy Kleiman
> *Sent:* Monday, June 16, 2014 7:49 AM
> *To:* Marika Konings; gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg at icann.org
> *Subject:* Re: [Gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg] LE/Ops Sec community input- section 
> 3.18 2013 RAA
>
> Great, tx you Marika. Appreciate the information.  Quick question, in 
> addition to the outreach to LE, have you reached out to data 
> protection commissioners and their staffs, particularly in the UK as 
> they will be right there in London. As the Whois Review Team 
> recommended, we should reach out to all sides!
> Best and tx,
> Katy
>
> :
>
>     Hi Kathy,
>
>     Comment #1 was sent by Terri Stumme of the DEA. Comment #2 was
>     sent by Daniel Burke of the FDA. I've suggested to my colleagues
>     in the SSR team that they share the information about the PPSAI
>     F2F meeting in London with their LE/Ops Sec contacts so that if
>     some of the representatives are available they could join the
>     discussions there.
>
>     Best regards,
>
>     Marika
>
>     *From: *Kathy Kleiman <kathy at kathykleiman.com
>     <mailto:kathy at kathykleiman.com>>
>     *Date: *Friday 13 June 2014 14:22
>     *To: *"gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg at icann.org
>     <mailto:gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg at icann.org>" <gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg at icann.org
>     <mailto:gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg at icann.org>>
>     *Subject: *Re: [Gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg] LE/Ops Sec community input-
>     section 3.18 2013 RAA
>
>     Tx Marika, but are there any names associated with these comments
>     - people we can reach out to explore their ideas and comments further?
>     Best,
>     Kathy
>     :
>
>         Hereby please find two additional comments that were received
>         in relation to this topic from law enforcement:
>
>         1. Privacy/proxy service providers should absolutely be held
>         to the same standards and requirements placed on Registrars in
>         Section 3.18.1 and 3.18.2 . Privacy/Proxy services attract
>         those individuals who utilize the Internet to conduct criminal
>         activity; therefore, it is imperative that these P/P entities
>         are accredited and held to the same standards to that of
>         Registrars, and that ICANN have mechanisms in place to enforce
>         action expeditiously when required.
>
>         2. Proxy/privacy providers should absolutely be bound by a
>         similar provision to RAA 3.18.  The simple answer is in my
>         experience, criminal activity on the internet is flourishing
>         because of the ability to be anonymous.  Although there are
>         very legitimate uses for such services, they absolutely
>         attract and cater to criminal conduct on all fronts, not just
>         illegal online drug
>
>         Best regards,
>
>         Marika
>
>         *From: *Marika Konings <marika.konings at icann.org
>         <mailto:marika.konings at icann.org>>
>         *Date: *Monday 9 June 2014 20:32
>         *To: *"gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg at icann.org
>         <mailto:gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg at icann.org>"
>         <gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg at icann.org <mailto:gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg at icann.org>>
>         *Subject: *[Gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg] LE/Ops Sec community input-
>         section 3.18 2013 RAA
>
>         Dear All,
>
>         As requested a couple of meetings ago, please find below some
>         feedback received from our Security Stability Resiliency
>         Team colleagues from the LE/Ops Sec community in relation to
>         section 3.18 of the 2013 RAA which is being reviewed by the WG
>         in the context of question D-2.
>
>         Best regards,
>
>         Marika
>
>         ____________________________
>
>         For domains that are tied to malware or tied directly to brand
>         mis-use associated with malicious or criminal activity, almost
>         all registrars have no problem suspending the domains via
>         Section 3.18 of the 2013 RAA. LE agencies have difficulty only
>         with a handful of registrars.
>
>         There are cases in which some registrars provide a standard
>         response back to the agencies to the effect that they should
>         contact the hosting provider since the registrar does "not
>         have the ability to oversee what data are being transmitted
>         through its site". If the hosting provider stops providing its
>         services, the criminals can simply move to a new hosting
>         provider. Suspending the domain itself has value for the LE
>         agencies for several reasons, not least of which some
>         providers unmask the private Whois information when the domain
>         is suspended.
>
>         Agencies encounter p/p domains used for malicious or criminal
>         activity in ranges that go from small batches (i.e.,
>         associated with scams where fraudsters target hundreds or
>         thousands of investors or phishing victims and generate
>         millions in losses, however only a few domains are created) to
>         large numbers where thousands of users are victimized in
>         several countries. Making the privacy/proxy services
>         accountable with a provision similar to 3.18 of the 2013 RAA
>         would add another layer of protection to help contain and
>         mitigate the harm caused to consumers on a global scale. It's
>         a consumer protection issue, however any such new obligation
>         to make p/p providers accountable with regards to abuse and
>         reports of abuse, should not, in any way whatsoever, dilute
>         contractually or in practice the registrars' obligations as
>         they are currently provided by 3.18.
>
>         If an agency presents to a registrar or p/p provider evidence
>         that there is criminal or malicious activity that is harming
>         users or has the potential to harm users (such as spamming,
>         spreading malware or distributing child abuse material), the
>         registrar or p/p provider should suspend that domain and
>         unmask the Whois. The agencies are not requesting subscriber
>         information. The agencies are reporting abuse of the DNS that
>         implies violations of the registration agreement between the
>         registrars and the registrants, and that also imply violations
>         of the agreement between the p/p providers and their customers
>         (including all cases of criminal and malicious activity as
>         well as those cases in which the LE agencies' own brands are
>         used by criminals in association with criminal or malicious
>         activity).
>
>         The burden should not be higher on the agencies than it was on
>         the registrant to register the domain (e.g., obtaining a court
>         order to have a domain suspended).  Since the victims are
>         located in several different countries, it is *very* difficult
>         to obtain any kind of legal process to effect takedown. Both
>         registrars and p/p providers must have adequate provisions in
>         their agreements with their customers that allow them to take
>         action - on a contractual basis - and suspend domain names
>         when there is malicious or criminal activity.
>
>         Additionally, for those cases in which registrars and p/p
>         providers can verify the evidence provided by the LE agencies
>         that there is indeed criminal or malicious activity involving
>         domain names that they sponsor, there should be no territorial
>         restrictions for LE agencies to submit reports to them,
>         regardless of whether they are in the same or in a different
>         country as the registrar or p/p provider. In these cases,
>         registrars and p/p providers should simply enforce their own
>         agreements with their registrants/customers and suspend the
>         domain names accordingly and unmask the Whois information.
>
>
>
>
>         _______________________________________________
>
>         Gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg mailing list
>
>         Gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg at icann.org  <mailto:Gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg at icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg
>
>
>
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-- 
Bei weiteren Fragen stehen wir Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen,

Volker A. Greimann
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